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Moiseyev Urges 'New System' in European Balance

LD2302182290 Moscow TASS in English 1727 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 23 TASS—Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces Army General Mikhail Moiseyev, said that "A real chance has appeared for the gradual removal of the outdated model of the European balance of forces for the first time in the post-war period".

"This model developed during the 'cold war' years and was based on military confrontation."

Speaking today at a reception on the occasion of the 72nd anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Armed Forces, Moiseyev stresed that "A new system of relations should be established" in place of this outdated model. "This system will ensure stability and security in Europe."

"By agreement with the Warsaw Treaty countries, the Soviet Union is ready to withdraw or cut our troops stationed beyond Soviet territory."

According to the general, the USSR is now unilaterally cutting Soviet armed forces. It limits strike systems of weapons and has cut the number of military exercises.

In a search for universal security, one should proceed not from a balance of forces but from a balance of interests, he believes. New thinking has considerably increased possibilities for guaranteeing the country's security through political means.

"But, until the world is militarised and fraught with armed conflicts, we need reliable defences," Moiseyev said.

The reception was attended by marshals of the Soviet Union, marshals of arms and services, generals and admirals, military, naval and air-force attaches accredited to foreign embassies in the USSR.

Further on Confidence, Security Measures Talks

Military Doctrines Seminar Held

LD2202222290 Moscow TASS in English 2200 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] Vienna February 23 TASS—The fifth session of the negotiations on confidence and security building measures in Europe is coming to an end in Austria's capital today.

The aim of the session was to elaborate a comprehensive package of confidence building measures that would include notification and observation of military activity, restrictions, exchange of information and control and a number of other provisions.

The session was marked with an important event: a seminar on military doctrines, attended by representatives of high-ranking military leaders of European states, the United States and Canada, was held on the initiative of the Warsaw Treaty states in its framework. It was an important measure of building up confidence and predictability of military activity.

The session illustrated that concord is taking shape at the negotiations, specifically in the area of development of military contacts.

The participants in the session became more clearly aware that such contacts should broaden. Of indisputable interest was the Dutch delegation's proposal that experts of 35 countries, participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, should hold annual meetings on confidence-building measures.

The proposal echoes with the Soviet proposal about consultations.

But on a number of problems positions of the participants largely differ, as before. The question of naval forces and confidence measures affecting activities of states in seas and oceans has not yet found its solution.

Speeding Up Vienna Talks Urged

LD2302091990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1334 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Excerpts] Vienna, 22 Feb (TASS)—Correspondent Vladimir Smelov reports: Richness and intensity marked the course of the fifth round of talks on conventional armed forces in Europe which concluded today. Representatives of 23 Warsaw Pact and NATO states are taking part in the talks. [passage omitted summarizing proceedings]

We think, O.A. Grinevskiy, head of the Soviet delegation, and roving ambassador, said in a conversation with a TASS correspondent, that the pace of the talks was far from being compatible with the tasks and timescales set by the supreme leadership of the participant countries in the forum. Not all is well with the work on the future treaty. For the time being we have practically managed to adopt only two articles on a preliminary basis and to start discussing two others. Supposedly, there will be over 20 of them. The preamble and other parts of the future document are awaiting their turn, while an unjustifiably long time is being spent on settling, for instance, organizational and procedural questions. It seems that the time has come for changing qualitatively the process of the work over the treaty and in any case to considerably accelerate its pace. As for the energy some Western partners are spending on defending their words in unchanged form, one could really spend it more usefully on finding compromise solutions. Maximum mobilization of our mutual efforts at the talks and mutual constructiveness are needed, of course while taking into proper account the interests of each other's security, O.A. Grinevskiy stressed. [passage omitted]

Future Agreements Being Drafted

LD2302200890 Moscow TASS in English 1545 GMT 23 Feb 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna February 23 TASS—The fifth session of negotiations on confidence-building measures and security in Europe, which ended here today, has reviewed the stands of its participants and started drafting future agreements. Unofficial work has begun in groups coordinated by representatives of Austria, Sweden, Switzerland and Finland.

The session has shown that the sides are apparently nearing agreement, particularly on the promotion of military contacts. Parties involved believe such contacts must be exapanded. The Dutch delegation suggested holding annual meetings of experts from 35 CSCE countries on confidence-building measures. This idea is similar to the Soviet proposal to hold regular consultations.

The session was marked by an important event: A seminar on military doctrines with the participation of representatives of top military leaderships in Europe, the United States and Canada. It was an important landmark in strengthening confidence and military predictability.

As the deadlines for an all-European summit become clearer, the sides are beginning to realise the need to step up negotiations and to exert efforts to put into play the accumulated understandings and to seek compromises on unresolved problems. It is primarily necessary to elaborate a comprehensive set of confidence-building measures, including measures for reducing and monitoring military activities, exchanging information and verification results, etc. Of course, all this must cover ground troops, navies and air forces.

Grinevskiy Cited on Talks Status

PM2502144190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Feb 90 Second Edition p 7

[Own correspondent I. Melnikov dispatch: "Five Rounds Behind Us. At Vienna Talks on Conventional Forces in Europe"]

[Text] Vienna, 22 Feb—The fifth round of the talks on conventional forces in Europe ended here today. Local observers are unanimous that the round was unusual.

Moscow's and Washington's joint efforts provided a breakthrough on the question of cutting the number of Soviet and U.S. armed forces stationed outside their national territories in Europe. The Italian, French, and FRG foreign ministers, who presented in developed form their vision of the present stage and future of the Vienna talks and the future structures of security and disarmament on the continent, also made an appreciable contribution. There was an intensive search for mutually acceptable solutions and specific formulas. The sides took a number of appreciable steps to meet each other halfway, increasing the degree of mutual understanding.

In a conversation with the PRAVDA correspondent O. Grinevskiy, special envoy and head of the Soviet delegation, above all singled out the accord reached on ceilings for the number of troops: The United States and the Soviet Union will not have more than 195,000 men each in ground and air forces on foreign territory in central Europe. Moreover, the United States pledged not to station more than 30,000 servicemen outside central Europe.

This by no means exhausts our opportunities, the Soviet spokesman noted. Our country is in favor of all foreign troops being withdrawn from foreign territories in Europe by 1995-1996, and all military bases in foreign territories being eliminated by the year 2000.

The question of aviation remains a complex problem, the Soviet diplomat thinks. Here, as before, there are still serious discrepancies in the sides' positions, although some shifts have taken place.

The head of the Soviet delegation thinks that work has progressed quite well on questions of exchanging information and verification. But the working out of a text for a future treaty by a special group is still not very productive. All the same, he concluded, I am convinced that all the conditions exist for serious, intensive work to agree this text. The final goal of the talks is not so far away.

Commentary Urges Arms Reduction Agreement

LD2502112190 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Weekly commentary by Valentin Zorin]

[Text] The head of the American Chiefs of Staffs Committee, General Colin Powell, declared in Washington recently that the Soviet military threat has diminished and could now be regarded as the smallest of the past few decades. We must admit that this opinion prevails in the West today. In fact this is a political reality of our time. Noone of the responsible leaders in any of the Western countries will undertake to repeat today the former assertions about a threat coming from the Soviet Union. Yet in the same statement General Powell did that, only in a slightly changed form. He said that despite the announced cuts and the changed military doctrine, the Soviet Union still has the powerful strategic nuclear force in its possession and is in a position to threaten the interests of the United States and its allies all over the world.

We here in the Soviet Union could say absolutely the same about the United States. This is the country that has a powerful strategic force in its possession, threatening the Soviet Union's national security. And what will come next? What will happen if each of the sides will keep repeating allegations of the kind the American general has made? Such a policy may push us once again to a vicious circle, with each side thinking about the buildup of its own military might, including the nuclear arsenal. Incidentally, as far as the American side is concerned, some of its actions in this respect cannot help but put us on the look-out. The development of the most expensive military aircraft of the Stealth class is a case in point.

What should be the Soviet Union's attitude to this strategic invisible bomber, this first strike capability weapon? It is neither a defensive weapon nor a means designed to help retain the existing balance of forces. The newspaper NEW YORK TIMES obviously had in mind the increase in the spending on this bomber and on other strategic weapons programs when it wrote recently that in its new budget submitted to the Congress the White House demonstrates its readiness to go ahead with nuclear arms buildup.

Is there any way out of this vicious circle? Senator Sam Nunn has pointed out in reference to the development of new weapons in the United States that the Americans must ask themselves if they need these weapons at all. I understand what the senator means, for I discussed this subject with him in Washington recently. He believes that one can and must have confidence in the policy pursued by the Soviet Union.

Indeed what we need today is not to whip up an atmosphere of mutual fear but to sign arms reduction agreements and to show trust in each other. And you cannot sit between the two stools here, sign agreements providing for weapons reductions and design more sophisticated kinds of weapons at the same time. It's time to give up a dual approach to the halting of the arms race and make a clearcut choice.

Press Agency Chiefs Confer in Budapest

PM2702100990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent F. Lukyanov dispatch: "In Favor of Objective and Full Information"]

[Text] Budapest—Leaders of Eastern and central European press agencies have held a meeting in the Hungarian capital, involving representatives of ADN (GDR), BTA (Bulgaria), MTI (Hungary), PAP (Poland), ROMPRES (Romania), CTK (Czechoslovakia), and TASS (USSR).

The joint communique published at the close of the meeting's work indicates that its participants exchanged information on the great changes which have taken place in their countries over the last few months and the agencies' work in the new conditions. Eastern and central European countries' agencies, the communique stresses, have decided to continue their cooperation in the future, too, and to make efforts to promote the constant broadening of knowledge and understanding of life in their states in an endeavor to circulate all forms of information more freely and extensively and improve journalists' working conditions.

At the close of the meeting in Budapest, IZVESTIYA's correspondent asked A. Krasikov, deputy general director of TASS, who represented the Soviet agency at the talks, to assess the meeting:

"It must be pointed out that on this occasion the meeting was initiated by Hungary's MTI, which proposed that the leading information centers in the countries which have rejected the authoritarian system compare the experience amassed in the first weeks and months of political pluralism," Krasikov said. "The meeting was also of particular interest for the press agencies themselves since new people have entered their leadership of late.

"Some people obviously expected acute disputes to flare up at the meeting and expected this to threaten the traditionally good relations between the main purveyors of news for newspapers, radio, and television. However, nothing of the kind happened. All the debate participants without exception stated the following: What unites them is far more important than what divides them. Above all, the need to cover perestroyka processes in each of our countries as fully and objectively as possible...."

One cannot fail to subscribe to the following conclusion, which was reached unanimously at the meeting in Budapest: Unlike newspapers, press agencies cannot become the mouthpiece of a particular current. It is their duty to serve the entire press and all society and supply them with accurate and proven information and, when setting out various assessments of events, attribute them to a precise source.

Ligachev Interviewed on Republic Rights, Germany

PM1602025790

[Editorial Report] London BBC Television Network in English at 2230 GMT on 15 February on BBC Two's "Newsnight" program, carries an "exclusive" interview with Yegor Ligachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Central Committee secretary, by Jonathon Dimbleby in Moscow "earlier this week"; the interview is recorded in Russian with English subtitles and is presented in three segments.

"Newsnight" presenter Peter Snow introduces the interview: "When Mr. Gorbachev became party leader in 1985, Mr. Ligachev was in charge of ideology and effectively the Soviet Union's No. 2. He said he favored perestroyka, but as reforms gathered pace, he became increasingly uneasy, and it was no surprise when he was demoted to the thankless task of running agriculture two years ago. Since then, he's provided a focus for all those who feel change is moving too fast. Mr. Ligachev spoke to us earlier this week—before today's further major break with tradition when the Soviet parliament was presented with a draft law which went much further than before to legalize the concept of private property."

Snow continues: "First, the economy. Mr. Ligachev told the BBC's Jonathan Dimbleby about his attitude to private ownership."

Ligachev says: "If hired labor is excluded, I'm in favor of any form of property—if it excludes the appropriations of someone else's labor in a private property context.

Dimbleby asks: "If it becomes a system in which there is hired labor, will you be washing your hands of the party?

Ligachev answers: "If the party puts forward that point of view, I won't agree: It's a matter of principle. I shall fight to try to convince people, try to prove to them that this is a matter of principle. It's a question of the form of production; it's a question of our way of life: That's what I shall do.

Dimbleby asks: "And this is a big fundamental question which is going to be the source of a big political battle?

Ligachev answers: "Yes, quite right.

Dimbleby asks: "And if you lose?

Ligachev answers: "Then I shall try to prove my point outside the party, if that is necessary. But that's also a hypothetical question.

Dimbleby says: "You have declared you are opposed deeply to those who drift towards capitalism—whether it's private property in the narrow sense or in the broad sense: You are opposed to the free market. Do you recognize now that even within the party—certainly within the party—there are many people who believe that that route, that road is now inevitable?

Ligachev answers: "But I stand for what's called the planned-market economy—a combination of the plan and the market: That's my point of view, and the party's. I never, ever ruled out goods-money relations, market relations. Besides, it's not today: We went over to market relations decades ago, but they weren't very developed or widespread, so I'm against going over entirely to free market relations and ditching the plan. And I'm also against abandoning all market levers and stimuli and relying only on the plan. I'm for combining the one with the other. The plan should determine a strategy and market relations and should resolve questions related to supply and demand."

Peter Snow introduces the next segment: "On the other particularly dangerous issue of the Soviet leadership, the problems of the outlying Soviet republics, Mr. Ligachev was apparently foursquare behind Mr. Gorbachev: Any republic has the right to secede, he said, in certain conditions. But in coping with the unrest among the nationalities in places like Transcaucasia, he sees the Communist Party as the only force that can exert control."

"In my view," Ligachev states, "we don't possess any other political force, which at the end of the day can cope with this extremely complex situation, which has arisen. For example, in the Caucasus there is only one political force, and that is the party—the Communist Party. Moreover, I think—though perhaps you won't agree with me—that in the present conditions, it is very important that it should be the only party. In the present conditions, with other political organizations being formed, I think they will make it even more complex. The fact of the matter is.... The tragedy is that it's not the leaders who suffer, it is the people who suffer: ordinary, simple people. People no longer have any certainty about tomorrow, certainty about themselves, about their families, their friends. I want to say frankly—and you'll probably agree with me—that we, the Soviet people, have always been proud that our society is stable, that we have no anxieties about tomorrow, that we are not afraid, that we have a low crime rate, that we can travel. Unfortunately, we are now losing this feeling—in particular, the ethnic republics. We get a lot of letters which demand protection from the ringleaders."

Dimbley says: "If the republics say: We do want to go, we do want to leave the Soviet Union, are you capable of accepting that or not?"

Ligachev answers: "Yes, it can, if certain conditions are fulfilled. Just now, at the session of the Supreme Soviet, we are submitting a draft law concerning the conditions in which a republic may exercise its right to secede. If those conditions are fulfilled, then naturally, any republic has the right of secession from the Soviet Union. That is my firm view. As for the conditions, let's wait a little: It's just a draft law. It'll be discussed, moreover, with the deputies from all the republics taking part. It may even take the form of a national referendum.

Dimbley asks: "And do you want those conditions to be of a kind that in theory they could be fulfilled?"

Ligachev answers: "I think so."

"On Germany," Peter Snow says, "Mr. Ligachev openly talked of the deep sense of unease that all Russians feel about a new united Germany. So did he feel that in allowing the two Germanies to decide their own future, Mr Gorbachev was being too soft on the German question?"

Ligachev shakes his head: "No, that's my point of view, too. I'm far from believing that one should deprive any nation of the right to behave as it thinks necessary, and you've noticed that despite all the complexities of the situation in East Europe, we, the leaders of the Soviet Union, our nation has not shown a hint of violence. And we adhere firmly to the belief that every nation has the right of social choice: consequently, the right of the German people to arrange their lives as they think fit, including their having a single state. But I think, in my opinion, we are not talking about reunification so much as East Germany being swallowed up by West Germany. That's the first thing.

"The second thing, all of us Russians—and I think this goes for the British, too, who suffered during the war—are very well aware that it was from that land, that German land, that the two world wars came from. And who better than we British and Soviet people to know the grief and suffering this caused? So how can Ligachev be indifferent to, and unconcerned about, this process? I'm not talking about forbidding this process—that would be irrational and wrong: It would be arrogant. What I am talking about is drawing the attention of my nation and the party and more than that—all the democratic nations so that the German question is resolved in such a way that never again should there be a threat of world war from Germany. And this needs to be resolved collectively and fundamentally so that there shouldn't be a Munich, no claims to Silesia or the Sudetenland or many other places. I think you and I do have grounds for apprehension."

Dimbleby asks: "There will be some people who say: Mr. Ligachev, you have been a powerful figure in the Communist Party for a long time in the Soviet Union. How do we know that you are speaking with sincerity and that deep down you don't want to go back to the past that many Russian people—and certainly people in the West—found abhorrent?"

Ligachev answers: "I've always kept to the path of ridding ourselves of everything authoritarian, everything bureaucratic, adopting democratic methods. I've always had the greatest respect for human beings in general—workers, peasants, intellectuals—because I realize, not from books but from life, the strength of these ordinary, simple people and did everything I could to make their lives better and richer, both materially and spiritually. So let us judge politicians not on what they say—because Mr. Yeltsin says a great deal, but it amounts to very little."

Following the interview, Snow talks with Dimbleby in the studio about his impressions of Ligachev. Dimbleby says: "I think he speaks with great passion—he's a forceful character. I had expected a much colder man, a more calculating man. He was, in fact, rather warm, ebullient—he bounced into the room. He's got that overworked term: He's got quite a lot of charisma. He has it in the same way that Yeltsin can hold a crowd—he can hold a crowd."

Solton Comments on German Reunification Concerns

LD2102163990 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] A major issue in world politics today is that of Germany's reunification. It also bothers the Soviet people who will celebrate the 45th anniversary of the victory over Hitler's Nazism soon. Answering their questions, Mikhail Gorbachev outlined the official position on this score to the daily PRAVDA. A commentary by Yuriy Solton, and this is what he writes:

The Soviet Union realizes that dramatic changes have taken place in both Germanys over 45 years. A new generation that has grown up envisions the role of a unified country as a peaceful state. But we keep the memory of the past war, and of the toll of more than 20 million lives it took. No wonder the Soviet people are anxious, whether the situation in Europe will change if the Germanys unify. (?Would) the threat of war grow? (?All the more so) many Western politicians seek a reunified Germany nowhere but within NATO. Revenge-seekers show signs of activity in West Germany and the German Democratic Republic alike.

Naturally the process of reunification, its terms and forms, are the Germans' internal affair. As Mikhail Gorbachev reemphasized, no one was going to create obstacles for them. But at the same time this country, and hopefully its big four anti-Hitler coalition partners, are not going to forgo their commitments. No one but they themselves can decline the responsibility for seeing to it that war would never start on German soil.

Nor a peace treaty with Germany has been signed. [sentence as heard] It's only such a treaty that can determine Germany's international and legal status in the European structure. The process of Germany's unification should be organically linked to and synchronized with the European process. The creation of a principally new security structure in Europe, a structure that is to replace the alliances; such is the official Soviet stand. It is irresponsible to speak about the membership of a unified Germany in NATO as a virtually settled matter. For a long time, however, security in Europe has been maintained by the existence of the two military and political alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. Changes with more stress on the bloc's political activity are just being planned, and a reunified Germany's membership in NATO would lead to tipping off the strategic balance and would compel the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Treaty partners to adopt countermeasures.

There must be complete clarity in this respect. To expect anything else would be tantamount to grave delusions. (?Still in all), one thinks that the German issue can be settled for universal satisfaction. There is an understanding between the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, and France to hold jointly with the German Democratic Republic and West German negotiations where all international aspects of Germany's unification could be discussed; obviously including the issues of the security of the neighboring states and membership in military and political alliances.

As for the Soviet people, they have every right to expect that the unification of Germany would do no moral, political, or economic damage to their country.

Falin Cited on Contacts With NATO Officials

PM2102101590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[Own correspondent V. Peresada dispatch: "Soviet Parliamentarians in NATO"]

[Text] Brussels, 19 Feb—The words "for the first time" have been heard whenever another point in the program of the Brussels visit by a delegation of Soviet parliamentarians headed by V.M. Falin, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee and head of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, has been fulfilled. Talks at NATO headquarters with the leadership of the alliance, participation in a joint session of the two main committees of the North Atlantic Assembly, a "roundtable" debate with NATO countries' parliamentarians—only recently a trip with such a program would have been simply inconceivable.

Very important aspects of East-West relations and of security and disarmament in Europe were touched on during the discussions, and views were expressed on problems of easing military confrontation and strengthening stability on the continent and of building confidence, including in the military sphere.

I asked V.M. Falin, leader of the Soviet delegation, to assess the results of the visit.

I believe that such meetings are necessary, he said. First, they provide an opportunity to explain topical policies and their special features and purport. Only yesterday many questions of our relations which were discussed were essentially a "forbidden zone." If we broached them, it was, as a rule, from ideological, propaganda positions and certainly not sharing even generally open information. But here there has been a frank discussion, in the course of which a simple truth has been reaffirmed: When there is a desire to understand each other and, in particular, a readiness to take each other's interests into account, it is not so hard to find a common language and to arrive at common or close assessments.

Second, such meetings make it possible to understand from where old stereotypes, prejudices, and suspicions—i.e., everything that has burdened and deformed international relations since World War II—are now coming to the surface in what would seem to be a totally new situation.

The inertia of the past—this particularly applies to NATO—is extremely great, and it seems to me that it would be unwise to underestimate it, V.M. Falin said in conclusion. The final choice of which line to pursue has not yet been made there. Perhaps it has been made or is being considered at government level, but the vast military apparatus is still functioning, the military flywheel is continuing to spin, and it will be very, very hard to stop it. A number of speeches which NATO parliamentarians made during the meeting strengthen this conviction.

Akhromeyev Visits NATO Headquarters

LD2402190590

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1500 GMT on 24 February, on the "International Panorama" program, presented by V. Ovchinnikov, broadcasts a 7-minute video report from Brussels on Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Akhromeyev's visit to NATO headquarters.

Correspondent K. Mazheyka is in Brussels. He says, "Here's a paradox: Over the North Atlantic alliance's 40-year existence its leaders have never before received representatives of the other military-political alliance at their base. There are eminent Soviet military commanders in the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation." The video shows a building with the flags of the NATO countries outside it, men walking through a room, men greeting one another, and a press conference in progress. Akhromeyev is then shown speaking to reporters. Valentin Falin is next to him.

Akhromeyev says, "Valentin Mikhailovich Falin and General Secretary Woerner have, of course, discussed current and prospective military-political problems. As a military and practical man, I would like to draw attention to those practical issues existing today, and without which prospects are generally inconceivable. I must say that for the most part we have found points of contact and understanding in the resolution of these practical problems for today and the near future and in connection with this we already have here certain prospects for the future."

Over video of a NATO meeting with Soviets present, Mazheyka notes that a "specific, fundamental conversation on a broad range of issues took place. The unification of Germany, the reduction of confrontation in Europe, provision of security at lower levels of armement, and confidence-building measures represent a far from full inventary of the subjects treated. Similarity was at least discovered in one sphere: the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact must play an ever increasing political role. It is necessary to switch from confrontation to business."

Over video of helicopters circling and troops disembarking from them and then Mazheyka talking to a NATO officer who answers in English, Mazheyka notes that 300,000 U.S. troops are in Europe. According to the recently reached accord, they will be cut by two-thirds. He says: "At the order of the headquarters of supreme command a special contingent can be transferred to any area from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea in the case of aggression or conflict, explained Bundeswehr General (Kassels). If we are to believe the opinion of the commander, the potential threat of a sudden attack has not passed. The numerical superiority according to nearly all parmaeters is on the side of the East. Well, and how should the Warsaw Pact countries react, when every autumn a mighty grouping numbering hundreds of thousands of servicemen who possess the latest weapons in their arsenal, including nuclear weapons, is formed? Jumping ahead, I will say that I never did get an answer to my direct question."

The video shows armored cars moving through arable fields, a tank with a radar dish on top, a plane, and a helicopter. While the video shows planes landing on an aircraft carrier, Mazheyka says it is probably easiest to implement sudden aggression from the sea and that the West has found no alternative to containment. He adds: "Nevertheless, a free, open exchange of opinions at parliamentary level has not been useless. The roundtable meeting reaffirmed the simple truth—discussion is preferable to a monologue, especially when there is a desire to understand each other and to take into account others' interests. Thus a common language can be found more quickly, and it is extremely necessary, for the sake of life on earth," the video shows more footage of the roundtable meeting and Brussels street scenes.

United States & Canada

Bush-Kohl Talks Create 'Fresh Misgivings'

LD2602222990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Commentary by station commentator Konstantin Patsyuk]

[Text] [Announcer] At Camp David, the president's country residence, the two-day talks have ended between U.S. President George Bush and FRG Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl. One of the most important problems that was discussed there was the German unification issue. Over to our commentator, Konstantin Patsyuk:

[Patsyuk] It is incontrovertible that there can be no room for ambiguity in the sides' positions in such a complicated issue as Germany's unification. It seems to me that the Camp David talks not only failed to eliminate that ambiguity but created fresh misgivings in other countries.

First, about what President Bush and Chancellor Kohl had to say in favor of a united Germany that should remain, as they put it, a full member of NATO, including in the military sphere. They consider that both in Germany and Europe the U.S. military presence should be retained, which, in their opinion, guarantees stability. Kohl also rejected the guarantee of neutrality of a united Germany, having stated that that would be an erroneous step. So, there would be a non-neutral German bloc. The U.S. Armed Forces stand guard over it.

Does such an approach to Germany's unification correspond to the interests of the Soviet Union, the GDR, and other countries? Does it take into account the positive processes in Europe, including the construction of a common European home? I am sure it does not.

Our country's reaction to such a unification model can only be negative in the current conditions. The Soviet Union has already adopted a decision on the complete withdrawal of its troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It is ready to start talks on their presence in Poland as well, if the latter expresses the desire to do so. It turns out that our country will withdraw its troops from East European countries, but the United States is not prepared to take corresponding steps in West Europe. What is more, they would still like to see a united Germany in the North Atlantic alliance. As a result, the military and strategic balance would be upset between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, whose existence has long served security on the continent.

Moreover, FRG Chancellor Kohl was fairly vague about the borders with neighbors as well, first and foremost with Poland. He said, this issue ultimately should be settled solely by a united Germany's government.

What will happen before Germany is united? What about the principle of immutability of postwar European borders fixed in international agreements? And what about the well-known German slogan to the effect that a threat to peace should never emanate from German soil? The process of the Germany's unification does not tolerate reservations, lack of agreements, as reiterated by the ambiguities in the interested states' positions. Well-reasoned positions and decisions are needed. They alone would be able to promote the German unification process and the provison of genuine security and stability in Europe.

TASS Notes Baker Statement on Nicaragua Vote

LD2702022890 Moscow TASS in English 0000 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Text] Washington February 27 TASS—U.S. Secretary of State James Baker congratulated Violeta Barrios de Chamorro and other members of the Opposition National Union on their victory and praised Daniel Ortega and Sandinist government for carrying out their commitment to conduct elections under international supervision.

More than 2,500 observers representing the United Nations, the Organisation of American States and other international organisations supervised the election procedure.

Baker, appearing at a meeting of the National Governors' Association, favoured the resumption of truce between the Sandinista Popular Army and the contra forces thriving on the financial aid from Washington. He stressed that the United States intended working with President-elect Chamorro in support of her stated goals which are national reconciliation and economic restructuring.

White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater stressed that in the light of the elections there were no reasons for military activity inside Nicaragua. He admitted that Chamorro's triumph in the elections was a surprise for the White House for all previous public opinion polls indicated Daniel Ortega was the favoured candidate.

The spokesman also said President Bush would begin a series of meetings and consultations with his advisers, including State Secretary Baker and National Security Adviser Scowcroft, to discuss U.S. responses to the elections in Nicaragua.

According to Fitzwater high priority will be given to the possible lifting of U.S. sanctions against Managua imposed in 1985. The spokesman said it was possible that the United States would render humanitarian assistance to Nicaragua.

Institute Aide Says 'End of Empire' Imminent

PM2901124090 London ITV Television Network in English 1900 GMT 25 Jan 90

[Interview with Sergey Plekhanov, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' United States of America and Canada Institute, by correspondent David Smith in Moscow, from Channel 4 "News" presented by Jon Snow; date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Snow] Well, our Moscow correspondent, David Smith, spoke to Sergey Plekhanov, the deputy director of the U.S. and Canada Institute, who advises the Soviet Government. He began by asking how dangerous the military situation in the south is for President Gorbachev.

[Plekhanov] I don't think that militarily it is a dangerous situation. The action in the harbor was strictly local, and it was designed to break the blockade. I mean, the blockade was a ridiculous idea that was one of those extremist actions which are very unfortunate, but in a situation like this you are bound to expect things like this happening. I think the important thing is that the troops were sent there not to solve the problem, but more like a fire brigade trying to stop the killing and stop the violence, which the local authorities were not able—and in some cases, not willing—to cope with. The solution will have to be political, and there will be negotiations; there will be compromises; there will be dialogue: In fact, those things are already happening.

[Smith] If that's the case, what are the prospects for a political solution?

[Plekhanov] I think that there will be a political solution: I'm quite convinced of that. It is... it looks messy right now, and necessarily so: Nobody's happy about having to send troops, but the situation really got out of hand as a result of the law and order breaking down and horrible acts of violence. It had to be done, but it's not something that anybody sees as the final solution of the problem.

[Smith] Okay, well, if it's a political solution, on what basis can that be—because they want independence? And do you think Moscow's ready for that?

[Plekhanov] Well, you see our Constitution has an article which grants each republic a right to secede. That article has never been used; that provision in the Constitution has never been used; but I think it's clear that one has to recognize that there is such a right: But one has to work out specific procedures which can be used if any republic wishes to leave the Soviet Union. I understand that work on drafting juridical language—constitutional language—and legislation providing for such an action is now going on, and hopefully, soon we will have specific terms on which any republic can leave the Soviet Union if it so wishes.

[Smith] In other words, the kind of independence that's been offered to the Baltics could now be offered to Azerbaijan?

[Plekhanov] You see, when Gorbachev was speaking about the constitutional provisions in Lithuania, he was not talking about Lithuania only: He was speaking about the Soviet Union, and the article applies not only to Lithuania.

[Smith] But doesn't that awaken age-old fears here of the Soviet Union falling apart?

[Plekhanov] The end of empire is a fact: This will not going to be... this will never be the Soviet Union that the world knew before perestroyka. There will be a new federation, and in that federation each republic will be truly sovereign. The overcentralized bureaucratized system which was associated with socialism has no chance of surviving: It will be replaced.

[Smith] But in your view, will Gorbachev survive if that happens?

[Plekhanov] Well, we are trying to effect just that: You're putting the question as if it's something that is happening against the will of Gorbachev and the central leadership. Reform of the federation is part of the policy of the party and of the government, and it will have to happen. It's a question of whether you're able to do it in an orderly manner and put in effect a new federation; or things happen in a clumsy and violent way, as it's happening in some places in the Soviet Union now. And I think it is important to keep it on an even keel, and in that sense, sending troops to Baku is part of the same process: It's part of the reform that is going on; it's necessary for the reform.

U.S. Experts Cited on Soviet Reform Process

PM2102120390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 15 Feb 90 Second Edition p 3

[Article by TASS Correspondent V. Matyash for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA: "Separatism Is a Blow Against Perestroyka: U.S. Experts on Ethnic Problems in the USSR"]

[Text] Washington—The difficult problems which have arisen in the sphere of interethnic relations are affecting the future of the Soviet state. In this situation the upsurge of separatist nationalist feelings is a blow against the processes of perestroyka, democratization, and glasnost which have been launched in the Soviet Union and are finding a positive response in the West. This is the conclusion of U.S. Sovietologists in a collection of articles under the general title "On the Path to a More Civilized Society. The USSR Under M.S. Gorbachev," published by the committee on American-Soviet relations.

After noting that the Soviet Government is displaying principle on such questions as the struggle against nationalism and separatism, committee president William Miller writes: "The unrest in certain Baltic republics and in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia must not shake Soviet people's faith in the ability of the Soviet leadership headed by M.S. Gorbachev to uphold the rule of law and order in the country."

Professor Gerold Ister [name as transliterated] of Columbia University and Ann Gruber of the London School of Economics point to the positive character of the decisions taken by the Soviet leadership to really strengthen the political and economic autonomy of the Soviet Baltic republics.

Ister and Gruber also stress that "Estonia's recent constitutional challenge on regional questions to the central authorities in Moscow was misplaced." In their words, General Secretary Gorbachev is "emphasizing social transformations as the necessary condition of the perestroyka movement for reforms" in the Baltic and other regions of the USSR. The cost of the social programs that are being implemented will require a "significant reorientation of state funds."

"Since the April 1985 plenum," Prof. Ister stresses in a separate article, "Gorbachev has been deeply committed to progressive reforms; his agenda on interethnic relations, including the Baltic republics, is full of new ideas... The reform movement now has far-reaching consequences affecting all spheres of Soviet society's life. On the domestic front the most well-known phenomena are glasnost, democratization, and perestroyka, which have affected the Baltic, too. These processes have considerably enhanced the Soviet state's prestige in the international arena. For M.S. Gorbachev, perestroyka means far more than political reform. It is a program of genuine economic and social changes in interethnic relations and in foreign policy."

Frederick Starr, president of Oberlin College and professor of Slavonic studies at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, points to the possibility and necessity of the further development of the contract principle for the Soviet federation. Welcoming the creation of legal conditions which provide an opportunity for the existence of various forms of federative ties, he writes: "The reform process in the Soviet Union also embraces the federative structure on whose basis various nationalities of the USSR are organized in a republic." He also notes that the Soviet leadership has not only "increased the national republics' autonomy in the economy and political and cultural questions but is also elaborating a fundamentally coordinated theory of federative reform."

Yakovlev Receives U.S. Politician Gary Hart

LD2602220190 Moscow TASS in English 1847 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 26 TASS—Member of the Politburo and secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Aleksandr Yakovlev received American politician and public figure Gary Hart today at his request.

They discussed questions of mutual interest.

Yakovlev briefed Hart on the pace of changes in the Soviet Union and the results and difficulties of perestroyka.

Solton Offers Comment on Cheney Asian Tour

LD1902203890 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Yuriy Solton commentary—read by announcer]

[Excerpts] The U.S. secretary of defense, Richard Cheney, is making a tour of the three Asian countries, including South Korea, the Philippines, and Japan. Yuriy Solton of our staff has this comment:

The three countries house America's key military bases in Asia with an overall personnel of more than 120,000. As usual the Pentagon chief will inspect the bases while on the visit, but unlike the previous visits he'll also consider options for reducing U.S. military presence there. He is planning to reduce the personnel of the American naval communications station in the Philippines, shut down three bases in South Korea and cut 5,000 from the 40,000 American troops in that country. According to the daily YOMURI the same number of troops is to be withdrawn from Japan.

This seems to be a step in the right direction, but regrettably a very small step. It looks as if the U.S.-Asian strategy were still dominated by obsolete thinking. Indeed while on a visit Mr. Cheney warned of a threat from the north, called for vigilance, and recommended a cautious approach to the Soviet reforms.

True in the past the Soviet Union gave Asian and Pacific nations cause for mistrust. It spared no effort to achieve a military parity with the United States in the region, which only worsened the situation. Times have changed and Moscow is now set to achieve a reduction of military tensions in Asia and the Pacific. It has taken unilateral as well as reciprocated steps to this effect. [passage omitted]

These major cuts have prompted the United States to think about a response. This is only to be welcomed, provided the response is adequate.

Northeast Asia

Cheney Meets With South Korea on Troops Reduction

SK2402112690 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 21 Feb 90

[From "Focus on Asia"]

[Text] The spokesman for the Soviet (?Foreign Ministry) has welcomed the fact that the United States and Korea began talks to reduce U.S. troops in Korea by 5,000 in the next few years. The talks were held when U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney visited Seoul.

Meanwhile, at a get-together in Moscow, (Vladin Berpiniyev) noted that this reduction only affects noncombatant servicemen and is caused by financial interests. Also, he said that the remarks of the U.S. defense secretary and Korean defense minister that a threat exists from the DPRK side are groundless. He recalled that the DPRK had set forth many proposals for cutting armed forces in the North and the South of Korea.

Cheney Remarks on Troops Stationed in Region

SK2502064490 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 24 Feb 90

[From "Focus on Asia"]

[Text] The main substance of the talks U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney has had during his week-long trip to the countries in Asia and the Pacific has to do with the safety of U.S. troops stationed in this region. The U.S. Secretary of Defense visited South Korea, the Philippines, and Japan. At least (?122,000) U.S. soldiers are stationed in the Pentagon's military bases located in these countries. This accounts for more than 90 percent of the total troops stationed in the Pacific region.

U.S. troops stationed in Asia and the Pacific have normally been seen, station commentator (Oleg Sibirov) says, as a counterweight to the Soviet forces deployed in this region. But, is it necessary to station U.S. troops in this region at a time when the confrontational (?spirit) in Soviet-U.S. relations is on a steady decline?

During his trip, Richard Cheney said that the United States plans to keep strong forces stationed in this region. The Soviet Union is not the only factor that makes the stationing of U.S. troops at such a level a necessity, Cheney said after visiting Tokyo, and went on: Without the presence of U.S. troops in this region, a political vacuum will develop. If this happens, it will lead to a (?destabilizing arms races and regional tensions), and it eventually will deepen conflicts. When you look at the situation across northeast Asia and the Korean peninsula, you will not find this kind of prospect to be hypothetical.

The question is whether the stationing of U.S. forces will be able to remove such tensions. Countries in this region should make their own assessment of this.

The U.S. commitment to security in Asia and the Pacific is a far cry from a proposal advanced by Moscow. The Soviet Union has already put forward a proposal for holding a European type of conference in this region. In this proposal the Soviet Union calls for a complete end to the deployment of military forces throughout the whole world. Such a process, however, will require a certain period of time. For this region [words indistinct]. This will be identical to the words of Soviet Foreign Minister Comrade Eduard Shevardnadze who said that trying to withdraw military forces from Europe without conditions is a wrong line. This development of course will in itself force the United States to reduce its own forces stationed in Asia.

For example, it was four years ago that Richard Cheney had announced a plan to cut U.S. forces stationed in this region by 10-11 percent. Moreover, the United States is now trying to make its allies in this region shoulder a fair share of the upkeep necessary for stationing its forces in this region [words indistinct]. For example, while in Seoul, Cheney said if U.S. allies do not accept U.S. [word indistinct] plan, U.S. Congress will find it necessary to take measures to reduce investment in military bases in this region by as much as one-fourth.

It may happen, wrote (Oleg Sibirov).

Trade Expansion With South Korea Reported

LD2202204790 Moscow TASS in English 1906 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 22 TASS—Trade between the Soviet Union and South Korea reached 500 million U.S. dollars last year, said Song Chong-hyun, head of the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) office in Moscow. He said that Soviet exports to South Korea had exceeded its imports by nearly 100 percent. Three hundred and fifty million dollars worth of Soviet goods were sent to South Korea, while only 150 million dollars worth of Korean goods were delivered to the Soviet Union.

Soviet exports to South Korea were made up of coal, timber, steel workpieces and other products. South Korean exports were dominated by domestic electric appliances, electronics, sewing machines and textiles.

"The opening of the KOTRA office in Moscow last August stepped up direct trade between the Soviet Union and South Korea," Chong-hyun continued. One of the office's main tasks is to study the Soviet market, search for ways of possible cooperation, help organize exhibitions in the Soviet Union and business meetings between Soviet and South Korean businessmen. Such contacts are so far being impeded by an underdeveloped infrastructure—communications lines, insufficient provision of information and skilled personnel.

"Nevertheless," Chong-hung said, "reciprocal trade is expected to increase this year. Soviet exports to South Korea will reach 400 million dollars and imports will nearly double to 300 million dollars."

The USSR and South Korea also engage in such new forms of cooperation as joint ventures. Several South Korean firms are helping to develop timber resources in the Far East, the dressing of furs and the production of fur articles, the repair and construction of ships and modernization of enterprises manufacturing consumer goods and household electronics.

Negotiations are under way for cooperation in fisheries and hotel building.

First Joint Academic Conference on Koreas Held

SK2402121090 Moscow International Service in Korean 1330 GMT 17 Feb 90

[Text] An academic conference on the present situation in socialist countries and on Soviet-Korean relations and their prospects was held 13-15 February in Moscow. It was cohosted by the World Socialist Economic Research Institute under the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Parliamentary and Political Relations Research Institute of Korea. The Korean delegation was headed by O Se-ung, former minister in charge of political affairs of Korea, member of the parliamentary league standing committee, and lawmaker. It should be noted that this level of conference was also sponsored by Soviet organs and enterprises interested in developing relations with Korean business firms.

The Soviet side was composed of representatives from the (Khonost), a world joint venture enterprise of the Soviet Union; the (Interhermez) company; the Soviet-Vietnam joint venture enterprise (Kuiura); and the [name indistinct] under the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The Korean side was composed of representatives from the Samsung, Hyundai, and Ilsin business groups, and Korean politicians.

The academic conference set three basic goals. The first goal was to (?establish) normal relations between the World Socialist Economic Research Institute and the Parliamentary and Political Relations Research Institute of Korea. The second goal was to develop cooperative relations between organs and enterprises of the two countries. The third goal was to discuss prospects for relations and to jointly explore a way to ease the state of political and military confrontation on the Korean peninsula.

In connection with the third goal, Valeriy Denizhov, a lawyer, noted: [begin recording in Russian with superimposed Korean translation] I think that there are two ways to remove military and political tension on the Korean peninsula: Within the framework of North-South talks and talks to discuss the proposals of the North and the South for easing military tension can be held with the participation of the Soviet Union, the United States, China, and Japan.

I think that if Pyongyang and Seoul [words indistinct], the DPRK's proposal for drastically reducing armed forces between the two sides of Korea can be realized. I believe that the holding of a high-level meeting, a [words indistinct] meeting, and (?parliamentarian) contacts would be adequate to realize the proposal.

Korean President No Tae-u's statement that before a declaration of nonaggression is adopted, Korea will not conduct a preemptive attack on the DPRK is an important statement which is of significance in terms of the question of security. In my opinion, it is completely logical to discuss the question of easing political and military tension in Korea in parallel with the work of deepening intra-Korean dialogue in the economic, cultural, and other areas.

Also, the DPRK's recent proposal for realizing free visits between the North and the South is also promising. I think that this overture merits attention. [end recording]

We will not report all the matters discussed at the conference and the addresses of the speakers there because the materials of the academic conference will be released both in the Soviet Union and in Korea. The materials will require careful analysis and understanding. However, a preliminary summation of the conference can be made.

We will however carry parts of speeches at the academic conference. (Vasiliy Miriyev), researcher of the World Socialist Economic Research Institute under the Soviet Academy of Sciences and an economist, spoke at the conference: [begin recording in Russian with superimposed Korean translation] The World Socialist Economic Research Institute and the Parliamentary and Political Relations Research Institute of Korea adopted a joint declaration to promote scientific contacts and develop research work.

One of the important aspects of the declaration is that the two sides [word indistinct] independent Soviet-Korean relations without that effort entailing either the conception of (?cross-recognition) of the DPRK and Korea nor concern itself with the final resolution of the Korean issue.

These contacts will provide a precondition for normalizing the situation on the Korean peninsula. As far as I know, a series of new joint ventures has already been formed in the economic field. For example, a Korean business delegation which is attending the conference hopes to stay in Moscow longer than scheduled in order to carefully study concrete ways.

Our Korean guests have pointed out that the reports of Soviet scholars' views toward the situation in the Soviet Union, East European countries, and Asian countries have been made on a high level.

The World Socialist Economic Research Institute under the Soviet Academy of Sciences is known as an authoritative scientific research institute which deals with the analysis of the situation. It is, of course, true that the participants from the Korean side beneficially grasped our evaluations. Also, it was interesting to grasp the experience of Korean economic development. Scientific exchanges have benefited both sides.

O Se-ung, chief of the Korean delegation, spoke at the conference:

[Begin recording] Mutually beneficial cooperation can be [words indistinct] through positive economic activities. I have realized that there are abundant natural resources for development in the Soviet Union. I have come to the conclusion that the two countries can develop in the international community in a friendly and peaceful manner.

I am convinced that as noted in the joint statement, the Parliamentary and Political Relations Research Institute, which I myself represent and the World Socialist Economic Research Institute of the Soviet side can greatly contribute to solving our common problems through biannual seminars and enlarged conferences with the participation of neighboring countries.

Through the first joint seminar, we have learned how the Soviet people think, have understood how they act, and what is most important, have learned that the Soviet people are a good people who can be closer to us. For this reason, I believe that the seminar is a successful beginning and will further develop and bear fruit. [end recording]

Winding up the program on the first Soviet-Korean scientific seminar, we note that the organizers of the seminar kept this conference open to the many scientific institutes of the DPRK, China, the United States, and Japan as well as those of the Soviet Union and Korea. In our own opinion, this opening of doors will be conducive to improving the political situation on the Korean peninsula.

Problems Noted With North Korean Consumer Goods

SK2402110790 Moscow International Service in Korean 1330 GMT 19 Feb 90

[From the program "Annals of Friendship"]

[Text] Many enterprises under the Ministry of Light Industry of our country have already cooperated with their Korean counterparts for many years. Among them is the (Zare), a garment complex, in Vladivostok. Station reporter Valeriy Surikov interviewed Yuriy Kisrey, director of the External Economic Liaison Department of the complex, on cooperation with Korean counterparts:

[Begin recording in Russian with superimposed Korean translation] Enterprises affiliated with our complex have cooperated with DPRK companies since 1987 when an intergovernmental accord on the joint production of light industrial products was signed. Within the framework of this accord, we have cooperated with Korean companies—the (Sinbal), the Unha, and the Songdowon. In 1988, our complex forged direct relations with the Nungnado Company. During this period, the quantity and variety of jointly produced goods has increased.

At first, we produced only men's shirts. However, hats, children's clothes, and cotton pants and shorts were added to the list last year. Products worth 22 million rubles in total were produced. [end recording]

[Station reporter read by an announcer] How has cooperation with Korean counterparts been put into practice?

[Begin Yuriy Kisrey recording in Russian with superimposed Korean translation] We supply our counterparts with the designs and fabrics of products. With these raw materials, DPRK enterprises produce finished goods. Then, these goods are shipped to us. After the inspection of quality, they are supplied to shops. According to an agreement with Korean companies, some of the raw materials are left to the DPRK. Korean companies produce goods to be sold at home.

These relations are beneficial to us, because we cannot expand production and increase the number of items due to our lack of man power. [end recording]

[Station reporter] What difficulties are there in developing cooperation with the DPRK?

[Begin recording in Russian with superimposed Korean translation] The development of our relations are frequently checked by the slowness of our Korean counterparts. It takes too long to receive finished goods after we supply DPRK enterprises with raw materials. As a result, contracts with domestic organs have been frequently violated. Also, the kinds of garments produced by Korean companies do not completely satisfy us. We want our Korean counterparts to master at an early date how to produce woolen coats and suits. The reason is that our market is already full of cotton goods. The quality of goods do not satisfy us either. Our factories sometimes send back those goods which they have not sold due to low quality. In the near future, a delegation of our complex will visit the DPRK to solve these problems with our Korean comrades. [end recording]

Sakhalin Koreans Take New Air Link to Seoul

PM1602103990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 February 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by nonstaff correspondent V. Ryabchikov under the rubric "On the Spot": "Air Link"]

[Text] Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk—The sky-blue airliner, smoothly following the glide path, lightly touched down on the runway and rolled along it, losing speed. Within minutes the plane had been skillfully maneuvered to halt by its parking bay.

That was how a foreign aircraft—a Boeing belonging to South Korea's KAL airline—landed for the first time at Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. This time not as a violator of Soviet airspace but as a welcome guest awaited with great interest and met with sincere Russian cordiality.

The Japanese colonialists, impudently lording it over the lands they had seized, drove tens of thousands of Koreans from Korea to south Sakhalin after ruthlessly destroying their families. Decades passed, the "cold war" came and went. Soviet perestroyka and new political thinking made it possible to smash the notorious iron curtain. The Koreans living in Sakhalin have received the opportunity to reestablish severed family ties and visit the land of their forebears. The Sakhalin Separated Families Association has carried out feverish activity in this area. Its efforts have been supported by the Republic of Korea Red Cross. And it was under the latter's auspices that the unusual flight which I described at the beginning of my short account was made.

The guests included Yi Ken-pe, member of the Republic of Korea parliament and deputy director of the Foreign Ministry, and representatives of the Foreign amd Justice Ministries and the South Korean Red Cross. They were able to see for themselves what an enormous amount of nobility perestroyka bears within it. [passage omitted]

...After the Boeing had been refueled and received its prescribed technical servicing it received its first 120 passengers—Soviet Koreans en route for South Korea to visit relations. The Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk-Seoul air link is now open.

Aeroflot To Begin Moscow-Seoul Air Route

LD2202132290 Moscow TASS in English 1139 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 22 TASS—An airroute connecting the Soviet Union and South Korea will open on March 25.

According to an agreement between Soviet Aeroflot and the South Korean company "Korean Air", the sides will continue their business contacts.

Aeroflot plans to start flights to Seoul from Moscow and Khabarovsk on March 29, TASS was told at the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation.

'Birthday Rainbow' Appears at North Korean Camp

PM2302110390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS correspondent Aleksandr Zhebin report: "NODONG SINMUN on Rainbow Over Paektu-san"]

[Text] NODONG SINMUN, organ of the Workers Party of Korea [WPK] Central Committee, today announced that a beautiful rainbow has appeared on three occasions over the secret Korean anti-Japanese partisans' camp at Paektu-san [Mt. Paektu].

The "native home" in which, according to official historiography, Kim Chong-il—member of the WPK Politburo Presidium and secretary of the Central Committee, son of the country's incumbent leader Kim Il-song, and proclaimed successor to the post of head of state—was born in 1942, was restored in this place near Paektu-san three years ago. Of late the camp, the house, and the mountain peak—named Chong-il Peak—that towers above them have been the object of organized visits for the population from all ends of the country and many foreign guests. Kim Chong-il's birthday, 16 February, was celebrated in the DPRK not only as one of the "greatest national holidays" but also as "a common day of delight for all mankind."

The rainbow appeared there 15 February; this is a legendary event which indicates that nature blesses our homeland's shining future, NODONG SINMUN points out.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Soviet Historian Interviewed on Burma Situation

Views Past Events

BK0902114590 Moscow in Burmese to Burma 1030 GMT 8 Feb 90

[First in series of discussions between Moscow Radio and Soviet Historian Dr. Vasilyev on the situation in Burma]

[Text] In their letters to Moscow Radio, Myanmar [Burmese] listeners asked how events in Myanmar [Burma] in the last one and a half years are being viewed in the Soviet Union and what the Soviet historians predict will happen in Myanmar based on these events. In response to these questions, Moscow Radio presents the first in a series of discussions with Dr. Vasilyev, who is an historian and an expert on Myanmar.

Moscow Radio first asked him to explain how he got his information and data in his studies about Myanmar. The historian replied that he gets data through various means. He said it is not an easy task to study the history of Myanmar because the U Ne Win government for many years had never encouraged foreigners interested in Myanmar. Therefore, newspapers and reports from news agencies became the main source of information for those who were interested in studying about Myanmar.

The historian said he would like to make a few remarks about the Myanmar press. He said he had regularly read and studied Myanmar press since 1951. However, he said, these newspapers were not very interesting until 1988 and then they were not very accurate. The Myanmar journalists were most active in their work during August and September of 1988 [period of the pro-democracy demonstrations in Myanmar] when there was no press censorship. Many newspapers carried very interesting articles and news. However, it is very regretable that this period did not last long.

Now, there is only one newspaper published under the strict control of the State Law and Order Restoration Council. However, compared to the press of the U Ne Win era, the newspaper has more substance. I use the term U Ne Win era because U Ne Win has officially given up all his posts.

There are many articles and commentaries on the events of 1988. The Myanmar press used to be silent on these events. Nevertheless, in my view, the approach of the press does not reflect the present and real situation.

Listeners, Moscow Radio asked him whether he thought the Myanmar press has been unable to reflect the mood of various stratas of Myanmar society as it is unable to print the views of those who criticized the current military government.

He said it is not so. The main weak point is the underlying (?principle). That is, the events in Myanmar are being protrayed as a purely internal affair which has no parallel elsewhere in other countries. In reality, life in our 20th century is more and more international in character. We can see any major event in any given country as part of an international trend. As the achievement of Myanmar's independence in 1948 was part of the development of colonialism, the events in 1988 are part of the international trend towards democracy.

Moscow Radio asked him whether he is referring to the events in East Europe.

He said the events of 1988 has wide geographical and chronological ramifications. He said it will be also necessary to take into consideration the events in the Philippines and South Korea. In Africa, we can point to events in Tunisia and Algeria. We can also point to developments in some Latin American countries.

Listeners, at this juncture, Moscow Radio pointed out that recent demonstrations against bureaucratic governments in East Europe are similar to Myanmar people's demonstrations. If this point is agreed to, several questions can be raised as to why the one-party system was dismantled earlier in Myanmar than in other countries, granted that the political systems that existed were similar.

In response to this question, the Soviet academician pointed to the shaky Myanmar economy and the inefficiencies and arbitrary actions of the country's administrators as the main factors for their inability to bear pressure. Referring to the frequent demonetizations in the last days [of the Ne Win era], he noted that although these measures were targeted in the main at the blackmarketeers, in practise they gravely affected the common people. He added that in his view, the isolation, which was more than necessary in extent, was also not appropriate.

Listeners, at this juncture, Moscow Radio pointed out that it cannot be said that the U Ne Win government did not attempt to reform its economic policies. We asked: Did not Burma in the seventies try to obtain funds from abroad after it became clear that its policies on self-reliance and the ending of farmer exploitation adopted in 1962, were holding up the country's economic development?

The academician said it was true, but direct investment was never allowed. Only a limited amount of loans were obtained from an international consortium for Myanmar: from Japan, Germany and minor countries. At the beginning, the economy became considerably active with the injection of funds. However, soon after, Myanmar faced problems in the raw materials and commodities market when earnings from its traditional exports dwindled.

From the mid-eighties onward, Myanmar had to start repaying its loans and this exacerbated the country's economic problems. Loan repayments grew each year and in the last years [of the Ne Win government] almost all of Myanmar's export earnings were used for repayment. From this, we can see both the positive and negative aspects of assistance from the West to Myanmar.

Moscow Radio pointed out that the severe economic deterioration of the country was not the only reason for the mass protest movement of the people of Myanmar.

The Soviet academician acknowledged this and said in his view, the main cause was the lack of will or inability of the former leaders to take a resolute step to change the situation. Another cause of the mass protest movement was the government's reliance on and its faith in the security organizations. The former Myanmar leaders thought they would be able to exploit the tradition and prestige of the military leaders and other leaders. However, when the soldiers opened fire at anti-government soldiers near the Inya Lake in Yangon [Rangoon] in March 1988, it became apparent that the anti-government demonstrations would continue to grow.

Listeners, we shall end our discussion here today. When we meet again next time for discussions, we shall talk about the situation after March 1988.

Calls for Economic Freedom

BK2202041590 Moscow in Burmese to Burma 1030 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Second in series on interviews with Soviet historian Dr. Vasilyev by unidentified Radio Moscow correspondent entitled: "A Soviet Historian's View of the Events in Burma"—read by announcers]

[Text] In their letters to Radio Moscow, listeners in Myanmar frequently ask about how Soviet historians view the events of 1988 in Myanmar. Soviet historian Dr. Vasilyev made the following observations in an interview with a Radio Moscow correspondent. In the last interview, he discussed the government's inability to resolve the vast, complex problems that had accumulated for more than 25 years. As he pointed out, these problems made the people rise up in anger against the government. He said the attempt by the military leaders at the time to crush the demonstrating masses through the use of arms ignited the fuse.

Our correspondent began this interview with this question:

[Correspondent] Does that mean that if the U Ne Win government had shown more flexibility, it could have saved the ruling party's administrative infrastructure?

[Vasilyev] No, there was no chance of that. Although the masses demonstrating and protesting in the country's major cities chanted political slogans demanding democracy, the most important cause, I think, was quite different. I believe the people had had enough of rising prices, a worsening daily life, and uncertain economic prospects, at the household level and on a national scale. The demonstrating masses called for democracy, but subconsciously, what they wanted was economic freedom. In other words, each of them wanted the right to earn enough to maintain a home through their own labor.

[Correspondent] But, efforts were made after U Ne Win's time to open up trading in agricultural products and to legitimize the black market.

[Vasilyev] That is right. But they were nothing more than what you just said, efforts. Problems arose because of that. What was needed was a change in the administrative system for Myanmar society; essential fundamental reforms were rejected by the Lanzin [Burma Socialist Program] Party government and the political infrastructure. It must be pointed out here that many of my colleagues are of the opinion that although the Lanzin Party declared it was following a Myanmar way to socialism, in practice it was setting up a military feudal system to rule the country. For instance, an official's status would not depend on his ability, but on the degree that he was obedient and loyal to his superiors and on the amount of influence wielded by his relatives. We have seen similar systems in other countries. It is also common knowledge that such systems do not permit any act that might affect or threaten the limitless power wielded by the bureaucrats. In Myanmar also, there seemed to be no limit to the power in the hands of the bureaucrats.

[Correspondent] Do you mean that an inflexible attitude on the part of the (?military) bureaucrats made the people resort to violence?

[Vasilyev] I would like to remind you that we should avoid using a word like violence in our discussion. Since the State Law and Order Restoration Council's assumption of power, the Myanmar media have been writing quite a lot about the unruly, anarchical acts and lootings that took place during the events of 1988. I have no doubt whatsoever about the uncontrollable situation at the time. But, it is a fact that you will always find such phenomena in events of that magnitude, which are a revolution in nature.

[Correspondent] According to news reports from Myanmar at the time, regional party and council offices collapsed voluntarily without any action being taken by the people demanding changes. Was this true?

[Vasilyev] Yes, your comments are most appropriate. The former government could not do anything then, and staff workers left their offices and departments in fright. Representatives of the masses, students, and monks took their places, and new organs of power were set up—not with the military's backing, but with the people's trust. This is one fact that proves that the events in 1988 were in fact a genuine democratic revolution. It was a revolution started at the grass roots and in which the broad masses participated.

[Correspondent] What do you feel about assertions that the uprising was organized by subversive elements, agents of the superpowers, and racist separatists?

[Vasilyev] Do you really think self-interested elements would not exploit such a complicated, difficult situation? I think they did. But, it would be ridiculous to blame everything on them. Could criminals really make the masses express their indignation in such an extreme manner? I believe that the ones who goaded the people into action were the ones who gave the order to shoot and kill the students near Inya Lake.

[Correspondent] Since you are talking about matters concerning the revolution, it is necessary to ask what role the military government headed by General Saw Maung plays.

[Vasilyev] I think it is still too early to give a definite answer to that question. On the other hand, the new government is already endeavoring to change to a free market economy. This is particularly evident in its relations with foreign entrepreneurs. Therefore, it appears that they have given up the policy of keeping Myanmar in isolation. But, another point which should be noted here is that economic reforms will gain a firm footing only when there is political stability. The most important requirement for achieving that stability in Myanmar today is the holding of genuine democratic elections on the basis of a multiparty system to form a new parliament and government that are trusted by the people.

[Correspondent] Do you believe this will take place in the near future?

[Vasilyev] Yes, I believe that. If the new National Unity Party, which emerged in place of the Lanzin Party, retakes power after the late May elections and attempts to form a government similar to the previous one by using its contacts in the military, I believe there is a very strong possibility that new difficulties and problems—not only economic, but political in nature—will emerge. What will the consequences be? It is very complicated.

[Correspondent] Whatever they may be, Radio Moscow expects to discuss them in the next interview with you.

[Vasilyev] Okay, I will agree to that.

Looks to Future

BK2302064590 Moscow in Burmese to Burma 1030 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Third in series on interviews with Soviet historian Dr. Vasilyev by unidentified Radio Moscow correspondent entitled: "A Soviet Historian's View of the Events in Burma"]

[Text] For you listeners, Radio Moscow has once again conducted an interview with Soviet historian Dr. Vasilyev. In the talks today, the Soviet historian views the events of 1988 in Myanmar as well as the situation that country will likely face in the future. According to the interviews we have had before, the historian believed that the events in 1988 constituted a bourgeois democratic revolution. What I also understand was that the election scheduled in May is the only way to avoid the adverse consequences of 1988.

Today, on behalf of the listeners of Radio Moscow, I posed this most difficult question to Dr. Vasilyev:

[Correspondent] What lies ahead and in what form for Myanmar? How will Myanmar fare in the next few years?

[Vasilyev] It would be necessary to point out here that Myanmar walked the path of bourgeois democracy soon after its liberation from the yoke of British colonialism. However, it was only for a short while. After 1962, efforts were made to achieve rapid national development through the principles of a strong centralized authority, rigid centralized control in drafting and implementing plans, and total restraint and control over the economic sectors. But, as we can point out today, such methods do not contribute to the development of productive relations in society. This being the case, a system had emerged in Myanmar that led to the economy's ruin. Many of my colleagues call such a system, feudal bureaucracy.

I believe that there are two ways to escape from the present situation. One way is to create an entirely new economic and state administrative formula. But, we have already witnessed the failure of such an experimental scheme. Hence, the alternative may be the better choice. The alternative is to utilize the experience learned throughout the course of history from the structuring of society with due consideration given to the absolute conditions of Myanmar.

[Correspondent] Does that mean that unmitigated capitalism with private entrepreneurs, free markets, private enterprises, and a bourgeois parliament is the only way out of the problems that Myanmar faces today?

[Vasilyev] Unmitigated capitalism only exists in the story books. Such a system cannot be found even among the Western nations. The role of the state as the coordinator, the state sector itself, and production through certain forms of cooperatives are very significant factors even for the economies of developed capitalist nations. There have been times in the United Kingdom and France when industries were retained in the hands of the government. What is important at this junction is another point. The government, if necessary under the circumstances, must have the power to transfer the control over industry from one sector to the other. But such a move should not be to serve the interest of the government or a certain group but in the interest of the entire society.

[Correspondent] You mean the government should always remain under the control, through democratic means, of the parliament, the opposition parties, and even the people themselves. Am I right?

[Vasilyev] Yes, that is true. Every government must understand the responsibility that it bears in making important decisions. Sooner or later, despite outstanding economic achievements, it becomes necessary even for dictatorial regimes to install democracy in their societies. For instance, South Korea and Chile, which recently held elections, come to one's mind.

[Correspondent] If that is the case, then how ready is Myanmar for a democratic administration?

[Vasilyev] There are many schools of thought regarding that question. American political observer Joseph Silverstein, whom I believe your listeners know about, said that the past 25 years have not erased from the minds of the Myanmar people the history of the struggle for independence nor the 14-year rule of a democratic government under which interests were multitudinous but each had the right to decide and choose according to his wish. His assertion may be right, but it is necessary to remember another point here. In the 1950's, there was instability in Myanmar because many parties were contending for power. A multiparty system can be stable only when the interests of different social strata and classes and interest groups are clearly delineated at the roots. In other words, every political party must represent the interests of a certain section of society, and not the interests of a certain popular leader. I believe that only then will the contention between parties become a contributing factor to the development of society.

In the years the Burma Socialist Program Party was in power, the political system in force could not contribute to the natural development of society and social classes. It divided the Myanmar society into two distinct classes—the rulers and the ruled. The surge of numerous new political parties in 1988 and 1989 was a manifestation of the desire by the Myanmar people to be freed from a situation of total obedience. But, it is quite clear that not many parties will actually be competing in the May elections.

[Correspondent] I believe that even if the elections do take place as scheduled, the party that is likely to become the most influential, either through the direct or the indirect assistance of the military, is the National Unity Party. What do you say to that?

[Vasilyev] The Defense Forces may continue to play an important role for quite some time in the political life of Myanmar. Experience in many Asian and African countries point to this trend. But whatever the outcome, it would be very detrimental to the country to reestablish a type of government that we all have seen in the past 25 years. That is why, there are good prospects for the establishment of a parliament based on the multiparty system. Leaving aside the other reasons, I believed that only a broadly represented People's Assembly can pave the way for the resolution of the racial problems of the country with the participation of delegates representing minority nationals. I am firmly convinced that Myanmar will, one way or the other, revert to a federal constitution. But, it will be very difficult to go into further details on this point.

[Correspondent] Yes, it would not be easy to make any predictions at this junction. We may even be seeing a situation under which the State Law and Order Restoration Council will continue to function and give orders to the rival government and the political parties. That contention may perhaps become the key impetus that will help develop Myanmar in the near future. Whatever it may be, we can only wait and observe the situation in pre-election Myanmar as the elections approach.

Near East & South Asia

Leaders Receive PLO Executive Members

International Department's Brutents

PM2102151390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Feb 90 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] A meeting took place on 16 February at the CPSU Central Committee International Department between K.N. Brutents, first deputy chief of the department, and PLO Executive Committee members M. 'Abbas and S. Najjab. In a friendly atmosphere, an exchange of opinions took place on questions of a Near East settlement and some other problems of the present international situation. The Palestinian representatives were informed of the present stage of perestroyka in the USSR.

N. 'Amr, ambassador of the State of Palestine to the USSR, was present at the meeting.

Supreme Soviet's Dzasokhov

PM2302102590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] Talks have been held between A.S. Dzasokhov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee, and Mahmud 'Abbas and Sulayman Najjab, members of the PLO Executive Committee.

During the talks, the importance of further developing and strengthening Soviet-Palestinian relations—including parliamentary ties—in the interest of achieving a comprehensive Near East settlement and a just settlement of the Palestinian problem was noted.

The USSR's support for the PLO's constructive and realistic course based on the resolutions of the 19th Palestine National Council session was reaffirmed.

N. 'Amr, Palestinian ambassador to the USSR, took part in the talks.

Lukyanov Receives PLO Envoy's Credentials

LD2102134490 Moscow TASS in English 1230 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 21 TASS—The Palestinian people will never forget Soviet assistance in their struggle for their legitimate national rights, Nabil 'Amr, ambassador of the State of Palestine, said in the Kremlin today, presenting his credentials to Soviet Vice-President Anatoliy Lukyanov.

The leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) firmly follows the course of strengthening the relations of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union in the name of a comprehensive and just peace in the Middle East, the ambassador emphasised.

When accepting the credentials on behalf of the Presidium and president of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Lukyanov said that peace and lasting security are the goal of Soviet policy in the Middle East.

The earliest commencement of a peace process designed to advance a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the convocation of an international Middle East peace conference would serve this goal, he said.

Lukyanov reaffirmed the Soviet Union's striving for the further development of Soviet-Palestinian relations and expressed solidarity with the just struggle of the Palestinian people under the PLO leadership for their legitimate national rights, primarily the right to self-determination.

The decision to grant the status of embassy of the State of Palestine to the PLO Mission is based on the Soviet Union's well- known position in favour of recognition of the proclamation of the Palestinian state and on the understanding that a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East conflict will also bring to practical completion the historic process of establishing this state.

Envoy Comments on Soviet Support

LD2102220190 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] A ceremony took place at the Kremlin today, at which the ambassador of Palestine to the Soviet Union, Nabil 'Amr, presented his credentials to Vice President of the Supreme Soviet Anatoliy Lukyanov. During the ceremony, Ambassador Nabil 'Amr highly praised Soviet support for the struggle and national legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Today also, Ambassador Nabil ' Amr met Soviet and foreign journalists at the Embassy of Palestine in Moscow, in the presence of Arab ambassadors in the USSR and the Arab League representatives. Ambassador Nabil 'Amr addressed the press:

[Begin 'Amr recording] We in the PLO consider the Soviet step in raising the degree of Palestinian representation in Moscow to the level of embassy and the acceptance of the credentials of the ambassador of Palestine on this basis as a qualitative step forward along the road to reaching our national objective: the establishment of this state on Palestinian soil. Certainly our appreciation of this step encourages us to build deep, frank, and strong foundations for our political relations with the USSR, whether as Palestinians or Arabs. [end recording]

Ambassador Nabil 'Amr described in detail the situation in the Middle East and said that Israel is striving today by all means to complicate or freeze the progress toward a just settlement. He went on to say that the Shamir government with its statements and intention to settle new Jewish refugees, including those from the USSR, in the occupied Palestinian territories, indicates that it considers the Jews of the whole world mere fodder for guns. He added that the Palestinian leadership knows the motives that pushed the Soviet Union to open its doors to the immigration of citizens from any nationality, including Jews, to other countries. We understand those motives and we must take them into consideration in our actions, he said, adding that any problems that arise in Soviet-Palestinian relations are solved quickly through close coordination of our positions and in a spirit of complete understanding and frankness.

Nabil 'Amr drew attention to the U.S. attitude:

[Begin 'Amr recording] We cannot give little attention to the U.S. attitude to this matter. True, for moral or other causes, the United States finds itself forced to declare every now and then its rejection, denunciation, or condemnation of the policy of settlement, but this is not accompanied by sufficient U.S. measures, which confirm this attitude and give it the required credibility. Moreover, we are aware of the direct U.S. role in forcing Soviet immigrants to go to Israel against their will by closing the door in their faces when they seek to go to the United States. We consider the demographic change being planned by the Israelis in the occupied territories as a decisive blow to any peace idea in the region, now and in the future. [end recording]

Finally, the ambassador of Palestine referred to the content of his talks with Comrade Anatoliy Lukyanov at the Kremlin:

[Begin 'Amr recording] I listened during this meeting with Comrade Lukyanov to an important and exciting survey of the foundations of the Soviet attitude toward the situation in the Middle East, and in particular toward the Palestine problem. Comrade Lukyanov, from the top of the Soviet leadership hierarchy in the Soviet Union, confirmed that the Soviet Union will not forget the Palestinians and will remain the force backing their struggle until they realize their just national rights. Also Comrade Lukyanov praised the stability, effectiveness, and regularity of the Palestinian-Soviet relationship at the political level. He confirmed that the joint effective efforts which we—the PLO and the USSR—carried out together, were based on the important meeting which took place between brother Yasir 'Arafat and Comrade Gorbachev. [end recording]

IZVESTIYA Interviews PLO's Sha'th

PM2202132390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview with Nabil Sha'th, chairman of Palestine National Council Political Commission, by A. Ostalskiy, IZVESTIYA correspondent in Kuala Lumpur; no date given: "There Is No Absolute Justice"]

[Text] Nabil Sha'th, chairman of the Palestine National Council Political Commission, is a well known figure inside and outside the Arab world. He is often described as representing the most moderate wing in the Palestinian movement, which advocates a policy of dialogue and compromise. Our correspondent spoke with N. Sha'th in Kuala Lumpur, where the PLO's Asian regional seminar and symposium of nongovernmental organizations on the Palestinian problem was held.

[Ostalskiy] Mr. Sha'th, the problem of Soviet Jews emigrating to Israel seems to have eclipsed all others in Palestinians' eyes. Why? Is this really the most important of all the questions facing the Near East?

[Sha'th] That is indeed the main problem in Arab-Soviet relations. But what I want to say is this: We cannot and must not interfere in the USSR's internal affairs, although we think it unjust that Jews leaving your country are only allowed to go to Israel. Many believe that the United States—a country where 90 percent of immigrants have landed up—is deliberately barring the way to them. There is a danger that in Israel the new arrivals will be settled in the occupied Palestinian territories and this will bring about a further deterioration in the situation and worsen the prospects of a settlement.

I believe that this question could be resolved by the USSR and the United States. If Americans were trying to secure for Soviet Jews the freedom to leave, would it not be logical not to restrict their freedom but give them the chance to go to America? On the whole, this question is the only one which may darken Soviet-Palestinian relations in the era of perestroyka.

[Ostalskiy] But I have heard Arabs—and they are not the only ones—voicing general misgivings that the changes in our country may encroach on their interests. Voices like this were heard at this seminar too in certain speeches. What do the Palestinians think on this subject?

[Sha'th] I would say that two viewpoints are widespread among Palestinians. Most believe that this is your internal affair and we must seek new means of cooperation under the new conditions. Some even hope that Israel's strategic value for the United States will lessen in connection with the cessation of the "cold war" and Washington will be able to adopt a more objective approach to the Near East problem. What is more, the new feeling of security associated with perestroyka frees Western Europe and Japan from their excessive dependence on the United States and they will be able to offer us greater support. Perestroyka in the USSR will possibly even ultimately speed up a just settlement. After all, regional conflicts remained frozen in conditions of confrontation.

But there are, of course, among us those who are accustomed to the former system (let us call it theoretically the "Brezhnevian" system), who were closely attached to it. It is naturally hard for them, they feel disappointed and bitter. But, in the opinion of most Palestinians, perestroyka in the USSR is in their interests and they hope that relations with the USSR will become firmer and sounder and will not be dictated, as before, by hostility toward the United States above all. Real friendship cannot be built solely on common enemies.

[Ostalskiy] Let us return to the situation in the Near East. What is your opinion of the prospects for a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue?

[Sha'th] I am one of the people who have long been advocating this kind of dialogue within the PLO. I have met hundreds of Israelis of the most diverse political views. I seem to be acquainted with virtually half the Labor Party members of parliament and former Israeli Army generals. I am convinced that the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the Near East problem depends to a considerable extent on support within Israel for such a settlement. Jews have experienced terrible sufferings in their history, particularly during the period of Nazi genocide. I cannot say this without feeling pain and sympathy. I believe that many Israelis who suffered at the hands of the Nazis cannot remain indifferent to the fate of my people, who are now in the role of oppressed and persecuted people.

According to my calculations, approximately one-third of Israeli politicians today support a peaceful solution and dialogue with the PLO and realize the need to create an independent Palestinian state as a condition for a lasting peace. Although, of course, prejudices and stereotypes are still widespread among the Israelis. I will not claim that the Palestinians are completely free of them. How are they to be smashed? There is only one way—meet face to face as soon as possible. I will never forget my first meeting with an Israeli. He was called Moshe (Makhover) and I met him in 1969 on neutral ground. I did not feel quite myself before the meeting, I imagined that I would be talking with some kind of monster and was nervous and afraid that I would make a mistake. Five minutes after we were introduced, I realized that I was dealing with a normal sympathetic man. We became friends.

Today there is no sensible, reasonable proposal on the Near East settlement from either side that we would reject. We only reject those options which, so to speak, reject us, reject the PLO. We accept and are prepared to discuss everything else that gives some kind of chance and reveals some progress toward negotiations, toward a mutually acceptable solution. We do not want "absolute justice"—it does not exist.

Lebanese Party Leaders Visit 13-18 Feb

PM2302115690 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Friendly Meetings"]

[Text] Walid Junblatt, chairman of the Lebanese Progressive Socialist Party and Lebanese minister of public works and transport, and D. Yaghi, deputy chairman of the Progressive Socialist Party, were in Moscow 13-18 February.

Discussions took place with A.S. Dzasokhov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee; Yu.M. Vorontsov, USSR first deputy foreign minister; and K.N. Brutents, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department.

The Lebanese guests were briefed on the development of perestroyka processes in the Soviet Union and the work of the CPSU Supreme Soviet's third session. The situation in Lebanon, which has recently deteriorated considerably, was discussed. In this connection, the importance of strictly observing the Al-Ta'if agreements and supporting the legitimate Lebanese authorities was stressed. The mutual desire to develop Soviet-Lebanese relations and friendly ties between the CPSU and the Progressive Socialist Party was expressed.

Afghan Defense Minister's Army Day Greetings

LD2302232290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 23 Feb 90

[From "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Another page in the history of our armed forces is occupied by Afghanistan, and it is very pleasant that on the celebration of our Army and Navy Day Afghan Defense Minister Colonel General Shahnawaz Tanai asked us to allow him to speak today on the Vremya program. We have just received this speech from Kabul via a satellite link:

On the occasion of Soviet Army and Navy Day, I convey, Colonel General Tanai says, most cordial congratulations to the valiant Soviet servicemen and all people of the land of the soviets from the Central Committee personally and from the Afghan Army. The second year since Soviet troops left Afghanistan has begun. But today, without doubt, it is possible to say that, thanks to the experience gained from our Soviet friends, our armed forces have demonstrated that they are capable of independently defending the national independence and territorial integrity of their country.

Today, I would like, the Afghan defense minister says, to express my sincere gratitude to the Soviet Union for the comprehensive aid provided to our Army and people and to wish all Soviet people success in the implementation of plans set by perestroyka.

Election Plans for Afghanistan Examined

TA2302180090 Moscow in Dari to Afghanistan 1500 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Sergey Viktorov commentary from "World Today" program]

[Text] Dear Afghan friends, greetings. Probably the only thing the Afghan Government and opposition groups agree on is the holding of general elections in the country. But each side understands the nature of such elections from its own viewpoint. [words indistinct]

As is common knowledge, talk about the need for general elections has been going on for a long time in the ranks of the Afghan opposition. When it comes to specific plans, however, differences immediately emerge between the leaders of various groups. It was for this reason that the issue of elections became a pretext for Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's withdrawal from the so-called opposition interim government.

AFP's report from Tehran does not contain details of the elections plan that Rabbani and Gaylani discussed with representatives of the Shiite nine-member opposition coalition. However, it is clear that currently the nine-member coalition does not favor joining the Peshawar interim government and has criticized that government's election plan. Therefore, it can be imagined that Rabbani and Gaylani will be facing difficult negotiations with coalition representatives.

While there is no precise information about the election plan prepared in Peshawar, the (?world) is well aware of the election plan put forward by President Najibullah. On the basis of this plan, during negotiations with the rebels, conditions should be created under which a new constitution and an election law would be drafted. To allay the other side's fears that the elections might possibly be rigged, President Najibullah's government has agreed to invite UN representatives to supervise the election process. Meanwhile, this kind of international supervision was tested in Namibia and produced good results. Moreover, President Najibullah has said that if he loses in the elections, he will be ready to resign.

Elections in Afghanistan are now necessary and there is probably no other way to resolve the country's complex situation, but what sort of elections should they be and how should they be held? It is expected that the Afghans themselves will accept an election plan that will most of all be responsive to their aspirations and be worthy of them.

'Successful Progress' in Iranian Ties Viewed

NC1402121990 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 13 Feb 90

[Station commentary]

[Excerpts] A speech by Iranian Ambassador Mr. Naser Heyrani-Nowbari was carried on Soviet television on the 11th anniversary of the antimonarchical revolution of 11 February. [passage omitted]

According to the Iranian ambassador, last year was a turning point in the history of the progress of Soviet-Iranian relations toward cooperation and goodneighborliness. The Soviet Union and Iran took a great step toward a new level of relations and this made the two countries an example of peaceful coexistence between countries with differing ideologies and systems. [Passage omitted]

What lies behind the successful progress in Soviet-Iranian relations? The Iranian side has put forward an interesting view, claiming that the restructuring of domestic and foreign policy which is being carried out in the Soviet Union was the key to success. Mr. Hashemi-Rafsanjani pointed out that this restructuring increased the trust felt by Iranians, who are extremely sensitive over relations with the superpowers and national sovereignty, toward the Soviet Union.

Iran is also undergoing a reconstruction. The influence of those who support the export of the Islamic revolution by force is declining by the day, although this influence can resurface at times, as was seen in the incidents in the Soviet Transcausus.

There was a time when the Soviet side also had such ideological fanaticism. This led to political mistakes, including the dispatch of armed forces to Afghanistan.

The Iranian side has not benefited from fanaticism either. The policy of mutually beneficial and equitable relations being followed by the Soviet Union and Iran provides greater benefits for both countries.

Sub-Saharan Africa

CPSU Delegation Attends Rally for Mandela

PM1502144590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Feb 90 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "CPSU Delegation Arrives in Ghana"]

[Text] Accra, 13 Feb—A CPSU delegation headed by A.I. Ilin, first secretary of Pskov CPSU Oblast Party Committee and USSR people's deputy, arrived in Accra on Monday at the invitation of Ghana's Provisional National Defense Council [PNDC]. It was met at the airport by Sam Garba, PNDC deputy secretary for the committees of defense of the revolution, and other officials. The welcome party included Ye.D. Ostrovenko, USSR ambassador to Ghana.

On the same day the CPSU delegation took part in a thousands-strong rally proclaiming solidarity with Nelson Mandela, leader of South Africa's African National Congress, to mark his release.

Ghana's Tsikata Receives Delegation

PM2102153190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Feb 90 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] Accra, 16 Feb—Today Kojo Tsikata, member of the Provsional Natinal Defense Council (PNDC) of Ghana, received a CPSU delegation headed by A.N. Ilin, first secretary of the Pskov CPSU Oblast Committee, which is here at the invitation of the PNDC.

During the talk the sides expressed satisfaction at the state of bilateral political relations and stressed their desire to continue to develop them. The members of the CPSU delegation described the progress of perestroyka in the Soviet Union and the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum.

Commentary Scrutinizes New Somali Government

EA1902074290 Moscow International Service in Somali 1600 GMT 16 Feb 90

[Text] The composition of the new Council of Ministers in Somalia has been announced in Mogadishu. President Mohamed Siad Barre has approved the composition of the new government formed by Lieutenant General Mohamed Ali Samantar, the prime minister of the country. Here is our commentator Vladimir Borisov commenting on the matter.

The new Council of Ministers is very much smaller than the previous one. It is down by a third. The question thereore is, what can we learn from the composition of the new Council of Ministers?

First, you can see the smaller number of military officers, including members of the Supreme Revolutionary Council formed in 1969 after General Mohamed Siad Barre seized power through a coup: only five of them remain in the new Council of Ministers. It seems as if the military regime in Mogadishu is becoming less military. The places of those excluded were taken up by professional veterans who have spent a lot of time in the administration of the country. Among them are Ahmed Jama Jangali who was named the important post of leading the Foreign Affairs Ministry of Somalia, Dr. Mohamed Oshman Jowari who was named as the minister of land and air transport, and Dr Mohamed Ali Munassar who retains his former post in Ministry of Health.

I think, says our commentator, that this new Council of Ministers is very different from previous ones in the country over the last 15 years. The level of experience and know-how of this new Council of Ministers reminds us of the Council of Secretaries formed in the country immediately after the 1969 coup. However, the new Council of Ministers differs from the secretaries of that time by their wide expertise in administrative affairs. As is clear, the president is very much aware, if we may say, of the need [word indistinct] ideology of the senior leadership of the country which has embarrassed the regime in the eyes of the people.

It is also important to point out the way the new Council of Ministers has been formed and how it would be possible to contact the opposition. This did not come about by accident. This is because the most important duty facing this new Council of Ministers is to reach tangible negotiations with at least some of the opposition forces, if not all of them. Ahmed Mahamoud Farah, the deputy prime minister of the country, hails from the Isaaq tribe of northern Somalia which is the backbone of the Somali National Movement [SNM] which controls many parts of the north. This front is the biggest in both the political and military fields among the existing opposition fronts. The new foreign affairs minister also comes from the north as it appears it is expected that he will play a big role in bringing the SNM to a peaceful political struggle. The president sees this method as the only one for settling the internal situation prevalent in the country.

Ahmad Jama Jangali is a diplomat with much experience who has held many senior posts in the country. He was the Somali ambassador in London where the SNM front and other opposition organizations with a tribal basis have their Headquarters. His ties in London and the people he came to know as a diplomat will no doubt be strong pillars in establishing contacts with these opposition groups. The retention of Dr Hussein Abdirahman Matan as minister of defense is of much value since he hails from the Ogaden tribe. Apart from this other duties, this means that the government is hopeful of settling its conflict with the Somali Patriotic Movement through dialogue.

The naming of Abdulkadir Haji Mohamed as minister of interior, which is an important post, was not expected. Generally it can be said that the president gave this important post to an operative from his clan. But the important point is that his naming came about as a result of a dialogue between the president, who is also the secretary general of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party [SRSP], and the leadership and operatives of the party led by Abdulkadir Haji Mohamed, since he was actually the deputy secretary general of the party.

It is known that the SRSP Central Committee played a big role in the dismissal of the former Council of Ministers since it strongly criticized the members of that council and even President Mohamed Siad Barre himself. The president once again showed his expertise and talent in a political power struggle. The characteristics of avoiding unreasonableness and even showing courage and daring in taking this step leading to the balancing of the new political and tribal reality is in line with the situation prevalent in the country today. But the question remains, can the new Council of Ministers of Somalia free the country from the chaos of civil war and economic collapse?

Historian Argues for Continuing African Ties

*PM1202161490 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5*

[Article by A. Vasilyev, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Africa and doctor of historical sciences, under the rubric "The World and Us": "Why Do We Need Africa?"]

[Text] Lately this question can be heard quite often from readers. Why should the problems of a distant continent worry us when we have more than enough no less acute ones of our own? But all the same it seems to me that there is sense in thinking long and hard before forsaking Africa.

In the evolving nonconfrontational pattern of international relations we are ceasing to be the political, military, and (to the extent that we ever were) economic counterbalance to the West. The center of gravity is shifting toward the USSR's cooperation with "Third World" countries. This means, as a rule, mutually beneficial cooperation, which of course implies a certain shift of emphasis toward deideologizing interstate relations, preserving links with traditionally friendly states, and widening links with stable regimes which we consider conservative. Nowadays every revolutionary authoritarian dictator can hardly expect our unconditional political, moral, and material support simply because he utters a dozen "Marxist-Leninist" slogans or pays lip service to anti-imperialism.

Are we psychologically, materially, and organizationally ready for this new situation?

African countries (excluding South Africa) annually import goods worth $69 billion and export goods worth $53 billion. We import from Africa goods worth 1,227 million rubles and export goods totaling around R1 billion. The figures are very small even after converting foreign currency rubles to dollars. Unfortunately glasnost has not yet spread to Soviet arms supplies, although it is known that some African countries are paying considerable sums for them.

Yes, Africa is experiencing severe crises—economic, social, and ecological. In several of the least developed countries the gross national product per capita is actually decreasing and they have become disaster, and at times famine, zones. But this cannot continue for ever. The African countries will, of course, find their own models for development, expanded reproduction, and improvement of the quality of life, which means they will increase their links with the surrounding world.

People will say: We have nothing to trade with Africa. I do not believe it! I do not believe that a state producing 25 million types of goods cannot find something profitable to trade in—from irons (which, it is true, have for some reason disappeared from our shops) to hydrofoils and aircraft, from ballet schools to eye disease treatment centers, from children's books to gigantic electric power stations. By the way, gigantism has become a dirty word. Another case of swinging from one extreme to the other. Gigantism is bad when it is not combined with ordinary large, medium, and small enterprises. But why discard the accumulated experience of building giants in cases when they are economically profitable and when they will not have severe ecological effects?

We can cooperate in the creation of joint firms and in cadre training, in scientific research and design programs, and in the creation of new forms of technology needed by both us and the Africans.

A skeptical smile at this is not appropriate: Some African schools, banks, and scientific research centers are better equipped with computers than our own. For example, at the Nigerian National Center for Strategic and Political Research—the elite equivalent of our Academy of Social Sciences—they are calculating the country's growth models by computer. In some fully computerized Senegalese banks the level of customer service per person is higher than in our own. Small islands in a world of backwardness? Undoubtedly. But their number is growing.

How can the mechanism of economic cooperation be started up, who in our country will be its real champion and executor? We are lazy and unenterprising, and not adaptable or curious. We have only a handful, at best tens, of real enthusiasts for Africa or, for instance, the Arab countries, when there should be hundreds of thousands.

Meanwhile more French people are now living in Africa than in colonial times (not counting Algeria and Tunisia). Among them are businessmen, teachers, doctors, and representatives of thousands of other professions. The main magnet is higher wages in exchange for a worse climate and the loss of an element of comfort. But there are also personal likes and relationships. Our workers who end up in Africa have no extra incentive compared to their colleagues working in Europe, rather the reverse. But the main trouble is that bureaucrats deal with our economic links. The lower the volume of operations or the number of deals, the quieter, in effect, is their life, for the same wage.

The solution? It is necessary to create a group of people personally interested in links with Africa, who owing to their professionalism and enterprise, would sharply increase their own earnings by widening economic cooperation, and therefore would try accordingly to preserve and increase their knowledge and experience. A new mechanism of economic cooperation is needed—above all trading, shipping, and consultative firms and companies, and joint enterprises.

True, their employees if commercially successful will become very wealthy people by our standards. "Seize them! Soviet bourgeois! Don't allow it! Take it away! Share it out!" the howls of supporters of lumpenproletariat leveling "socialism" will be heard. If such sentiments prevail as before, we will not have dollars, pounds, and francs from expanding exports to Africa, we will not have coffee, tea, cocoa, bananas, oranges, pineapples, peanuts, dates, or olives—in short, the whole range of tropical and subtropical agricultural products, which constitute a considerable part of civilized man's diet. Obviously we will also be deprived of rare earth metals and a number of industrial products.

Many of our people are also faced with overcoming a psychological barrier. The attitude to Africans—from both the northern and southern parts of the continent—is a complicated mixture of official slogans absorbed from childhood ("brothers in arms oppressed by colonialism, who have found freedom," which implies younger brothers protected by us) and common or garden racism ("they have just come down from the trees").

We should not puff our chests out, get carried away, or boast! Let us be more modest and reserved...

Paternalism and especially snobbishness tinged with racism are unacceptable, improper, and shameful for us ourselves (not to mention that by the same "logic," and with ample grounds, we may find ourselves made the target of such feelings by the Americans or Japanese, the Dutch or the French). We and the Africans had different starting points. Let us not forget the centuries of the slave trade, the Africans' suffering and oppression in the past and present, and above all the inequality of growth in various regions of the world.

It is laughable and ignorant to underestimate the Africans' contribution to panhuman civilization.

This is not to mention the place of northern and parts of tropical Africa in the great Muslim civilization. Without the heritage of Africa one cannot imagine the Beatles, Elvis Presley, or Michael Jackson. The origins of all contemporary mass musical culture lie in Africa (we recognize this irrespective of whether we like this mass culture or not). In our concrete, synthetic, gray humdrum lives, bogged down as we are in the search for human values and new forms of art, we can find much in Africa. From the natural merging and harmony with nature to the amazing expressiveness of the human body, from the tremendous sense of rhythm to the unusual combination of colors and new sculptural forms. One needs only the will and the ability to see.

We customarily admire the successes of Africans and black Americans in sport. But let us not forget: In the last few years two Nobel literature prizes have been given to Africans—the Egyptian Najib Mahfuz and the Nigerian Wole Soyinka.

In manifestations of the human spirit and culture there are no "highers" or "lowers." Each person has his own contribution.

My conclusion is simple: We do have something to give Africa, and the Africans have something to give us in return.

East Europe

CSSR's Havel Visits USSR, Meets Gorbachev

Gorbachev-Havel Talks Begin

LD2602174190 Moscow TASS in English 1641 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 26 TASS—Soviet-Czechoslovak talks began in the Kremlin's Catherine Hall this afternoon.

The Soviet delegation includes Mikhail Gorbachev, Vladimir Kryuchkov, Yuriy Maslyukov, Eduard Shevardnadze and Dmitriy Yazov.

The Czechoslovak delegation includes President Vaclav Havel, Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Dlouhy, Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier, Defence Minister Miroslav Vacek and Interior Minister Richard Sacher.

Commenting on the beginning of Havel's visit to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry spokesman Lubos Dobrovsky told TASS that the dialogue had begun successfully. He expressed hope that the visit will end with as much success.

According to Dobrovsky, the talks focused on two major aspects.

The sides discussed the further development of bilateral relations and the removal of "barriers that are the legacy of the past."

The other important aspect was the European process, specifically the unification of the two German states. The spokesman said "this difficult problem concerns the vital interests of our countries and its discussion will be continued at the talks now."

The spokesman said economic issues "are, naturally, featuring prominently in the dialogue, because the economies of the two countries are closely linked by mutual obligations and long-term plans."

[Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1630 GMT on 26 February, in its report on the talks at this point, says: "These problems were discussed in detail in a conversation between Dlouhy and Maslyukov, in the context of political changes, and they will also be touched on at the talks."]

The Soviet leadership will give a dinner for Havel at the Kremlin tonight.

Declaration on Relations Released

LD2602184590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1807 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 26 Feb (TASS)- The official text of a declaration on relations between the USSR and the CSSR has been circulated here today. The document, signed by Mikhail Gorbachev and Vaclav Havel, says:

"Mikhail Gorbachev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and CSSR President Vaclav Havel, having met in Moscow on 26 February 1990, have stated:

"That relations between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia will develop on the basis of equal rights and full mutual respect for state sovereignty. Only on this basis can voluntary cooperation, advantageous for both countries, in all spheres of public life, be implemented.

"Both leaders think that this statement can become a good start for diverse agreements in the realm of politics [politiki], the economy, trade, science and culture; and will open up prospects for strengthening the friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

"Mikhail Gorbachev and Vaclav Havel spoke out in favor of Soviet-Czechoslovak cooperation in the interests of ensuring the security of both countries and peace in Europe. They come out for the further development of the all-European process."

Foreign Ministers' Meeting Reported

LD2602201990 Mocow TASS in English 1950 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 26 TASS—Follows the full official text of the announcement about today's meeting between the foreign ministers of the USSR and Czechoslovakia.

"On February 26 the Politburo members and foreign minister of the USSR E. Shevardnadze met with the foreign minister of Czechoslovakia J. Dienstbier who is in the Soviet Union in connection with the working visit of the Czechoslovak president Vaclav Havel.

In the course of a frank and meaningful conversation they discussed in detail the status and the prospects of bilateral relations in the light of the processes of perestroika and reforms under way in the two countries. They held a detailed discussion on a broad range of topical international problems.

The sides expressed their profound interest in developing Soviet- Czechoslovak relations on the principles of friendship, equality, non-interference in each other's internal affairs and mutual benefit. They reaffirmed the desire of the USSR and Czechoslovakia to ensure a stable and multi-faceted economic cooperation, and stressed the importance of enhancing its effectiveness on the basis of a radical restrucuring of the mechanism of bilateral economic relations. The two ministers reached mutual understanding on the need to activate contacts in science and culture and to broaden contacts between people.

The meeting reflected a coincidence or similarity of the sides' assessments of the dynamic changes at work in the world. They expressed the opinion that the success of the talks to cut conventional armed forces will be facilitated by the level of the U.S. and Soviet armed forces in Europe, agreed upon in Ottawa. The sides reaffirmed the commitment of the two states to the all-European process and their intention to make a constructive contribution to the preparation and holding in 1990 of a summit meeting of the European countries, the United States and Canada.

The sides were unanimous in stating that a lasting peace and security on the continent can be safeguarded only if the territorial realities that have evolved in Europe are oberved. They believe that a solution of the German question must serve the cause of peace and stability in Europe, be achieved within the framework of the all-European process and take into account the legitimate security interests of the neighbours of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, and of other European states.

The sides favoured further improvement of cooperation within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty and lending it a greater political directedness

The ministers reaffirmed the sides' desire to deepen their interaction on the international plane.

The ceremony of signing the Soviet-Czechoslovak intergovernmental agreement on the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia was held on the same day. The agreement was signed by Eduard Shevardnadze for the Soviet side and Jiri Dienstbier for the Czechoslovak side."

Troop Withdrawal Accord Signed

LD2602191990 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1730 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Excerpts] President of the Republic Vaclav Havel and his entourage started a two-day working visit to the USSR today. The events of its first day are summed up by our correspondents Petr Voldan and Lubomir Sisak. [passage omitted]:

[Voldan] Accompanied by extraordinary interest from journalists, Vaclav Havel and Mikhail Gorbachev signed—just less than two hours ago—the texts of the declaration on relations between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. In it the two statesmen say that relations between the countries will be developing on the basis of equality and mutual respect for state sovereignty. And a voluntary and mutually advantageous cooperation in all spheres of social life will be implemented on this basis, too. As is said in the declaration, this document could be a good foundation for concluding agreements. In the declaration the two statesmen advocate further development of the pan-European process.

After exchanging the signed documents, Foreign Ministers Jiri Dienstbier and Eduard Shevardnadze sat down to sign the much awaited agreement on the departure of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia with the datelines agreed by the delegations of the two countries in the course of talks in Moscow and Prague.

Havel Summarizes Topics of Talks

LD2602215690 Moscow TASS in English 2011 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 26 TASS—Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel has described a declaration that he signed with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev today, as "setting the beginning of future relations between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union."

Havel, who arrived in Moscow on a working visit, was speaking to reporters here today.

He said "this is a short declaration but I consider it as very important, because from now on our relations will be built on the principles of equality and sovereignty of both states.

"This declaration is giving scope for new treaties and agreements in the areas of politics, economy, trade and culture.

Havel noted the declaration's universal nature, which he described as positive: on the one hand, the declaration does not specify areas of bilateral cooperation and, on the other, does not limit them.

Speaking about the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which is expiring this year, Havel said that he did not discuss this issue during his talks with Gorbachev.

"I think we should neither extend this treaty nor conclude a new one, because our present-day relations are quite different from those that we had when the treaty was signed," he said.

"The political declaration signed today reflects the nature of our new relations."

Havel said the two sides today signed a treaty on cooperation between the two countries' security forces in anti-terrorism, anti-crime and anti-drugs efforts.

He also spoke about the Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement on the Soviet troop withdrawal from Czechoslovakia, signed by the two countries' foreign ministers today. The agreement contains a specific date—July 1, 1991—by which the pullout should be completed.

The president said he requested Gorbachev that the withdrawal of Soviet forces—five divisions with combat equipment—be completed by February 26, 1991.

Havel said the Soviet leader did not rule out the possibility of completing the withdrawal within a year. He quoted Gorbachev as saying that this "will depend on the success of the process of cooperation" between the two countries.

The sides agreed not to change the original date for the complete withdrawal—June 30, 1991—in the treaty.

Havel said his discussion with Gorbachev of the German issue revealed the closeness of the sides' positions.

"I think the process of German unification should accelerate European unification, rather than slow it down," the Czechoslovak president said.

Speaking about Czechoslovakia's and the Soviet Union's approaches to ways to overcome "dark pages" in the history of their bilateral relations, Havel said he and Gorbachev agreed that "the best way to do it is to look forward."

Havel Fields Journalists' Questions

PM2702122690 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Meeting With Journalists"]

[Text] In the evening of 26 February CSSR President V. Havel, who is in our country on a working visit, met with Soviet and foreign journalists at the USSR Foreign Ministry press center.

The president did not make a statement, but invited questions immediately.

One concerned the unification of the two German states. In reply, the president said that during his talk with M.S. Gorbachev they had told each other their views and discovered that they are very close. My personal viewpoint, V. Havel noted, is that the process of unification of the two Germanies should not be a brake on the development of European relations, but, on the contrary, a stimulus to its progressive development.

The president was asked whether he brought any message to M.S. Gorbachev from G. Bush. I did not bring any specific message, the Czechoslovak leader replied. I suppose, he added, if the U.S. President felt the need for that, he could do without me. Mr. Bush simply asked me to brief Mr. Gorbachev on the content of our talks, which I did.

Answering another question, V. Havel said that he believes that the opinions of G. Bush and M.S. Gorbachev on the CSSR's role in Europe are very close.

Speaking about his meetings with the American and Soviet leaders, the CSSR president shared some purely personal feelings. He acknowledged, for instance, that he had arrived feeling a certain embarrassment, as the president of a small country approaching the presidents of great powers. But in two minutes this embarrassment disappeared, and we talked, in both cases, as one person to another.

The guest was asked what, in his view, was the trickest point during his meeting with M.S. Gorbachev. I think, V. Havel replied, that it was the 1968 invasion. I believe that this is in the past now, especially since our signing of the declaration. Furthermore the Soviet Union itself has already given a critical assessment of this. We concluded that the best way to close the book on the past is to look to the future, the CSSR president stressed.

Gorbachev, Havel Elaborate on Talks

PM2702115090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Feb 90 Second Edition pp 1-2

[TASS report under general heading: "Working Visit"]

[Text] On the same day [26 February] M.S. Gorbachev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, met with V. Havel in the Kremlin. In the afternoon Soviet-Czechoslovak talks were held, with the participation of an extended group. On the Soviet side, V.A. Kryuchkov, Yu.D. Maslyukov, E.A. Shevardnadze, and D.T. Yazov took part; on the Czechoslovak side, the officials accompanying the CSSR president took part. The dialogue resulted in the Declaration on USSR-CSSR Relations, the text of which is published in the press.

A dinner was given by the Soviet leadership in honor of the Czechoslovak head of state.

M.S. Gorbachev and V. Havel commented on the start of the dialogue at the request of journalists covering the Czechoslovak president's visit to the USSR.

V. Havel: I believe that today was unusually successful, for three reasons: First, Mr. Gorbachev and I signed a declaration that is to become the basis of a new type of relations between us; second, our ministers signed an agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovak territory; third; we understood each other very well on the very diverse problems that we discussed.

M.S. Gorbachev: I think much can be explained by the new stage our countries are passing through—our perestroyka and the great and profound changes taking place in Czechoslovakia. Of course, there is much that is similar and much that differs in these processes. That is only natural, because it is a question of countries that have cooperated and collaborated for a long time, each of which has its own history and its own traditions that make their mark on the current processes. It is important that Mr. Havel and I noted the need, at the present stage and in the new conditions, to leave behind whatever was negative in our relations and open a chapter for the further development of our cooperation. I see this, first and foremost, as the significance of the declaration now signed. I must say that this document was born actually during the talks, it is brief, but substantive in terms of the ideas and political guidelines it contains. We agreed that we must take everything that was good in the past, rid ourselves of everything that was a burden on our political and economic relations, and move forward taking into account the interests of the two countries and the demands of the new time.

[Unidentified questioner] Is our president different from the other statesmen whom you have met, Mikhail Sergeyevich?

M.S. Gorbachev: I have met many people, but I have never found that presidents or prime ministers resembled one another. Each of them is an individual, and I must say that I feel satisfaction at the acquaintanceship that was formed today. This took place in a good atmosphere, and I hope we understood each other well. We found many opportunities to give a new, dynamic character to cooepration between our peoples and countries and boost Soviet-Czechoslovak relations in the sphere of political dialogue on the problems that affect the European continent. So I found in the president of Czechoslovakia a man who is open to frank conversation and discussion of all problems from the standpoints of realism and with an eye to the future.

[Unidentified questioner] And how do you, Mr. Havel, assess Gorbachev as a politician?

V. Havel: Mr. Gorbachev talked with me not in the way that the leader of a superpower talks, but like a man who is concerned about the earth's peaceful future and who is pleased to talk about that future with representatives of any state, regardless of its geographical size.

[Unidentified questioner] Did you invite M.S. Gorbachev to visit Czechoslovakia?

V. Havel: Of course.

[Unidentified questioner] And you, Mikhail Sergeyevich, did you accept that invitation?

M.S. Gorbachev: Yes, I accepted the invitation, I am grateful for it, and I will be glad once again to meet with many friends and with the people of Czechoslovakia.

[Unidentified questioner] How do you, Mikhail Sergeyevich, assess the prospects for Soviet-Czechoslovak relations in the context of the all-European process?

M.S. Gorbachev: I think each country has its role in this process, and I see the unique role of our two countries. There is clearly no need to explain the unique position of the Soviet Union or look for arguments to substantiate the obviously unique role of Czechoslovakia—a state located in the center of Europe, one of whose main traditions is the ability to establish good relations with its neighbors. I believe that this quality of the CSSR people and the experience that this state has accumulated will serve the building of new relations in Europe well. The uniqueness of the two countries, combined with cooperation between them, is a very important factor in European building.

[Unidentified questioner] Was the question of the unification of the Germanies raised?

V. Havel: Yes, we talked about that. We are united in the view that this process should take place in an all-European context. In fact, this understanding existed even before our personal meeting.

M.S. Gorbachev: I expressed my views on this point in some detail the other day, so Mr. President knows these views. In any event, during the exchange of opinions we found that on this very important question of European and world politics we have a deep understanding of the need for cooperation not only among the countries of the "great coalition," but all the European countries. This affects the interests of everyone, especially neighbors and especially countries like the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, where history itself has decreed that there is a special interest in these problems. We hope that this process, through joint efforts, will benefit the peoples of the two German states too, and promote the interests of the peoples of all the European coutnries.

[Unidentified questioner] Was there anything on which agreement was not reached?

V. Havel: I can't recall anything...

M.S. Gorbachev: I must repeat that we had a good mutual understanding, the only things we did not agree on were things we did not discuss...

Solton Commentary on Visit

LD2602145790 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] The Czechoslovak president, Vaclav Havel, begins his working visit to Moscow today. And we have this commentary from Yuriy Solton, and this is what he writes:

Vaclav Havel is a familiar name to Soviet people. He's known here as both a playwright and a champion of democracy who has served three prison terms for his dissenting views. Upon his election last December, President Havel stated he would be guided by common sense and the interests of his nation, rather than by ideological doctrines.

Clearly Soviet people have been asking what turn bilateral relations will now take. For long years these relations were clouded by the memory of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Adding to the resentment shared by many Czechs and Slovaks was the obedience to Moscow their former leaders displayed.

Interviewed by Soviet journalists, Vaclav Havel said his country was no longer going to play a colony to the Soviet Union's metropoly. [as heard] An equal and friendly relationship, he added, would benefit both sides. This view is shared by the present Soviet leadership, which has formally denounced the decision to send Soviet troops to Czechoslovakia. The issue of their withdrawal has been solved to both sides' satisfaction. An appropriate agreement has been initialled and will supposedly be signed during the Havel visit.

Havel Receives Yeltsin, Others

LD2602234390 Prague CTK in English 2250 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow Feb 26 (CTK Correspondent)—Visiting Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel and members of the Czechoslovak delegation met here tonight with representatives of the Soviet informal and democratic groups and movements.

The Soviet delegation included Soviet deputies Boris Yeltsin, Anatoliy Sobchak and Sergey Stankevich, radical economist Nikolay Schmelyov, Academician Oleg Bogomolov and others.

Havel Meets Soviet Democrats

LD2702111990 Prague CTK in English 1000 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow Feb 27 (CTK)—Visiting Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel received here during breakfast this morning several representatives of Soviet public and informal initiatives, including Mrs Yelena Bonner, wife of academician Andrei Sakharov who died in December last year.

The breakfast took place in the temporary Moscow residence of the Czechoslovak president and was attended by prominent Soviet democrats Sergei Kovalyev and Alexander Podrabinek, and by two of the participants in the Red Square demonstration on August 25, 1968 against the occupation of Czechslovakia by Soviet troops—Larisa Bogoraz and Konstantin Babitski.

In a cordial discussion Vaclav Havel thanked the participants in the demonstration for their courage and invited all the demonstrators to Prague for August 21, for the anniversary of the entry of foreign troops.

"It was a meeting with an old friend. I am very pleased by the development in your country. I am happy because a meeting with friends is always a big happiness," Yelena Bonner told CTK after the meeting with Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel.

Larisa Bogoraz who has been sentenced to four years in a Siberian labour camp for participating in the demonstration stressed: "It is the culmination of my life. When we stood in the Red Square 23 years ago, we were unable to imagine something like that. It is a beautiful dream."

Vaclav Havel and his entourage visited then the Vostryakovski cemetery on the outskirts of Moscow to lay a bunch of flowers at the grave of Andrei Sakharov.

Havel Lays Flowers at Sakharov Tomb

LD2702105790 Moscow TASS in English 1047 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 27 TASS—President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia today visited the Vostryakovskoye cemetery in Moscow to pay tribute to prominent scientist, public figure, human rights activist and nobel peace prize winner Andrei Sakharov and lay flowers on his tomb.

Sakharov, who died on December 14, 1989, was one of the few Soviet people to openly welcome "the Prague Spring" and denounce Soviet armed interference in Czechoslovak affairs.

CPCZ 'Welcomes' Havel Visit to Soviet Union

LD2702113890 Moscow TASS in English 1121 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Text] Prague February 27 TASS—The Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ] attaches great importance to the development of relations with the Soviet Union and welcomes the visit of President Vaclav Havel to the USSR, a statement released here says.

The Soviet Union is a close neighbour of Czechoslovakia. The two countries are connected by numerous ties, including trade and economic cooperation.

The statement also laid out the party's stand on major aspects of the international position of Czechoslovakia.

The underestimation of Soviet-Czechoslovak relations and distortions of political and economic realities would have a far-reaching negative impact on stability and the international position of Czechoslovakia.

In this connection, one cannot help recalling the decisive role of the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia's liberation from the Nazis, the statement said. This reality was reflected in minds of the majority of Czechoslovak people and boosted the development of Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship over the post-war period.

It is now high time to rid bilateral relations of some distortions and erroneous political decisions, which harmed both sides and socialist ideals as well.

The party welcomes the initialed agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, the statement stressed.

Wisdom and reality should prevail over emotions and anti-Soviet moods when the troops are withdrawn. The party has advocated this stand from the very beginning of the intergovernmental negotiations.

The party is closely watching Soviet developments. It wishes perestroika success and wants it to prompt the revival of socialist ideas and enable the creation of a socially just, democratic and free society.

The party described the Soviet Union as an important guarantor of European and international security, which, alongside the United States, will play a key role in solving problems of the new European set-up, the statement noted.

Havel's Speech to U.S. Congress Reported

PM2702135590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[IZVESTIYA press service report: "V. Havel Speech in U.S. Congress"]

[Text] "I am often asked how the United States can help us today," Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel said, addressing the U.S. Congress. And he continued: "You will help us most if you help the Soviet Union. The sooner, the quicker, and the more peacefully it begins to move along the path to real political pluralism, to respect for the people's rights, and to a market economy, the better it will be not only for the Czechs and Slovaks but also for the whole world."

The speech to both houses of congress ended the first official visit in history by a Czechoslovak head of state to the United States, during which V. Havel twice met with President G. Bush. During this second meeting, it emerges from a White House statement, agreement was reached that the presence of U.S. troops in Europe is a factor of stability and security.

The following fragment from the Czechoslovak president's speech, also highlighted by the news agencies, can be assessed as the desire to explain his preceding statements on this issue, which gave rise to an adverse reaction in Washington. "It is not true," he said, "that the Czech writer Vaclav Havel wants to dissolve the Warsaw Pact and NATO immediately. Vaclav Havel simply believes what he has already said here: In the next 100 years U.S. soldiers should not be separated from their mothers because Europe cannot be the guarantor of peace that it should be, if only because it has caused two world wars."

V. Havel, who intends to visit Moscow in the next few days, stated in his speech that in the interests of political stability he would like as many Soviet troops as possible to be withdrawn from Czechoslovakia by the time of the elections. At the same time, he said that he understands all the extraordinarily complex reasons, primarily those of an internal political nature, why the Soviet Union cannot withdraw its troops as rapidly as they were brought in in 1968. Czechoslovakia, he said, understands that the arsenals constructed there in the past 20 years cannot be dismantled and removed immediately.

Defense Minister Yazov Receives CSSR's Vacek

LD2602230690 Prague CTK in English 2237 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow Feb 26 (CTK correspondent)—Czechoslovak Defence Minister Miroslav Vacek met here Monday with his Soviet Counterpart Dmitriy Yazov.

They concentrated on several partial issues concerning the removal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia.

Minister Vacek told CTK the talks also focused on the problem of the unification of Germany, and the conversion of military industries in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.

The Czechoslovak defence minister added that favourable prerequisites for the talks have been created by President Havel's statement that Czechoslovakia will remain a member of the Warsaw Treaty alliance.

Troops Begin Official Withdrawal From CSSR

LD2602183190 Moscow TASS in English 1814 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] Prague February 26 TASS—A trainload of 31 flatbed cars loaded with tanks and other combat equipment left the Czechoslovak Frenstat Pod Radhostem station, North Moravia, today, marking the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country.

Soviet troops were stationed in Czechoslovakia under a 1968 treaty.

All troops stationed at Frenstat must leave the country before March 15.

On Tuesday, two more of the expected 14 trains will leave for the Soviet Union. Columns of trucks will finish the withdrawal. Simultaneously, released Soviet troop facilities will be turned over to the town authorities.

No Differences With CSSR on Troop Withdrawal

LD2602135590 Moscow TASS in English 1338 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 26 TASS—"There are no fundamental differences between the USSR and Czechoslovakia on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country," TASS was told by Colonel General Anatoliy Kleimenov, deputy chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, in connection with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, which starts today. General Kleimenov took part in the Prague negotiations on the framework for the withdrawal.

According to the general, there were more than 73,000 Soviet servicemen in Czechoslovakia on February 25, 1990. He said the redeployment of such a large contingent required a lot of preparatory work.

Kleimenov noted that the troops would be withdrawn in three phases. The first starts today. Units of an armour division, deployed near the town of Bruntal, are being withdrawn by rail. The operation will be completed by May 31. This will reduce the Soviet troops in the country by more than 25,000. The second phase will be completed by the end of 1990 and the last—in 1991.

Kleimenov said that, in addition to purely organisational and technical problems, the withdrawal of Soviet troops is linked with certain social factors affecting the life of servicemen: 11,000 families of commissioned and non-commissioned officers, now serving in Czechoslovakia, have no housing of their own in the USSR. "Time is needed to build homes, schools and child welfare institutions, in short, to create the necessary infrastructure," Kleimenov stressed.

General Vorobyev on Withdrawal From CSSR

LD2602153590 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia began on Monday, 26 February. It has begun prior to the signing of the appropriate agreement in Moscow. All in all, 73,500 Soviet troops, 1,220 tanks, more than 2,500 armored vehicles, 77 planes, and other military equipment and arms will be withdrawn. Our correspondent, Vadium Solovyev, spoke to the commander of these forces, General Eduard Vorobyev.

[Begin Vorobyev recording in Russian fading into English report] The withdrawal of our forces will take place in three stages. The first stage is set for 31 May, the second up to the end of the year, and the third in 1991, says General Eduard Vorobyev. We plan to carry out the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Czechosklovakia in an organized way. We see to it that the level of military preparedness even during the withdrawal do not lower [as heard]. In agreement with the Czechoslovak side, as from 16 February joint Soviet-Czechoslovak working commissions have been operating in all garrisons. They are responsible for examining all facilities received by the Soviet side on lease, to determine their condition and check for any damage. They will do the same at the facilities constructed by the Soviet side and will also consider the further use of these facilities. We shall do everything so the facilities, if they are to remain operational, can be used for the benefit of the people.

In answer to the question, if there were any difficulties in relation to the forthcoming troop withdrawal, General Vorobyev replied: Yes there are difficulties. To mention but two: First we have a technical one. We need a continuous supply of rolling stock from the loading station in Czechoslovakia and especially at Chop, the border station. I must stress this constant supply has to be kept up during the whole period of the withdrawal. The second one is related to moving the officers' families to new places where they will be stationed. Nearly 60 percent of these families cannot be guaranteed housing in the Soviet Union at the present time.

Maslyukov Receives CSSR's Dlouhy 26 Feb

LD2602234990 Prague CTK in English 2251 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow Feb 26 (CTK Correspondent)—Czechoslovak Deputy Premier, chairman of the State Planning Commission Vladimir Dlouhy met here Monday with Soviet First Deputy Premier, chairman of the State Planning Committee Yuriy Maslyukov.

Vladimir Dlouhy said that the Soviet Union has promised to supply Czechoslovakia with the planned 16.6 million tonnes of crude oil by the end of this year.

Dealing wwith prospects of long-term cooperation the two sides stated that greater freedom should be given to enterprises. The Soviet Union, in Vladimir Dlouhy's opinion, pushes through quick transition to world prices and clearing in convertible currencies in mutual trade. [as received]

Soviet Scientist Views European Changes

AU1902175190 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
16 Feb 90 p 15

["(PP)"-signed report: "Now Political Reforms"]

[Text] Prague (From our own correspondent)—"Now it is essential to take a decisive step in political reforms, to give further freedom to manufacturers, and to make progress, in particular, in the ownership issue," said Oleg Bogomolov, the well-known Soviet scientist and director of the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, at Thursday's [15 February] news conference in Prague.

Evaluating the changes in Eastern and Central Europe, he spoke about the positive influence of these changes on European policy and on the position of the Soviet Union. He stated that as far as the USSR's economic relations with these countries is concerned, it may happen that at the beginning his country will lose something. However, in his opinion, the transformation process corresponds to the Soviet Union's long term strategic interests. It is logical that in these countries' economies, the volume of cooperation with Western states will increase and participation with the USSR will decrease. However, this does not mean that the USSR's interests will suffer. We think, he added, that the period of confrontation led to a detachment from the world in these countries. Overcoming this is both in these countries' interests and in the Soviet Union's interests.

In reply to a question on how the Soviet public evaluates the changes in Europe, Oleg Bogomolov said that it is impossible to talk about a united viewpoint. It is clear that the forces which support restructuring followed these processes with understanding and appreciate them very positively. On the other hand, there are people who are following the changes very warily and who have no sympathy for them. A certain role is played in this by a lack of information among the Soviet public about what is happening in Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and other countries.

When he evaluated the results of the recent CEMA session in Sofia, he said that the participating delegations obviously did not yet have precise ideas on how to overcome the Council's difficulties. Despite this, a substantial step forward was taken. "We got to the stage of transferring to world prices and to accounting in freely convertible currencies," he recalled. In O. Bogomolov's opinion, the transition period should last two or three years but the Hungarians, for example, are demanding that the transition be implemented immediately.

Readers' Worries on Changes in East Europe Aired

PM2202153990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
20 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[Anatoliy Karpychev article under the rubric "International Theme in Readers' Letters": "Difficult Answers to Easy Questions"]

[Text] Readers always have lots of questions, and very unexpected ones, too. We think that everything is clear to them, but it can be seen from letters to the editors that, yes, it is clear, but not entirely. Take this letter, if you please.

"It seems to me that the time has come to publish a detailed article on the subject: 'What is happening in the world socialist system?' Hungary is looking at capitalism. Poland too. The GDR will unite with the FRG, tomorrow if not today. In Romania there has been a coup which is welcomed most of all by Bush, Mitterrand, and other imperialists.

"It would be interesting to know what the socialist countries' leaders talk about when they meet. Is it not part of their duty to tell each other the truth and to envisage negative phenomena?

"Does it turn out that our soldiers died in vain?

"What is the matter with the Warsaw Pact?"

Evidently wishing to show that these questions are not an idle mental exercise for him, the writer—G. Korobov—stuck to the left of the letter a newspaper clipping entitled "Memorial Defiled." The reference was to the memorial to the Soviet liberator servicemen in Berlin's Treptow Park, as well as the fact that a GDR Government spokesman had most resolutely condemned the anti-Soviet action.

This is the kind of letter. It is not the only one. Seemingly easy questions, but how hard the answers to them are.

When the people in fraternal countries began, one after another, to reject the Stalinist model of socialism, the imitation of "stagnation," bureaucratism, and the power of official posts, the essence of the events there was in principle clear to readers. But when the word "people's" vanished from the names of the Hungarian People's Republic and the Polish People's Republic, questions appeared in letters to the editors: Why? Readers noticed that Prime Minister Mazowiecki, while he was in Moscow, addressed our premier not as comrade but as "Mr. Ryzhkov." And again a question in letters—why? Readers noticed that in Leipzig, where the wave of purification of GDR public life originated, 100,000 people soon held a demonstration which bore the slogans: "Down with Communists." Readers noticed how hastily the Communist Party was outlawed in Romania and then the mistake rectified.

We have always considered these to be fraternal countries and felt especially close to them, and it would be a sham to pretend that we are not interested in the changes or their future fate. No, we do not have the right to make definitive assessments of situations which are developing and which are complex, still less to draw hasty conclusions, but, like the whole of the rest of the world, today we can already empathize and reflect on the dramatic events and destinies.

We cannot fail to reflect on them. Just over a year ago, for example, I talked with Karoly Grosz, general secretary of the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party]. I knew him well, for I had once worked in Hungary. After that last conversation, however, events moved so quickly that for a time not only was my acquaintance Grosz not on the horizon but the party itself also ceased to exist for a while. Recently the Polish United Workers Party acted almost in accordance with the Hungarian precedent. The party existed—and then it did not. The closing down of one party—sometimes with ceremony and with the bitterness of parting—and the birth of a new party in the same hall give rise to a contradictory feeling in readers, and in myself personally, too. It is as though some people have decided to acquire a more fashionable suit, for the old one no longer looks good. Or they wanted to change their appearance and not attract attention, so that the people would not point a reproachful finger at them. But it is only in the Russian folk tale that Ivanushka throws himself into a tub of scalding water and emerges a handsome man. In life everything is more complex. In the view of a number of readers, and I agree with them, it is impossible to create a new party from an old one, however many times it changes its name. It is possible to abandon certain postulates, but people all the same remain as before. And not everyone wishes to part with the old party. Some MSZMP members did not want to go over to the Hungarian Socialist Party—they convened their own congress and said that they were loyal to Marxism-Leninism and were remaining in the MSZMP.

So what is happening in the world socialist system? Some readers go still further in their ponderings—does the socialist system itself remain in a country if the Communist Party ceases to be the ruling party, as in Poland or Hungary, let us say? And, in general, can we now call these countries socialist and fraternal?

This is not yet clear to readers. I do not know all the answers either—I have taken up my pen in order to reflect together with the readers. Together with them I would remark that it is too soon to answer many questions, because everything is in flux, in dynamic motion. We, like the West, were not ready to perceive the events in East Europe. They proved so unusual that they seemed "alien" and frightening. As a Western journalist pointed out, a very "stable situation," which, it was generally believed, nothing at all threatened before the end of the 20th century, suddenly proved very unstable. When officials in the West were asked their attitude to what was happening, their reply was more often cautious: Let us wait and see.

We do not particularly like to wait, and so we want to see everything without delay. This is one of the reasons why the course of certain events and the new order of things in the fraternal countries fit badly within our consciousness. And the second reason—for which we pay later with the readers' mistrust—is that the newspapers do not tell the truth in time. The whole truth. For until recently we "painted" Ceausescu in pleasant hues in all respects. This is why the reader whose letter was cited at the beginning of this article inquired whether the fraternal countries' leaders tell each other the truth.

The events in Romania have elicited many letters. They are still arriving. I wish to cite one more.

"Quite recently I heard on all-union radio a broadcast which stated that Romania is the only country that does not have a foreign debt. I really envied the Romanian people and leadership such a good state of affairs. And suddenly—like a bolt from the blue... The events in Romania. I just cannot understand clearly what is going on and what was the cause of the events."

When reflecting, we seek answers, as a rule, outside, including in the newspapers. And... we do not always find them. But, I will dare to remark, the answers are frequently within ourselves. Precisely within us. In our understanding of events, in our civic stance, in our honesty to ourselves and to our own thoughts and actions.

The processes in the fraternal countries are ambiguous and contradictory and give rise to different feelings. Yes, certain communist parties have lost people's trust and ceased to be ruling parties, and a totally unfamiliar situation has arisen in the countries. Why? Let us analyze and learn lessons. Even Western politicians do not rule out the possibility that a new model will be found for the socialist organization of society and will prove very attractive. These opinions from outside are somehow warming. Historical practice is a serious thing, and it is with this that we are coming into contact. Wisdom, patience, and courage are needed here. And fewer empty words... Inflation in words and a shortage of deeds is an old disease which is very hard to treat.

To continue reflecting, it is posssible to point out for myself: Not all the "forecasts" of the advantages of Western democracy have been confirmed in practice. While in Hungary, I inquired what could attract their Austrian neighbors on Hungarian soil. "A great deal," the Hungarians replied. "They buy foodstuffs from us, for they are cheaper in Hungary; they have their teeth seen to at the dentist; they have their cars repaired and pay in currency. What is more, Austrians come for family celebrations in our restaurants—this is cheaper, too." And what does the Hungarian buy in Austria? Technical equipment, but not food. So, to readers' questions of the type "how to regard the changes," I would advise regarding them calmly and sensibly. Calmly does not mean impassively.

But sometimes it is very hard or almost impossible to take a calm attitude. For example, when Soviet stars were dislodged from gravestones on New Year's Eve in the city of Gera in the GDR, a fraternal country. When messages received in Buchenwald—no, not under Hitler but today—state: "Keep the ovens open, a Russian and a communist with every shot." It is hard, you will agree, for readers to remain calm and mutely neutral when youths in the Polish city of Krakow stage a rampage beside the monument to Lenin—tins of paint are thrown at it and books burned beside it. It is hard to remain calm when people fan anti-Sovietism and storm our general consulate. When they spitefully persecute communists, defame them, and lead them to the noose.

"Why such hatred? What bearing does it have on the renewal of socialism?" our readers ask. "Hatred not only of the living but also of the dead." Of what, in fact, are Russian soldiers guilty? Of lying in their ground? But are the soldiers really to blame? They should have lived out their days in the motherland, readers remark, and should be lying beneath their own birch trees—look, Russian mothers would be calmer, too.

Every people have their own moral values and dear names and facts of history, and these are mocked only by those who are poor in spirit. Of course, the citizens' committee in the Polish city of Poronin can send the Polish Ministry of Culture a document recommending the closure of the V.I. Lenin Museum in that city. And I do not dispute the fact that in Krakow itself, where Lenin lived at the beginning of the century, someone might demand the abolition of the Lenin Museum and the transfer of the museum building to the music academy. But when you add together the Krakow facts, you get a very definite picture—hostility toward the personality of Lenin. I am not in favor of thoughtlessly repeating quotations and dogmatically following Leninist teaching. But readers have a question: Why does PRAVDA stay silent, and what stand do we take? Let us read the letters.

"Lenin belongs to all mankind. How can one call oneself an educated person and insult his memory?"

"A mother of six children, I address the Polish Government: On reading in newspapers and seeing on television shots of the outrage upon the Lenin monument, this is what I think about. Why did our fathers and grandfathers die liberating Poland from fascism? If they had liberated our country alone, many would still be alive. Of course, the fascists would then have annihilated more Poles—burned them in ovens, starved them to death, shot them, or hanged them. But then—forgive me for thinking this—perhaps those who are now defiling the Lenin monument would not have been born. For this denotes hatred of us."

"L.G. Kravtsova, 50 years old, milkmaid, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast."

"I have learned that Italian journalists and Communists have decided to ransom the Lenin monument which has been dismantled in the city of Krakow. This noble act by civilized people in Italy arouses admiration. But it pains me that such people were not found here, among the Communists and journalists of PRAVDA, which Lenin founded. I and my friends, Communists of the older generation, particularly war participants, are ready to share our pension in order to redeem the monument from Poland. Savva Doroshenko, Fastov City."

"To the Poles who barbarously insulted Lenin's memory and the graves of Soviet soldiers, to their memory! I am a Pole who grew up in the USSR. I was born eight km from Grodno into a large Polish family," K. Golubinskiy begins his emotional letter to the editors from Krasnoyarsk. "Have you, the descendants of Wroblewski, Dabrowski, Sienkiewicz, Orzeszkowa, and Mickiewicz, really become vandals? For the soldiers whose graves you insult gave their lives for Poland, for its freedom. Is your memory really so short? For the man against whom you hurled cans of paint and whom you furtively dragged from the pedestal signed Poland's independence."

There is no point in providing commentaries on the letters. Everything is clear as it is. I wish only to add the following to this. After reading the letters, I opened N.K. Krupskaya's reminiscences of Lenin and found the pages devoted to the Krakow period. Ilich very much liked the city of Krakow. Nadezhda Konstantinovna remarks that he joked merrily and praised both the "kwasne mleko" [soured milk] and the Polish "mocna starka" (strong vodka). Here Bukharin, Kamenev, Zinovyev, and Inesse Armand visited Lenin. They lived as a small circle bound by ties of comradeship. Ilich, Nadezhda Konstantinovna, and Inesse Armand liked to walk a great deal. They would walk to the edge of the city, to the meadow (meadow in Polish is "blonia"). Inesse Armand even took Blonina as her pseudonym.

Readers condemn the acts of vandalism. Our own correspondent in Czechoslovakia recently sent in a report from a newspaper. Here it is: "The end of last year will remain in the history of our region. Twelve years after the unveiling of the memorial to V.I. Lenin in 9 May Square in Prostejov the wish of the city's residents for it to be removed from the central square has been realized..."

The city's residents realized their wishes—this is their will and their right. But there is something in common between this and what happened in Krakow—tactlessness with regard to memory. This was manifested in the selection of photographs in the windows of Prostejov city hall. They record the moment the memorial was removed, and the chief detail is a rope noose. It seems that the fashion for dismantling memorials and changing the names of streets and squares with a Russian name has begun here too.

I would not like to offend friends. But I cannot pretend, nor do I have the right to pretend, that nothing at all is happening. Readers reproach us for hushing up facts. For not telling each other the bitter truth when it has to be told. Otherwise it is very hard to answer the readers' question: What is happening in the socialist community countries?

These are the thoughts suggested by a reading of the editors' mail on international topics.

West Europe

Falin Delivers Address to Europarliament Deputies

PM1502162990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS correspondent Aleksandr Sorokin dispatch: "Meeting of Parliamentarians"]

[Text] Strasbourg (Bas-Rhin Department), 14 Feb—The second interparliamentary meeting of delegations from the USSR Supreme Soviet and the European Parliament continues in the Palace of Europe. The first working sitting was devoted to an analysis of the political reforms currently being implemented in the Soviet Union.

In his speech Soviet delegation head V.M. Falin, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee and chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, drew the meeting participants' attention to the exceptionally great importance for Soviet society's development attaching to the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th party congress, which has been published in the Soviet Union. The development of the stipulation about the CPSU's rejection of its monopoly on power, he said, the formation of new parties and political organizations in the Soviet Union on the basis of an appropriate law which is due to be adopted, and the ensuing emergence of a multiparty system will transform the all-Union and republic parliaments, giving a different tone and hue to the questions being discussed there. Specifically, it is a question of different options for the development of both the federation and its components. The new platform is being built through an approach toward man not as an abstract individual but as a specific living person who has a mass of problems and a mass of questions. I hope that this human dimension of our platform will prompt members of the European Parliament to seriously ponder the stage to which the Soviet Union has been brought by perestroyka, the distance we have covered with our steps toward changes in our society, and you will then realize why these innovations are so difficult to achieve. We are really parting company with the past, not in words but in practice, V.M. Falin noted.

Members of the European Parliament asked the Soviet participants in the meeting numerous questions. They primarily wanted to know about the effect of the CPSU Central Committee February plenum decisions on the transformation and further development of Soviet society's political system. The course of the debate demonstrated the European parliamentarians' interest in the maintenance of political stability and democratic development in the USSR. They specifically expressed concern over the fact that the introduction of a multiparty system in the multinational Soviet state, in which the CPSU, in the opinion of many members of the European Parliament, plays the role of a connecting link, could lead to exacerbation of ethnic problems and destabilization of the situation.

It was noted from the Soviet side that a multiparty system in any state, including the Soviet Union, can neither be decreed nor handed down from above. Parties emerge as a result of the development of processes within society itself. The USSR Supreme Soviet deputies outlined in detail the Soviet parliament's viewpoint on the ways to solve political and ethnic problems in the Soviet Union.

"One of the tasks of our meeting," Magdalene Hoff, member of the European Parliament from the SPD [Social-Democratic Party of Germany] (FRG), said in an interview with a TASS correspondent, "is to inform our Soviet colleagues about the way complex problems of social development are solved in the conditions of a multiparty system. Of course, the availability of such experience does not fully insure any social system against shocks and crises. Nonetheless, we hope that the West European experience of multiparty parliamentarianism could be useful to the Soviet parliament."

The Soviet parliamentarians will continue their debates in different groups of the European Parliament.

Falin, Entourage Attend NATO Assembly Meeting

LD1602110690 Moscow TASS in English 2153 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Text] Brussels February 16 TASS—By TASS correspondent Valeriy Shashkov:

The Political Committee and the Committee on Defence and Security of the North Atlantic Assembly which includes legislators from 16 NATO member-countries, held a joint meeting in Brussels on Thursday.

For the first time the meeting was attended by a delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet led by Valentin Falin, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs and head of the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, which arrived in Brussels at the invitation of the assembly.

Greeting the Soviet visitors, K. Voigt, Defence and Security Committee chairman, stressed that their presence at the meeting is evidence of deep-going changes in Europe and development of such processes as democratisation in East European countries, establishment of control over armaments and West European integration.

John Galvin, supreme allied commander in Europe, and Vigleik Eide, NATO Military Committee chairman, who delivered reports at the meeting, dealt with European security and NATO's future.

They favoured broader contacts between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries and the establishment between them of relations based on a political dialogue and not on confrontation.

In Galvin's opinion, there are now good prospects for this purpose: efforts should be pooled to lessen confrontation in Europe and to ensure security at lower levels of armaments.

The INF Treaty was concluded, confidence-building measures are in operation, and talks are in progress to cut strategic weapons and to ban chemical arms, he continued.

The signing of a treaty on cutting armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe will be a major move forward. NATO should take into account the current changes and cannot look upon the Warsaw Treaty as it did a decade ago, Galvin noted.

At the same time the two speakers opposed disbanding NATO which, according to them, remains a bulwark of stability and security in Europe.

They emphasised that they do not see now an alternative to the strategy of containment and reliance on nuclear forces pursued by the North Atlantic alliance, although they recognised that it may change with time.

Participants also heard reports on the future of the two military and political alliances and changes in the Soviet military doctrine.

Soviet legislators disagreed with some appraisals in the reports concerning the role of the Warsaw Treaty and Soviet Armed Forces.

At the same time they stressed that meetings, similar to the present one, can help remove apprehensions on both sides and would create a clearer understanding of events in the Soviet Union and its position.

Falin Meets European Parliament CDP Group

LD2102202190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1300 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 21 Feb (TASS)—A conversation took place today between Valentin Falin, CPSU Central Committee member and chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, and a delegation from the Christian Democratic (People's) [CDP] group in the European parliament led by J. Penders, a member of the European parliament's Political and Institutional Affairs Committees, which is in the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation. The exchange of views focussed on topical matters of European development.

Italian Minister Urges 'New Rules' in Europe

PM0602150790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Own correspondent M. Ilinskiy dispatch incorporating interview with Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis: "Decisive Years for Destiny of Europe"—date of interview not given, first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] Rome—For the first time in the practice of the present Italian Government, Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis met representatives of the Italian and foreign press at the editorial office of the newspaper IL MESSAGGERO and answered questions concerning wide-ranging foreign policy problems. The minister was interviewed by correspondents of Il MESSAGGERO (Italy), IZVESTIYA (USSR), THE WASHINGTON POST (United States), and EL PAIS (Spain).

Answering a question from a correspondent of IL MESSAGGERO, who had asked him to comment on the events which are taking place in the Soviet Union, the minister said:

The most difficult thing at the moment is to make predictions. However, I believe that the months at the end of 1990 and the beginning of 1991 will be decisive not just for the leadership in the Soviet Union but for the success of perestroyka as a whole. This conclusion can be drawn from a number of relatively obvious causes.

The policy of perestroyka consciously and deliberately set in motion a broad process of changes in East Europe. These drastic changes exposed problems which had been suppressed or covered up for 45 years. I am referring above all to ethnic relations, which were only partially resolved after World Wars I and II. It is not difficult to understand this. We in West Europe also have long-standing problems in ethnic and religious relations which remain unresolved. For instance, problems between the Flemings and the Walloons in Belgium, the Basque question in Spain, the Alto Adige here in Italy, the Northern Ireland problem... In the Soviet Union, the biggest country within the other socioeconomic system, an explosion is also taking place.

The future of the economic system, as the Soviet leadership has frankly declared, will be decided precisely on the threshold between 1990 and 1991, in a period of decisive changes, in a period which is bound to be stormy and difficult. Only short-sighted people can believe that it will be otherwise. However, this does not mean that Gorbachev will not be able to overcome the difficulties and cope with the situation. Personally, I remain moderately and rationally optimistic. I proceed from the following premise: The USSR is too strong a reality in state terms for its current system of leadership—to which there is no alternative—to succumb to a crisis. I see no such alternative on the horizon, not even a negative one. I am in no hurry to sound the death knell.

In my opinion, what Gorbachev must guard against is not Estonian, Lithuanian, Georgian, or Azerbaijani nationalism, but a flareup of Russian nationalism in response to the nationalist mood among the other peoples. Small peoples or ethnic groups have never presented the main danger, if only because of their size. Ultimately, a solution can always be found in their case, be it an ethnic solution, or the exercise of power. Thus what is happening on the streets of Vilnius is causing me no concern. I would be worried if I saw a million people on the streets of Moscow. So far there is no sign of this.

I am one of those, the minister went on, who are saying that we must contribute to the success of Gorbachev's policy. In certain circles in America the question is still being discussed whether "helping" Gorbachev is advantageous or disadvantageous, whether it is worth doing or not. I have never had any doubts on this score. I have welcomed with a sense of profound satisfaction the fact that over the past 2-3 months all Western governments have adopted this stance.

In response to a remark by the correspondent of EL PAIS, that there are various proposals as regards the political course of West Europe, G. de Michelis emphasized:

I am aware that inopportune proposals are being voiced in various quarters and I am worried by attempts to put the cart before the horse and the suggestion of roundabout solutions. I have my own views on this score. I will highlight at least four important points, of which three are obvious, and the fourth, which is more controversial, is more of a personal opinion.

First. West Europe can assist Gorbachev's policy without straying from its own path, while firmly steering a course toward integration within the framework of the European Community. At the same time, we can accelerate progress toward the objectives studied and outlined in recent years, months, and weeks. From this angle, the idea of a "European confederation," as put forward by F. Mitterrand, seems less than useful to me. If we want to have a working program and confidently pursue the general line, then we must strengthen the role of the EC in relations with the countries of East Europe rather than trying to outdo each other, showing off who can get there first, who can put in the first appearance, who can make the first promise.

The second point lies in the ability to establish East-West relations on the lines of joint ventures. It is not a question merely of assistance, but of cooperation. We want to see each other as full collaborators, as complete partners. We must both accept our share of risk, we must bring into play the necessary resources (and to an ever-increasing degree and without being miserly) invest our "know-how" and also accept a share of the political risk. We must realize that their failure will also be our partial failure. This is the logic which governs the idea of joint ventures.

Such ventures may take shape in many spheres. Take, for instance, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development whose establishment we endorsed in Strasbourg. The "Commission for Democracy Through Law" which met in Venice 19-20 January falls into this category. Such ventures also comprise technical structures which are to provide the partners from the East with management experience and resources, the "know-how" of democracy, and legal "know-how," which are no less important than money. The question of the inclusion in the statutes of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development of a preamble linking credits with democratic reforms is currently being discussed.

And finally, third, there is Helsinki, or rather "Helsinki-2." Why? Everything that we have witnessed in the second half of 1989, with the exception of the events in Romania, passed off remarkably peacefully. This evolution is a continuation of the process initiated by the CSCE in 1975; it is the result of the far-sightedness of those who grasped that, in order to avoid sliding into the abyss of a new war, it is necessary for the same rules to apply to everyone, even if their positions are diametrically opposed. This is the line which must be adhered to. It would be wrong to look for shortcuts. For this very reason we are opposed to haste in resolving the question of the unification of the two Germanies. Nor are we in favor of allowing the national demands, even justified demands of individual peoples to exceed the framework of the common rules of the game. It is necessary now to establish order in these rules, going beyond the limits outlined by CSCE in 1975. It is no longer a question now of two rival systems wanting peaceful coexistence. We now have a single civilization. It is necessary to draw up new rules of coexistence in a Europe no longer divided into two rival blocs. In these circumstances, problems may remain on the lines of those which exist in the relations between Greece and Turkey within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty, or in relations between Romania and Hungary.

Only by convening "Helsinki-2" will it be possible to get all governments and all countries to accept the new, common international norms. How else can one make it plain to the Lithuanians and Estonians or the newly elected parliaments in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary that there is a limit to everything? We cannot permit ourselves to invent the antithesis of the "Brezhnev doctrine." The only solution is to demand that common rules be adopted which will be binding on everyone and will partially restrict the freedom of choice.

As for the fourth point, which, according to the minister's words, is of a more controversial and personal nature, it was set out as follows:

Western Europe, G. de Michelis said, must make its contribution to the establishment of what is described as the political trend. It is necessary, beginning with the West European countries, to take steps in the nineties to establish a "center-left" balance in Europe. That means that even in this question it is no longer possible to advance, guided only by national logic, sentiments, preferences, wishes, and so forth.

The coming years will be most decisive for Europe's destiny. At the same time, political stability assumes paramount importance. They will be years when common interests must prevail over contraditions, even justified contradictions. If a balance is not achieved between left-wing and "centrist" forces, if a compromise is not found between the socialist and social democratic reformist forces and the moderate political forces of the "center," if these forces choose the path of rivalry, it will not pass without extremes in the domestic political situation of individual countries. In one camp there will be the right-wing supporters of Le Pen, Schoenhuber, and extreme nationalist forces, and in the other camp the neopacifists, utopians, "greens," supporters of unilateralist measures, and so forth.

Replying to an IZVESTIYA correspondent's question on the actual prospects for holding the European "Helsinki-2" conference in the light of the changes which are taking place in Eastern Europe, the minister said:

In any event the decision on holding "Helsinki-2" has already been taken and the agenda is currently being discussed. When the talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe are concluded, the heads of state and government from the 23 countries taking part in these talks will meet. There is agreement in principle that it would be appropriate at this moment to also invite the remaining 12 heads of state and government, to ensure representation of all the 35 Helsinki participant countries. That will be a "Helsinki-2" held in 1990, ahead of the meeting scheduled for 1992 in Helsinki.

Cultural Exchange Agreement With Italy Signed

LD2502113690 Moscow TASS in English 1046 GMT 25 Feb 90

[by TASS correspondent Vladimir Drozhzhin]

[Text] Rome February 25 TASS—A programme for cultural exchanges between the Soviet Union and Italy in 1990-1992 was initialled here at the 15th session of the Soviet-Italian Mixed Commission.

The programme covers practically all fields of cooperation: the arts, education, science, youth group exchanges, sports, publishing business, etc.

The possibility which is opening up for the establishment of direct contacts between union republics, cities, creative unions, and artistic groups has become one of fundamentally new aspects of Soviet-Italian cultural relations.

This concerns in particular creative exchanges between the Bolshoi Theatre and Leningrad's Kirov Opera and Ballet Theatre, on the one hand, and Milan's La Scala and the Rome Opera, on the other.

Another peculiarity recorded in the document is that the governments of the two countries undertake to support the initiatives of respective public organisations and local authorities in the establishment of international cultural dialogue centres, in Leningrad, Florence, and on Capri in particular.

The three-year programme is an illustration that cultural cooperation between the Soviet Union and Italy plays an increasing part in the further development of the traditionally good relations between the two countries.

On the Soviet side the document was initialled by Ambassador A.I. Glukhov, head of the cultural relations department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, and on the Italian side by Mr S. Balanzini, general director of the Italian Foreign Ministry's department for cultural relations.

NOVOSTI Praises Political, Economic Ties

90ES0400B Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 29 Dec 89 p 12

[Unattributed article: "Positive Comment From NOVOSTI Agency"]

[Text] Italy is in the vanguard of European politics and is one of the privileged partners of the Soviet Union. Those are the gratifying views expressed by the Soviet agency NOVOSTI in its commentary on the year about to end.

The agency wrote, "the year 1989 has shown that extremely favorable conditions are developing in Europe for establishing a new form of interstate relations based on multilateral cooperation." It added, "Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to West European countries contributed in large measure to this." NOVOSTI went on to state, "the visit to Italy, a country that in recent times has been actively in the vanguard of European politics, was an important step in the series of contacts with Western Europe."

After having stated that the political dialogue between the Soviet Union and Italy has always been characterized by a high level of trust and soundness, NOVOSTI continued, "Our countries often have been pioneers in beginning a dialogue between East and West, even in the most complex times of postwar Europe." And, concluded the agency, "Today it is even more important to preserve that pioneering role now that, in Europe and the world, unprecedented possibilities are opening up for cooperation and the construction of the common European house."

Latin America & Caribbean

Levchenko Lauds 'Honest, Honorable' Sandinists

PY2702022090 Moscow in Spanish to Latin America 2300 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Report on Leonid Levchenko commentary]

[Text] According to the news agencies, the Nicaraguan election results are the main news item of the day. The preliminary results indicate that voters preferred Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, presidential candidate for the National Opposition Union.

Current Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega issued a public statement in which he said that the Sandinist government will recognize the final official result of the election and will respect the people's decision.

In the opinion of our commentator Leonid Levchenko, it is difficult to make a precise evaluation of the results. The surveys conducted before the election predicted a Sandinist victory. The Sandinist platform included important proposals such as the creation of a mixed economy, internal political pluralism, and nonalignment in the international field.

Another important Sandinist goal was to achieve national reconciliation; it was searching for a compromise agreement to this end. The Sandinist revolution raised the dignity and honor of the fatherland to new levels. They encountered, however, difficult times after the Reagan administration decided to arm and direct the counterrevolution and establish an economic blockade of the country.

No matter how generous the Sandinists wanted to be in their aim to improve the life of their people, their goals regretfully could not be implemented. Nicaragua needed peace to accomplish its goals but could not find it. The Sandinists did everything in their power to bring peace to the country, but their efforts were affected by the general situation in Central America. The Sandinist government made great efforts to end the regional conflict, and it was one the Sandinists' own commitments that brought about Nicaragua's early elections.

The electoral campaign took place in a positive climate despite the fact that the opposition had the moral and financial support of the United States. International observers were able to see that the election was honest and free and that violence was practically nonexistent. The opposition tried to taunt the Sandinists several times by warning about a possible fraud. The opposition did not think it was facing honest and honorable rivals who had the courage to recognize their defeat when they saw it.

A new question arises: Can this really be a defeat? The opposition did not win a really great majority. Many Nicaraguans continue to be loyal to the Sandinist ideals that overthrew Somoza's dictatorial regime and raised the dignity of the country. The Sandinists said before the election that they would seek ways to attain national reconciliation regardless of the election results. This is still an essential task in the post-election period. The winners, if they really want to live in peace, freedom, and democracy, must take into account the fact that without the cooperation of the Sandinists their goals will never become reality.

Observers Comment on 'Fair' Nicaraguan Elections

LD2702091890 Moscow TASS in English 0729 GMT 27 Feb 90

[By TASS correspondents Yuriy Dmitriyev, Igor Pshenichnikov, and Aleksandr Trushin]

[Text] Managua February 27 TASS—With more than 80 percent of the vote counted on Monday, the Sandinista National Liberation Front is trailing the Opposition National Union (UNO).

Chairman of the Supreme Electoral Council Mariano Fiallos said on Monday that the opposition's presidential candidate Violetta Chamorro had 55.2 percent of the vote, a 14.4 lead over President Ortega and the Sandinistas.

In the parliamentary race, the opposition was leading the Sandinistas by an equally decisive 54.8 percent to 40.7 percent. Chairman of the Supreme Electoral Council said that the preliminary official results by all polling stations will be published on February 27.

The UN secretary-general's personal representative for the monitoring of the electoral process in Nicaragua Elliot Richardson, General Secretary of the Organisation of American States Joao Baena Soares and former U.S. President Jimmy Carter reaffirmed that the vote was fair.

At a joint news conference held here on Monday they praised the government's and the Supreme Electoral Council's efforts to ensure conditions for free and democratic elections.

Soares called for national reconciliation and noted a high turnout. Richardson said that international observers note the support rendered by President Daniel Ortega to the election process. Richardson noted the unprecedented character of the United Nations mission, which for the first time exercised control over elections in an independent country.

Carter praised the maturity of the statements made by Chamorro and Ortega after the results of the vote were announced. The elections enable the contras to join the national reconciliation process.

The Sandinistas will now be able to play a major opposition role which will be of great significance for the country's future, Carter said.

"Reconciliation in Nicaragua is the priority task of the would-be government," Augustin Jarquin, member of the UNO Political Council, said at a news conference held here on Monday. "There are no winners nor losers. We believe that the Sandinistas will retain their major place in the process of national reconciliation and rehabilitation of Nicaragua."

Supreme Soviet Session

Congress of Peoples Deputies Set for 12-13 March

LD2702153590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1509 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 27 Feb (TASS)—TASS parliamentary correspondent reports from the Kremlin:

The Soviet parliament today supported by a majority the proposal of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on establishing the post of USSR president.

To elect the president and make the relevant amendments to the Constitution it has been decided to convene an extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies on 12 and 13 March this year.

Gorbachev Chairs Supsov Session on Presidency

LD2702073290 Moscow TASS in English 0725 GMT 27 Feb 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, February 27 TASS—At a joint sitting of its two houses today, the Soviet parliament began a debate on Presidency, which is considered one of the most controversial issues of the current session.

According to preliminary discussions, the parliament's attitude to the issue is varied.

The morning sitting is being chaired by Mikhail Gorbachev, president of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Kudryavtsev Speaks on Presidency Draft Law

LD2702104290 Moscow TASS in English 1033 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 27 TASS—Vladimir Kudryavtsev, vice president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, told the Soviet Parliament today that instituting the presidential post was one of the most important elements of forming a socialist law-governed state.

The bill vests a president with rather wide powers. His all- important function is to see to it that the adopted laws are implemented. The head of state has the right to propose the replacement of any statesman or government executive.

The president can impose a state of emergency in some or other area of the country. In case of an attack on the USSR, he has the right to declare war and carry out a mobilisation. However, the head of state cannot send troops abroad without the consent of parliament.

Kudryavtsev said that the bill pays much attention to the control of the president's activity. The constitutional compliance committee is called upon to make sure that the presidential decrees are consistent with the country's Constitution. In case the Constitution is violated, parliament will be empowered to recall the president ahead of time.

The term of the president's office is expected to be limited to two terms. The head of state is proposed to be elected by the entire population, but, by way of an exception, it is suggested electing him for the first time at the Congress of People's Deputies and reducing the term of office from five to four years—that is, until the next elections in the country.

Moscow TV Carries 26 Feb Supreme Soviet Session

Nishanov Chairs Sitting

LD2602205190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1900 GMT on 26 February begins carrying a recording of the session of the Supreme Soviet of Nationalities held in the Moscow Kremlin on 26 February. The session is chaired by Rafik Nishanovich Nishanov, member of the Supreme Soviet Presidium secretariat.

At 1904 GMT, Eduardas Vilkas, chairman of the commission for the social and economic development of union autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts, and okrugs, delivers a report on the draft law on the general principles of management of the economy and the social sphere. The law is to create a system of legal measures governing this sphere, he says, and to determine the remit of republics and central bodies. The law also provides for economic incentives within the framework of an All-Union market. There are provisions for republics to acquire a greater degree of economic independence—they will have greater control over their finances, budget, environment protection, and so forth. It is a very difficult task to delimit the powers of republics and the central union bodies, but a determined attempt to do so has been made. Contractual forms of cooperation between republics will play a greater role than has so far been the case, he goes on, and this will facilitate the process of economic integration. Various forms of ownership will have equal status. There will be no customs barriers. The law will ensure that there will be no discrimination in favor of areas or producers. Autonomous oblasts and okrugs will have greater economic independence. Republics have a right to suspend central decisions which run counter to the law. There will be a system for settling differences between republics.

He adds that it is planned to rename this draft, because after work that has been done by commissions and committees, the draft has been substantially altered. The proposed new name is: USSR's Law on the Foundations of Economic Relations between the USSR and the Union and Autonomous Republics.

At 1915 GMT Vilkas praised the more realistic and precise delimitation of powers of republics and the center. Articles of the Constitution relating to the country's economic system will have to be changed, if the draft law is adopted. He proposes that a decision should be adopted on the procedure whereby the draft law will come into force—assuming it is passed.

At 1918 GMT discussion begins on the draft law. An unidentified Estonian speaker indicates that he is not persuaded that the government will cease to do what it wants, asserting that the law is not sufficiently effective to prevent this. Let us embark on talks to determine the status of the Baltic republics within the USSR, he says, noting that this is an official request from the Estonian Supreme Soviet. The talks ought to be on an equitable basis, and friendly, he adds.

At 1922 GMT Deputy Mukhametzyanov describes how much work was done by commissions, committees, and groups of experts to ensure that the draft law takes account of all demands and requirements from republics. He praises the fact that autonomous units have been placed on an equal footing with union republics.

At 1925 GMT Deputy Kiseleva says the enterprise's relationship with the local soviets ought to be governed by an appropriate taxation system. The commission she represents thinks that identical labor protection legislation ought to be in force throughout the entire territory of the USSR. All transactions should be based on the Ruble.

At 1929 GMT Deputy V.A. Ivashko makes the point that the draft currently under examination ought to be adopted. He thinks that the name of the law is not in keeping with its content. It should simply be called the Law on the Foundations of Economic Relations in the USSR. The draft should ensure that the new system of running the economy should not be to the detriment of any republic or formation. He is very worried by the fact that people buy up goods in short supply to resell them elsewhere.

At 1934 GMT Deputy Advadze dwells on individual phrases within the draft, querying the meaning of some. The draft leaves too much power with the center, the speaker says. He lists various areas and spheres in which, in his view, the center has more power than republics. Appropriate amendments ought to be passed to have this state of affairs rectified.

At 1942 GMT an unidentified deputy calls for autonomous formations to have greater powers. He would like to have a fund for national development.

Draft Debate Continues

LD2602212690

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian continues carrying its recording of the 26 February session of the Supreme Soviet of Nationalities in the Moscow Kremlin.

At 1947 GMT Deputy Kugultinov praises the draft law. It is an enormous step forward relative to the constitution, he says, asserting that all the debate about Article Six of the Constitution could serve to obscure the fact that it is the selfsame Constitution that made it possible to destroy whole nations and commit crimes against the people. All our nations must be equal—this is the basis of our perestroyka and the foundation of this draft. Autonomous republics have thus far not been on an equal footing with the Union republics, he contends.

At 1953 GMT Deputy Tikhonov thinks that national minorities now have a very great say in what happens where they live.

At 1956 GMT Deputy Mashbashev complains that resources made available for regional development are inadequate.

At 1958 GMT Deputy Osipov thinks that the Soviet of Nationalities ought to have debated interethnic relations—maybe the outbreak of current strife could thus have been prevented. As for the draft, the speaker thinks that the Council of Ministers ought to pay more heed to what legislators want. He disagrees with the currency reform. Now our people going abroad are even poorer, even Negroes are better off, he says. The draft has many expressions the meaning of which is unclear.

At 2004 GMT Deputy Yusupov thinks that the draft is at times inconsistent. He suggests various amendments to various articles, quoting the latter at length. As for those who talk of secession: We have created our crisis jointly—let us jointly seek ways out, he says.

At 2010 GMT Deputy L Abalkin begins his speech. He praises the draft, saying its task is to ensure that the sovereignty and independence of both the constituent parts of the USSR and of the country as a whole are safeguarded. He thinks that a State Committee for Interethnic Relations must be set up. Abalkin thinks that general and unified principles of customs and taxation policies must be worked out, just as has been done with regard to the country's financial system. This will make for greater coordination nationwide. Other areas, such as culture, could also benefit from an approach of this kind. We must have a single, nationwide market, free of all obstacles and restrictions. Abalkin praises the soviet government decision of 7 February 1990 concerning the Baltic Republics' transition to financial and economic independence, signed jointly with these republics. A mechanism of protecting union and republican interests must be worked out, he asserts. For instance: The Estonian Supreme Soviet decided that alcohol and tobacco revenues would be under its own control; the USSR Supreme Soviet disagreed, but nothing has been done in the Republic to comply with this decision.

The draft bill is then adopted in its first reading by an overwhelming majority of votes and handed over to committees and commissions to be worked on further.

At 2024 GMT the television begins broadcasting a recording of the proceedings at the Soviet of the Union, chaired by Yevgeniy Primakov, chairman of the Council of the Union.

At 2025 GMT Justice Minister Yakovlev talks about the draft law on the legal foundations for a state of emergency. It has been made necessary by various recent events. International laws are quoted to the effect that a state of emergency can be introduced under certain circumstances and conditions. The draft law provides for the basis of introducing a state of emergency, procedure for its introduction, and measures that can be applied after a state of emergency has been introduced. Yakovlev quotes the draft, giving examples of events which may necessitate its introduction—such as pogroms, mass disturbances, and so on. He quotes relevant articles of the Constitution. The draft must be altered somewhat to ensure that its provisions are in keeping with what the Constitution has to say. He notes that other provisions are ambiguous: If a republic does not give its consent to the introduction of state of emergency, the matter will be debated by a Supreme Soviet sitting. This may be interpreted as meaning that only the Supreme Soviet can decide on the matter. But, in the meantime, it may be urgently necessary to introduce a state of emergency to prevent bloodshed. In France, for instance, it is the prerogative of the executive power.

At 2036 GMT primakov gives the floor to deputy Golik. He thinks that ought to be the prerogative of a republican Supreme Soviet to introduce a state of emergency on the area under its power. The center must also have this power, he says, if the country as a whole suffers from what is happening in this or that republic. In the latter case, it ought to be the USSR Supreme Soviet which has the power to adopt such steps. Likewise, it is the Supreme Soviet that ought to have the power to extend a state of emergency.

State of Emergency Discussed

LD2602221290

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television in Russian continues carrying its recording of the USSR Soviet of the Union session in the Moscow Kremlin on 26 February.

At 2041 GMT Deputy Kim Yen Un takes the floor, briefly talking about specific measures.

AT 2042 GMT Deputy Shcherbak says the draft law is inadequately structured. It fails to take account of the sovereignty of republics—this issue requires much more work. A state of emergency must not be imposed upon republics from above, he asserts.

At 2045 GMT Deputy Burlatskiy says the role of the Supreme Soviet Presidium is inadequately defined in the draft. As for point three, stating that the Presidium can introduce a state of emergency in the whole of the country—this, in the speaker's view, is unjustified.

At 2047 GMT Deputy Kisin thinks work on this draft ought to be completed during the present session. It is a technical error, he thinks, that autonomous republics are not even mentioned in the draft. He thinks only the Supreme Soviet ought to be able to decide on the introduction of state of emergency. The draft ought to make provisions for people who are charged with tasks arising from introduction of state of emergency.

At 2050 GMT Deputy Y.A. Ryzhkov praises the draft. He asks what is the meaning of the concept of state security?

At 2051 GMT Deputy Vagris says concepts from the past make themselves felt in the draft: If a republic disagrees, it will be the Supreme Soviet that will decide (on introducing a state of emergency). Thus the functions of a Union Republic are reduced to nil, something that runs counter to the party's platform. He thinks it must not be passed, not even in the first reading. Let the commissions continue work taking account of the proposals made today.

At 2054 GMT Deputy F.J.L. Sharin asserts that we cannot wait longer for this law. It should not be delayed.

At 2057 GMT an unidentified women deputy agrees that it should be the prerogative of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to decide about the introduction of state of emergency.

At 2100 GMT Deputy Krivoruchko speaks about the work being done in Chimkent to ensure peace and order. The law must be adopted as soon as possible to prevent the country from getting further into crisis.

At 2102 GMT Justice Minister Yakovlev comments positively on the debates. He says the Supreme Soviet prepared this law as a result of the great concern it feels about the situation in the country. He points out the immense problem of refugees that has arisen. He cites the use by the United Nations of forces to maintain peace in areas of strife. He agrees that the draft law is bound up with many other bits of legislation, but asserts that it is a vital law and particularly urgent, because of the present situation. He agrees that the union must have the power to introduce a state of emergency in order to rally forces in the case, say, of a natural disaster.

At 2108 GMT Yakovlev warns that if no decision is taken fast on this matter, this will alarm the public.

At 2109 GMT Primakov says no one has claimed that such a law is unnecessary. He rounds up the group of issues discussed and proposes that a decision be taken to adopt the draft in its first reading, and hand it on for discussion by the Soviet of Nationalities.

At 2110 GMT a woman deputy shouts something inaudible from the hall. Primakov responds. He asks for suggestions. Various voices are heard but nothing is audible. He puts the proposal to the vote; for 150, against 22, abstentions 16.

Evening Session Begins

LD2602224190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian continues carrying its recording of the USSR Soviet of the Union session on 26 February in the Moscow Kremlin.

At 2113 GMT Primakov opens the evening session. Deputy Fedorov gives a report on the draft law on the rights and duties of the internal troops. He is speaking on behalf of the Committee on Issues of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order. He summarizes some of the main points of the law. It has been proposed that internal troops be given the right to fire on criminals attacking them and trying to seize military materiel. The draft law is being examined thoroughly at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The internal troops are to be manned on a voluntary basis. Extra expenditure will be required but this will ensure that eighteen-year olds on national service are not sent to carry out tasks which they are not competent to carry out.

At 2121 GMT Fedorov asserts that the draft law is of a transitional nature. This legislation would remove problems of a constitutional nature arising as a result of government decree. He calls for the draft law to be approved.

At 2123 GMT Yakovlev takes the floor again. He hopes he has not bored everyone today. He says that the internal troops were first used to defend the Soviet system and to maintain public order back in Lenin's time. However they have never really had the legislative backing for this. Such legislation will ensure that there are no deviations from legality and that the Constitution is not violated when internal troops are used in such a manner. The draft law will allow internal troops to enter any building in order to stop the actions of criminals violating law and order. He looks to other countries, which have special police units for dealing with mass disorder, including the FRG, Italy, and the United States. Likewise their activity is controlled by legislation.

At 2131 GMT Deputy Shapovalenko points out that the draft law which he has was given out two weeks ago and Fedorov's draft law is a different draft. He proposes that a special professional army be set up to deal with internal problems. He says some of the money spent on aid to other countries should rather be spent on sorting out our own problems. He disagrees that the Minister of Interior should be able to call up reservists.

At 2135 GMT Fedorov replies to written questions.

At 2136 GMT Primakov suggest that the draft be passed to Fedorov's committee for further work and passed on to the Soviet of Nationalities. A vote is taken on this: 186 for, 2 against, 5 abstentions.

At 2138 GMT Primakov moves on to discuss the draft law on Infringements of the Equality of National Rights of Citizens and Violations of the Unity of the Territory of the USSR. Kalmykov of the Committee on Issues of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order, presents the draft law. He points out the distinction between this law and existing ones is that it is aimed against activities of associations rather than individuals. He indicates the powers of various instances in dealing with associations infringing citizens' national rights. He lists the kinds of punitive measures available for dealing with such crimes, including administrative and criminal prosecution. There may be doubts and fears that this law could be used against certain informal associations. He believes, however, that the law defines the category of associations quite clearly.

At 2144 GMT an unidentified deputy says that the existing laws do not work as is seen from the awful crimes committed lately. He asserts the need for this matter to be weighed up and compared with similar laws in other countries.

At 2148 GMT Primakov calls for a vote on what to do next with the draft. The draft is adopted at its first reading.

At 2150 GMT Primakov concludes the session for 26 February.

Roundup of Supreme Soviet Separate Sessions

LD2602183990 Moscow TASS in English 1813 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 26 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent: The two chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet—the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities—held their separate sessions today to consider and approve in the first reading a number of important bills.

The Council of the Union examined a package of regulatory enactments to strengthen law and order, including a bill on a state of emergency. It is intended to ensure the protection of people's lives and health, as well as of public order, and to regulate the payment of damages. A state of emergency can be imposed in cases of natural disasters, major accidents and massive unrest.

As extreme situations call for prompt action, the bill grants the right to proclaim a state of emergency to the executive body—the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet—reserving the right to prolong it for parliament alone.

Internal security troops will probably be the first in the Soviet Union to be manned by volunteers, as envisaged by the bill on the rights and duties of internal security troops in protecting public order.

Five military units are expected to be manned on a voluntary basis in 1990 and 1991. All the others will still be manned by conscripts.

The Council of the Union also approved in the first reading a bill to increase responsibility for infringements on the national equality of citizens and for forceful violation of the Soviet Union's territorial integrity. The bill declares unlawful any activities designed to propagate ideas of national or racial exclusiveness, enmity, racial or religious violence, or to violate forcefully the Soviet Union's territorial integrity. The activities of such organizations can be banned only by court, after which these organizations are disbanded and their property confiscated.

The Council of the Union sent the three approved bills to the Council of Nationalities for discussion. In turn, the Council of the Nationalities sent to the other chamber the bill on the fundamentals of economic relations in the Soviet Union and the constituent republics. It grants republics the right to independently resolve all issues in their economic and social development, form their budgets, regulate investments, participate on a voluntary basis in federal programmes and engage in international economic relations on their own.

The joint session of the two chambers on Tuesday is expected to consider expanding presidential powers in the Soviet Union.

Soviet of Nationalities Morning Debate Reported

LD2602114590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Report from the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities session by correspondent Marina Novitskaya]

[Text] [Novitskaya] As you know, separate sittings of the Supreme Soviet chambers are in progress today. I am going to tell you about the morning debates at the Soviet of Nationalities. Under discussion here is the draft law on the general principles of managing the economy and the social sphere in the union and autonomous republics. Let me remind you that this draft was already discussed at the previous session, and was not even accepted in its first reading. It was returned for further refinement. The new draft is considerably different from its predecessor. The approach to the concept of the law has been fundamentally changed. Instead of detailed regulations from above, there are proposals to delimit the rights of the center and the republics, giving the republics the opportunity of dealing independently with all matters of economic and social life, apart, of course, from those which the republics themselves delegate to the union in everyone's interests. This will create conditions for the formation of an all-union market, and for this reason the majority of articles are devoted to the economic sphere. Also fundamentally new in the draft is the desire to replace administrative and command methods of running the economy with economic methods. Moreover, the basis for mutual relations will be agreements and contracts between the center and the republics and between individual republics. Essentially, the economic conditions are being created for a renewed federation. Another important point is that the rights of the autonomous republics are being substantially expanded, and this is reflected in the name of the future law. The rights of autonomous oblasts and national okrugs will also be increased. Moreover, the republics are even given the right to halt implementation of decisions on their territory from whatever body of the central state administration, for example the Council of Ministers, if these do not correspond to this law. Extension of rights, of course, signifies mutual economic responsibility. Incidentally, there are proposals to alter the name of the future law. The committees and commissions suggest calling it "On the Bases for Economic Relations of the USSR, Union, and Autonomous Republics." Its introduction will, of course, require that amendments are made to the text of the Constitution. The majority of deputies who spoke today support the new draft law and see it as a step forward in the formation of a renewed union as a federation of economically independent and sovereign republics. Not everyone, however. Deputy Advadze from Georgia spoke very sharply against it. He believes that the draft law does not give the republics spheres in which they would be completely independent. In his opinion, enactments should have been adopted to start with on the principles of building a renewed federation. However, I have to say that this was the only such harsh speech. The remainder of those who took part in the debates—and these were Deputies Kiseleva from Belorussia, Blokhin from Moldavia, Mukhametzyanov from the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Ivashko from Ukraine, Mongo from Evenki, and many others—supported the draft law, albeit, of course, with comments of their own. The discussions are now continuing both here and at the Soviet of the Union, where I remind you, the draft law on the legal basis for emergency situations is under examination. We will tell you more later, in detail, as to how the discussions are progressing. For the moment, I will bring to a close my report from the Kremlin, where the USSR Supreme Soviet session is in progress.

Soviet of the Union Discusses Internal Troops

LD2602154690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] At the USSR Supreme Soviet session. Over to the All-Union Radio correspondents' office in the Kremlin. Marina Novitskaya is at the microphone.

[Novitskaya] The Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet continued work this afternoon. After the interval, the deputies started examining the draft law on the obligations and rights of the internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in the maintenance of public order. May I remind you that the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 28 July 1988 is currently in force. This came in for harsh criticism even at the first Congress of People's Deputies, and the Supreme Soviet was instructed to examine the constitutionality of this decree.

Reporting on the draft of a new law, Deputy Fedorov commented on behalf of the Committee for Legislation and Legality that despite all its shortcomings, the 1988 decree did play a positive role. It is essential in light of the interethnic and social conflicts we have all witnessed at this time. In many cases, the internal troops were the sole guarantee of the constitutional rights of citizens. However, their obligations and rights must of course be regulated not by decree but by law, all the more so in that the decree contains provisions which are at variance with the Constitution—for instance, the right to enter citizens' homes. Furthermore, it does not stipulate the participation of the republics in resolving issues on the use of the internal troops. This is corrected in the new draft: An article has been introduced, incidentally, which regulates the conditions under which special means and also weapons may be used.

It should also be said that many deputies today also raised the question of manning the internal troops on a voluntary basis, under contract. At present, as you know, soldiers are drafted into the internal troops, as for active military service. Such a switch will naturally cost money, however, and this must be taken into account. The leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs therefore proposes manning some subunits on a voluntary basis, under contract, in the near future; and in general carrying out the switch to professional internal troops gradually.

In a word, the draft law is of an interim nature, but it is essential, and everyone who took part in the discussion today agreed on this. The Soviet of the Union adopted the law; now it will be submitted to the Soviet of Nationalities.

Discussion on yet another draft has begun: On Strengthening Accountability for Infringing the Equality of National Rights of Citizens and Forcible Violation of the Unity of the Territory of the USSR. The discussion is continuing; we will report its progress in subsequent casts.

Details Provided on State of Emergency Bill

LD2602141290 Moscow TASS in English 1344 GMT 26 Feb 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents]

[Text] Moscow February 26 TASS—The Council of the Union, one of the two chambers of Soviet Parliament, began discussing today the legal regime of a state of emergency. A report on this bill, drafted by the government, was delivered by Soviet Justice Minister Veniamin Yakovlev.

"The need for such legislation," he noted, "is linked with the possibility of emergency situations endangering large numbers of people. The Constitution of the USSR allows the declaration of a state of emergency, but there is no corresponding legislation in the USSR. This is why the authorities either remain inactive in emergency situations or resort to groundlessly harsh measures.

The bill lists cases when a state of emergency can be declared. They include natural calamities, major accidents and riots. Measures taken to promptly restore normal life, as well as public law and order, should guarantee the population's safety, maintenance of proper order and compensation for any possible damages.

The executive arm, namely the Supreme Soviet Presidium, should be vested with the right to declare a state of emergency in cases when it is necessary to react promptly to emergency situations. A state of emergency can be prolonged, when necessary, only by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

"The importance of this legislation is confirmed by recent tragic events in our country," said Yuriy Golik, who addressed the session on behalf of the parliamentary legislative committee. "Its urgent adoption would allow us to avert many tragedies."

As many as 34 deputies took the floor during the morning sitting. Noting the importance of clearly distinguishing between natural calamities and public disorders, many speakers objected to a state of emergency being declared without the consent of the Supreme Soviet of the union republic concerned.

This view was advocated particularly by deputies from the Baltic republics. "The legislation must be backed by solid democratic guarantees and the creation of a mechanism that would prevent any groundless declaration of a state of emergency and the abuse of power when it is in force," said Estonian scientist Mariu Lauristin.

Belorussian Deputy Sergei Kalashnikov, on the other hand, said the final say should belong to the USSR Parliament if a republic was unable or unwilling to declare a state of emergency. However, he also stressed the importance of previous consultations with the Supreme Soviet of a union republic concerned.

"The adoption of state of emergency legislation should be accompanied by a law on the status of refugees," said Moscow Deputy Viktor Kisin. He moved to decide first the question of presidential rule in the USSR and then to return to the state of emergency bill. He was seconded by Academician Yuriy Ryzhov, who believes the bill should not be discussed even in the first reading before the presidency problem is resolved.

Nevertheless, the bill was approved in the first reading and submitted for consideration to the Council of Nationalities. The deputies deemed it necessary to complete work on the legislation during the current session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Draft of Nationalist Activity Approved

LD2602172690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1640 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 26 Feb (TASS)—A TASS parliamentary correspondent reports from the Kremlin:

The Soviet of the Union (one of the chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet) today approved by an absolute majority the draft law on strengthening accountability for infringing equality of the national rights of citizens and for forcible violation of the unity of the territory of the USSR.

Presenting the draft law to deputies, Yuriy Kalmykov, chairman of the parliamentary committee on legislation issues, noted that the need for such a legal act is connected with the recent emergence in the USSR of associations and organizations the activity of which is aimed at inciting national strife and at infringing the territorial integrity of neighboring republics and autonomous formations. "This law is essential," stressed Kalmykov. "The situation requires a resolute struggle against this kind of association."

He said that what distinguishes this draft law from legal acts presently in force is the fact that it deals with the activity of associations of citizens and not with individual persons. The draft law declares unlawful the activity of any associations that is aimed at propagating national or racial exclusiveness and hostility, violence on a national, racial, religious, or other basis, and also aimed at the forcible violation of the unity of the territory of the USSR.

A decision on the banning of such activity by associations of citizens can be adopted only in legal form, after which these organizations are dissolved and their property confiscated.

As far as the accountability of specific persons is concerned, the organizers and activists of such associations can be proceeded against administratively, noted the chairman of the parliamentary committee. If, on the other hand, their actions are marked by calls for the forcible overthrow of the Soviet state system or for the forcible violation of the unity of the country's territory, then these persons can be prosecuted for terms from between three to 10 years.

Such strict measures aroused no doubts among the people's deputies. The Soviet of the Union approved the draft law in its first reading with only one vote "against" and six abstentions, and it will now be examined in the other chamber, the Soviet of Nationalities.

Chambers Debate Emergency, Economic Laws

LD2602125790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0930 GMT 26 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report over video by V. Polozhentsev]

[Text] The Soviet of the Union has been discussing the draft law on a state of emergency in the USSR. Two options were submitted—by the government and by the Supreme Soviet Committee on Legislation and Legality. Setting out the main features of the USSR Council of Minister's draft, USSR Justice Minister Yakovlev said:

[Begin Yakovlev recording] The purpose of the law on a state of emergency is, as it happens, to create the opportunity in law for effective steps to be taken without delay to normalize public life, to safeguard the lives of people, and to restore and maintain public order. Consequently, the essence of the law is to determine the steps that the organs of power and government can employ in an emergency. Moreover, these steps must be sufficient and adequate to meet the situation—and to some extent they will inevitably entail limitations on the rights of citizens—yet at the same time they should not be unjustified or disproportionate to the situation. [end recording]

[Polozhentsev] Voicing the point of view of the Committee on Issues of Legislation and Legality, Deputy Golik focused attention on legal aspects, on the responsibility of those who introduce a state of emergency, and on how they do it. He substantiated the harsher wording of some of the draft's articles put forward by his committee. Debate has begun on the draft law.

On the agenda for the sitting of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Soviet of Nationalities is discussion of the draft law on the general principles of management of the economy and the social sphere in the union and autonomous republics. A report on this was delivered by Deputy Vilkas, who stressed that the USSR Supreme Soviet's committees and commissions have been working assiduously on the draft law. They have taken account of the comments and suggestions made at the second Supreme Soviet session. The draft law on the general principles for management of the economy has been refined with the participation of the USSR Council of Ministers:

[Begin Vilkas recording] By comparison with its preceding version, the draft law has been radically overhauled. The approach to the concept of the law has undergone a fundamental change. Instead of the traditional regulation of the rights and powers of the union and autonomous republics, there is a proposal to establish a system of legal measures to define the new economic relations between entities in the Soviet federation. As submitted, the draft law defines the limits of the jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and establishes the right of the republics to decide for themselves all issues relating to their economic and social development apart from those transferred by the republics to the purview of the center. As I have said, it would be no bad thing to say here: Transferred voluntarily. It is proposed that these would include only those spheres of activity that ensure the protection of the general interests of all republics and that create the legal prerequisites and economic preconditions for their independent management and mutually advantageous cooperation within the framework of the pan-union market. [end recording]

[Polozhentsev] Then debate on this issue began. The sitting of the Supreme Soviet's Soviet of Nationalities is continuing.

Soviet of Nationalities Approves Economic Law

LD2602130890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1215 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Excerpts] Moscow, 26 Feb (TASS)—TASS parliamentary correspondent reports from the Kremlin:

The Soviet of Nationalities (one of the chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet) today approved the draft Law on the Basis for Economic Relations Between the USSR, the Union, and Autonomous Republics at its first reading.

Let us recall that at the fall session of the Soviet parliament the first version of this document, which proceeded from a different concept, as can be seen even in its name—the Law on the Basic Principles of Managing the Economy and the Social Sphere in Union and Autonomous Republics—was rejected. The deputies felt that it retained the old dictatorship of the center over the republics.

Submitting the new version of the draft law today, Eduardas Vilkas, chairman of the Commission for the Social and Economic Development of Union and Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Oblasts and Okrugs, drew the attention of the deputies to the fact that instead of the traditional regulation of the rights of the republics, the draft sets limits on the competence of the USSR and establishes the right of republics to deal independently with all matters of their own economic and social development: To create their own budget, to regulate investment activities, to take part voluntarily in all-union programs, and to establish foreign economic links independently, etc. [passage omitted]

As a result of the vote, the Soviet of Nationalities approved of the draft law in its first reading by an absolute majority and handed it over for examination to the other chamber, the Soviet of the Union.

Political & Social

Reforms Would Continue Without Gorbachev

AU2602214490 Paris AFP in English 2103 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] Manila, Feb 26 (AFP)—Far-ranging reforms in the Soviet Union would go ahead even if President Mikhail Gorbachev were for some reason unable to continue as leader, his chief spokesman said in an interview aired here Monday.

"I don't want to speculate on this but I can say that he was the initiator of the process, he started it. He continues it but this doesn't mean that he invented it," spokesman Gennady Gerasimov said over GMA television.

"Actually our country was pregnant with this, with this perestroyka (structural reform). He (Mr. Gorbachev) was the first to see it as a political leader, and to take a new course.

"God forbid if something happens" to Mr. Gorbachev, he said, but added that "there are other people" who would continue his reforms.

Mr. Gerasimov described the reforms initiated by the Soviet leader as "inevitable" but stressed: "This is not a period of transition from one system to another. It is a period of adaptation."

The station did not say when the interview was held. Mr. Gerasimov was in the Philippines last week as a guest of a conference of Asian journalists.

Mr. Gerasimov said the United States "must now find another reason" for its continued military presence in the Philippines and other areas in the Asia-Pacific after Soviet moves to militarily withdraw from the region.

The Philippines hosts Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base, the two largest U.S. overseas military facilities.

"This is a trend of the times. If Europe is disarming, why is the Pacific exempted?" Mr. Gerasimov said, referring to an agreement by Moscow and Washington to limit their troops in central Europe to 195,000 each.

Mr. Gerasimov said last week that Soviet forces in Asia would be reduced by 200,000 men, 50 ships would be decommissioned and Soviet combat aircraft would be withdrawn from Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam.

Mr. Gerasimov declined to comment on the possibility that the ongoing political changes in Eastern Europe would be duplicated in China.

He cited improved relations between Moscow and Beijing after the visit to China last year of Mr. Gorbachev, and cited the growth of that country's economy.

"As to the domestic development of China, I'm afraid to predict what's going to (happen) next," he said.

Primakov Discusses 'Urgent' Presidency Issues

PM2702114190 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 27 Feb 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Ye.M. Primakov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Union and candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, by TASS correspondent A. Orlov; date and place unspecified; first two paragraphs are editorial introduction: "Presidency Issue Is Urgent. Discussion With Ye. Primakov, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Union"]

[Text] The proposal to switch to a presidential form of rule—a proposal approved at the recent and in many respects unprecedented CPSU Central Committee plenum—has been extensively discussed by the country's public in recent days. We can say that, on the whole, the idea of such a radical change in the political mechanism is being assessed as an inevitable, democratic, and long-overdue measure that is generally accepted and confirmed by world practice.

But there are also arguments of a different nature. Thus, THE WASHINGTON POST published an article which, citing the opinions of certain USSR Supreme Soviet members, cast doubt on the expediency and timeliness of setting up a presidential post in the USSR. In this connection TASS correspondent A. Orlov asked Ye.M. Primakov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Union and candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, to share his ideas on this issue.

[Primakov] First of all I must admit that it is hard for me to take issue with my Supreme Soviet colleagues, since I have had no opportunity to familiarize myself with the article you are referring to. I can only state my own opinion on the essence of the problem. I believe this issue is not only urgent but also overdue. The need for a new form of rule is dictated not by any transitory or opportunistic considerations. The creation of a presidency and the introduction of corresponding amendments to the country's basic law is a logical consequence of the process of democratic transformations in the country. The transition to a multiparty system which was virtually proclaimed in the platform adopted at the CPSU Central Committee February plenum will require appropriate changes to the country's state structure. After all, until very recently the CPSU Central Committee not only defined strategic tasks (the party will obviously continue to elaborate policy in the future as well), but also provided day-to-day leadership of everyday life in the country. Now that the situation is decisively changing, the party is changing its forms of work. In order not to relax state order or allow anarchy, which would be damaging for perestroyka, we need a strong new institution capable of assuming the functions of state governance and checking that the new laws adopted by parliament are implemented without any "hitches."

I am convinced that we need such a new center by the work of the Supreme Soviet itself: The initial legislative "euphoria" and even the fixation of parliament is giving way to a more balanced approach and a realization that it is not enough merely to adopt laws—we need to implement them. Many of these laws—the Law on Leasing adopted by the Supreme Soviet, for instance—are far from being implemented. We need an institution capable of implementing laws and of providing strategic leadership. It is clear to me that the only such organ is presidential rule, which should be very strong.

But there will be no mixing of functions, since we will retain a strong—I emphasize—a strong and independent Supreme Soviet with its own chairman, who will focus on questions of improving the effectiveness of the Soviet parliament's work. That need is also felt.

At the same time, the creation of a new institution of power is demanded by the current times. The country is being rocked by ethnic conflicts, things in the economy are by no means going the way we would like, discipline is declining, and the rise in crime is no joke. Under these conditions it is quite clear—and this is not just my opinion, but that of my colleagues in the Supreme Soviet, the party, and academic circles—that, bearing these circumstances in mind, a president should have quite strong power. Otherwise it would be a waste of time. In order for democracy to develop it needs the protection of the law. The law with a capital "L," binding on everyone—from the country's top leaders to ordinary citizens. Ensuring unswerving observance of the law is one of a president's most important functions. In this connection, he should, in my view, be able to resolve the question of the replacement of any official.

[Orlov] In this connection I cannot fail to cite the argument frequently used by critics of this new idea. Would not the granting of such wide-ranging powers to a single individual lead to an excessive strengthening of one-man rule—even in the hands of such a democratic figure as M.S. Gorbachev?

[Primakov] Society's prosperity—I am profoundly convinced of this—is ensured by combining effective power with democracy. In our country this is particularly urgent—after all, in the past we experienced a great many things due to abuses of power which must never be repeated. That is why "democratic checks" [amortizatory] should also be created along with the creation of a strong presidency.

How do I envisage these? Above all, as the possibility of adopting laws or making decisions even if the president uses a so-called delaying veto (he should have that right). If the USSR Supreme Soviet again [povtorno] adopts a law by a majority, its decision is binding on the head of state.

Moreover, the democratic nature of power is also reinforced by the opportunity to use another instrument of expressing no confidence in the president in the event of his violating the USSR Constitution. Parliament should be able to dismiss him before his term is up. Perhaps at the proposal of the constitutional commission. It is also important to limit the term of the president's powers—I think this should not exceed two terms.

[Orlov] And for what term could a president be elected?

[Primakov] There are differing opinions on that. Some people—quite justifiably, it seems to me—believe that the presidential cycle should not coincide with the terms of the work of parliament. When the powers of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies expire, the new body will be able to observe a certain continuity through the president.

In order to exercise his functions the president must have a council. This could include statesmen and politicians, both ex-officio and presidential appointees. It might be proposed, for instance, that the council include the chairman of the Council of Ministers, the defense and foreign ministers, and the minister of internal affairs. I am convinced that it would be useful to include on the council politicians who would help the president to clearly understand the entire range of sentiments and views in society.

The president should have a very great duty to strengthen the federal basis of the state. There are no valid grounds for any fear that the introduction of a presidency would damage the processes of expanding republics' autonomy. A strong center is needed, but its creation should be accompanied by giving real content to republican sovereignty. That is why it is planned to create under the president a federal council or a council of the USSR federation, which would include the top officials from all the union republics. The main questions of the federation will be resolved right there, on a democratic basis.

I would like to stress once again the point I began with: The question of a president is urgent and demands the speediest resolution. The different discussions and sometimes even speculation being conducted on this subject are due partly to misunderstanding and partly to unscrupulousness. Incidentally, some of the so-called "radicals" currently voicing their doubts on the question of the presidency were categorically calling for it until quite recently. Isn't that evidence of a blatant lack of principle? It turns out that if the idea is not put forward by them, they invariably have to torpedo it. Or personal ambitions and a struggle for personal interests immediately start to prevail. That is not the way, we need to have a supreme sense of responsibility to society and the state.

I believe that the idea of the presidency will be supported by the broad masses and the majority of the population. I personally see the presidency as harmonizing three principles: democracy, the law, and order. This is precisely what the people are demanding more and more insistently.

[Orlov] There is quite widespread doubt about our haste. People say that the issue has not been worked out, that we need to think again, and so forth. Just how did the idea of the presidency crop up? Could you say something about the history of the question?

[Primakov] Well, I could start by saying that this question has long been discussed in society. People first started talking about the possibility under Khrushchev, if I'm not mistaken. Later the idea was repeatedly raised at the Congress of People's Deputies. The idea did not meet with support at the time and both we ourselves and society were not yet ready for many genuinely radical steps. But the situation was different, too: Article 6 was unshakable. Now the situation is different and we can believe that the idea has essentially been reborn.

[Orlov] Does it follow from this that the country's elected president could even be a representative of another party? Or a nonparty person?

[Primakov] It is quite obvious that any organization or social movement—including in the future parties enjoying the right of legislative initiative—could nominate a candidate for the top post in the country. The president should be elected on a multicandidate basis. In the current situation I personally hope that M.S. Gorbachev would become president. I can see no other figure on our political horizon who could rival him for the maturity of approach to state affairs, balanced judgment, and depth of information needed to lead the state.

[Orlov] Could you be more detailed about the president's functions, if possible? You have already talked about the right of veto, the possibility of declaring a state of emergency and removing any officials—including, as far as I understand it, even the prime minister?

[Primakov] These questions will be comprehensively discussed once again by both the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies. For the time being, I can state my own views. In my opinion, apart from the already mentioned powers pertaining to cadre affairs, the president will probably assume some of the functions of the Supreme Soviet Presidium—on citizenship, awards, and pardons. The president, naturally, should also be the supreme commander in chief. As such, the president can declare war and order partial or full mobilization in the event of an attack on the USSR. But he should not be entitled in any other circumstances to make the decision to send troops abroad. Such questions, it seems to me, can be resolved only by the USSR Supreme Soviet. And that is yet another guarantee of democracy and legality.

The president will clearly be able to declare a state of emergency in various parts of the country provided there has been a compulsory discussion with the top organs of power in the relevant union republics. Although, being realistic, it would be naive to expect that agreement would automatically be given. There is also a possibility of situations where some of a republic's population advocate a certain decision, while others favor the opposite decision. In such cases the president should undoubtedly have the powers to decide.

[Orlov] What do you think would happen if the presidency were not introduced? Are there alternatives?

[Primakov] I think we simply have no other choice: If it has been decided to abandon the role formerly played by the party and its Central Committee in leading the country, then I cannot imagine society without a president.

[Orlov] One last question: Who will elect the president?

[Primakov] In general the president should, of course, be elected by the entire people. And in the future I am sure that this will be the case. But currently the loss of rhythm would be simply ruinous for perestroyka. I think we should act through electors [vyborshchiki]—an institution which exists in the United States too, incidentally. In our case, this is the Congress of USSR People's

Deputies elected by the entire people. But in the future, of course, direct nationwide elections should be held to elect the president.

Further Reportage on 25 Feb Rallies

LD2602165390 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1300 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] Here is information from unofficial sources. Crowded meetings took place yesterday in Moscow, Minsk, Tbilisi, and Sverdlovsk demanding democratic transformations and radical economic reforms. In Moscow, according to preliminary calculations of the meeting organizers, the Union of Democratic Forces, the meeting was attended by about half a million people. People came in spite of internal troops which surrounded them and which were heavily equipped and in spite of barriers consisting of snow-clearing machines.

Symbols of the most extreme trends—from the flags of old Russia to the flags of anarchosyndicalists—could be seen at the meeting. The meeting was organized in support of the candidates of the block of democratic Russia, linked with the pre-election campaign and, as the organizers of the meeting stated, one should not draw a parallel with the February revolution of 1917. We are for a democratic revolution at the polling stations, said one of the organizers of the meeting, who spoke there, member of the Interregional Group of Deputies, member of the Committee For the Problems of Legislation and Public Order, Sergey Stankevich.

Many speakers at the meeting dwelt on the struggle against corruption. The story of the scandal at the ANT cooperative which was caught red-handed through the conscientiousness of an ordinary border guard was named by the speakers "Soviet Irangate." It was stated from the tribune of the Moscow meeting that the USSR Prosecutor's Office has expelled Gdlyan and Ivanov from the CPSU and expressed itself in favor of their commitment. The Muscovites at the meeting demanded that the USSR general procurator and his whole office be dismissed. For the first time in a crowded meeting a thought was expressed that Russia's sons should ask forgiveness from their homeland for political and economic adventures that have been taking place in this state with the taciturn approval of its all citizens.

I warn you once again that this information has been received by us from unofficial sources.

Reaction to Supreme Soviet, CPSU Appeals

LD2302193490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] The statement of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the address of the CPSU Central Committee to the working people of the country is at the center of attention of the working people in many organizations, establishments, and enterprises of the capital.

Many Muscovites believe that in the course of the rally scheduled for 25 February, acts of anti-democratic organizations and groups may take place. At the city's enterprises, meetings were held. Participants spoke about the need to prevent the creation of instability and the rekindling of dissension.

In Tagan Rayon, at public transport stops and at the entrance to blocks of flats, leaflets exhorting the population not to take part in the rally appeared. This appeal is substantiated by the fact that the organizers of the Sunday meeting do not put forward any specific demands. Their slogans are vague, unclear, and sometimes of an instigatory nature. The collectives of the shipbuilding and ship repair yard, the Krasnyy Bagatyr Moscow production association, the State Bearings Works-1, tire manufacturing works, and of other enterprises stated that they do not intend to follow the forces obstructing the course of perestroyka and therefore decided not to go outside on Sunday, and not to hold alternative meetings.

With the slogans containing appeals exhorting the public to condemn any forms of violence and to abandon any manifestation of extremism, the organization calling itself The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR] intends to take part in the upcoming city preelection rally scheduled for Sunday. This was stated by its representatives at a press conference in Moscow. According to them, maintaining moderately centrist positions, the organization intends to establish parliamentary and partner relations with the CPSU and to organise a roundtable with the participation of all democratic forces in the country.

Culture Minister Cautions Against Violent Meetings

LD2402170290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 24 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] A report "In the CPSU Central Committee Politburo," which many of you are probably already aware of, is published in the press today. [passage omitted]

Taking part in our program today is Nikolay Nikolayevich Gubenko, actor, producer, USSR people's artiste, and USSR minister of culture.

[Gubenko] Perhaps more than any other people, ours knows the smell of blood, invasion, violence, the strength of the spirit, clarity of thought and patience, and have the ability not to allow any extremist, provocative forces to rock the ship of our unity so that violence should not recur. I am concerned about this, and I hope that the people are, and are aware of the importance of the moment, when for the first time the country has taken on the task of bringing about a real revolution gradually and in stages...you know, Pushkin, in his "Boris Godunov", has "the habit, having taken over the spirit." We in this country have not yet discovered the habit of freedom. The absence of freedom over decades has resulted in various interpretations of freedom. Some interpret it as anarchy, as an attitude of anything goes. In my opinion, that is what is dangerous. Once we get used to freedom and start using it as normal people, then the mass meeting will turn into a normal exchange of human opinions. But while there is no habit of freedom, there is the danger that a mass meeting could get out of hand and turn into an extremely unwelcome violent sort of action. That is dangerous and extremely undesirable. It is terrible when an individual becomes a member of a crowd.

Commentary on Future of Perestroyka

LD0602152890 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] What kind of future can the process of perestroyka be expected to have in the Soviet Union? Can Soviet-American relations be made predictable? To answer the first question, one has to turn to the on-going plenary meeting of the Communist Party Central Committee. The second is directly connected with the scheduled visit to Moscow on Wednesday by the U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. Radio Moscow's Mikhail Mayorov has been studying the present situation and this is what he finds:

George Bush makes no secret of his sympathies toward Mikhail Gorbachev, although some of his opponents, namely Dr. Henry Kissinger, insist that neither the United States nor the West as a whole should be infatuated by only one person in the Soviet Union. The former secretary of state argues that if change in a country depends entirely on one man, it might sooner or later find itself reversed.

Significantly, both Dr. Kissinger and the present chief of the White House see eye-to-eye on one and probably the most important thing—they agree that the current reforms in the Soviet Union must be furthered, thus whether or not Gorbachev's individual efforts should be supported is a matter of tactics rather than strategy.

One may wonder how accurate the assessment is that Gorbachev alone should be credited with initiating the process of renewal in this country. True, his name is inseparable from every kind of positive change which the nation has undergone over recent years. Equally true is that the Gorbachev era has seen unprecedented close contacts established between East and West. But there's little reason to view the future of perestroyka as dependent exclusively on the nation's leader. Mikhail Gorbachev's chief merit consists precisely in that he's created an atmosphere in which for the first time in many decades, political decisions in Moscow have ceased to be taken by a handful of top-ranking officials behind closed doors.

During his stay in Moscow, Secretary of State Baker will address Soviet parliament and reply to questions from people's deputies. It's hard to say at this point what Mr Baker's impressions will be like, but very probably he will get an idea of where in the Soviet Union one should look for the brain center outlining this country's home and foreign policy.

As far as the future of Soviet-American relations is concerned, continues Mikhail Mayorov, I am positive that collective decision-making and pluralism of opinion can well make Moscow's actions in the international arena more predictable. Of course, president is president, and party leader is party leader, but those overseas observers who see the USSR's future in a gloomy light seem to be overlooking the fact that Gorbachev's prestige is the prestige of a winner of many political debates and an active worker for the consolidation of pro-perestroyka forces, and although many westerners have been pointing to the lack of political stability in the Soviet Union, it's a good time now for the Americans to seek compromise, not confrontation, through dialogue with the Soviet leader who can discuss things frankly and openly.

This is a personal quality of a big politican ready to meet the challenge of the times, but, concludes Mikhail Mayorov, it is also a desire to work in the interests of those representative public groups who will not allow the positive changes to be reversed.

Communist Party Split Said Not Impossible

PM2602154090 Paris LE FIGARO in French 22 Feb 90 p 6

[Interview with Vyacheslav Shostakovskiy, rector of the Higher Party School and founding member of the Democratic Platform, by Pierre Bocev in Moscow; date not given]

[Text] [Bocev] The wing of the party which you represent, the "Democratic Platform within the CPSU," says it is disappointed by the results of the recent plenum. Why?

[Shostakovskiy] There has been a great deal of talk about crisis and loss of authority. The leitmotiv was to restore the party's vanguard role, as if it had not been lost for a long time.

There was a break in the early twenties, and it has become increasingly obvious since. The socialist movements, whether Bolshevik or not, were based on some fundamental values: equality among party members, freedom to criticize, and complete glasnost. That all disappeared. The minority has imposed its views since the Stalinist period. There has been an "internal party" formed by those who made the decisions, and another formed by CPSU troops who blindly obeyed and had nothing to say.

If we do not manage to change that, the party will not be capable of fulfilling its role. In five years of perestroyka, nothing has been done in this sphere. The CPSU is lagging behind the changes in society.

[Bocev] Has there been total failure?

[Shostakovskiy] Not necessarily. On the one hand, the CPSU is not society's vanguard. On the other hand, the men who are the potential vanguard within this society are members of that party. There is therefore a human potential which is at present not being used.

[Bocev] Hence your attempt to exploit it and the creation of the "Democratic Platform within the CPSU...."

[Shostakovskiy] We reforming Communists set up this "platform" on 20 and 21 January in the hopes of giving rise to a movement of ideas in favor of a radical renewal. We need a new kind of party.

[Bocev] But do you regard yourselves as the party's only possible saviors, despite Gorbachev's policy?

[Shostakovksiy] It is not so simple. There are not just the neo-Stalinists and our "platform." There are conservatives who, despite everything, show common sense.

We are 100 percent in favor of purely and simply abolishing Article 6 of the Constitution regarding the party's leadership role. We are not satisfied with simply amending it. We are also in favor of a clearly multiparty system.

We gradually want to reach a parliamentary-style party. We want the party's democratization; we want everybody to be able to express themselves and to be able to stand by their opinions, even if they are in a minority.

[Bocev] Does that necessarily depend on a strengthening of Mikhail Gorbachev's personal power, particularly his election to the post of USSR president?

[Shostakovskiy] Gorbachev is at present a prisoner of the political system. He is chairman of the Supreme Soviet, but the 2,250 deputies in the Congress of People's Deputies can dismiss him from office. Similarly, the CPSU Central Committee can strip him of his parliamentary mandate and hence his position as head of parliament. In each case, he would be ousted without even consulting the people.

We must therefore change the present situation. On that basis, the election of a USSR president is one of the possible solutions. We would prefer an election by universal suffrage and not by the deputies.

With regard to the accumulation of powers which that involves, it disturbs me because it could lead to an authoritarian government.

[Bocev] The plenum did not satisfy you. What will happen if the congress also disappoints your wing of the CPSU? Will the party split?

[Shostakovskiy] I do not rule that out.

[Bocev] Would that not make your movement into a social democratic party?

[Shostakovskiy] That is an accusation that we often hear. After all, the social democrats and we have the same historical roots. It was at the beginning of the century that our movement separated into revolutionary and reformist parties. The reformist branch may, after all, be more effective than the revolutionary branch.

However, there is a psychological problem. Using the word social democracy creates suspicion. We must take that into account—especially because people think that "social democrat" implies the transition to private ownership.

People are accustomed to a low but guaranteed standard of living. A few months ago, a worker said to me: "I am content with my 200 rubles, but make sure that there is sausage in the stores. The rest does not interest me." That is a real problem for us.

[Bocev] There is therefore a loss of interest in politics....

[Shostakovskiy] There is very strong disillusionment with the political institutions. We carried out an opinion poll which produced worrying results. In the forthcoming elections for the local and republic soviets, 35 percent of the voters say that they intend to abstain, and 12 percent say they will go into the polling booth and cross out all the names.

There is therefore virtually a majority of the voters who have an extremely negative attitude, whoever the candidates are. In short, the people no longer believe in the possibility of really significant changes.

[Bocev] Whose fault is it? Is it Gorbachev's fault?

[Shostakovskiy] Yes, partly. His centrist action, focused constantly on compromise, is really a political art. However, there is more need than ever for decisive measures to form a bloc of democratic forces—for instance, through the organization of roundtable discussions, like those which were held in East Europe.

[Bocev] But in East Europe, those roundtables led to the communist parties losing power....

[Shostakovksiy] The danger exists, but our situation is not the same. We do not have any force comparable to Solidarity in Poland; in our country, only the Communist Party can guarantee the renewal.

These roundtable discussions would have two aims. First, political stability, which is in everybody's interests—we cannot afford to go through a Romanian-style experience. And second, the creation of a social consensus on the need for economic reforms.

To achieve that, we are trying to exert all our influence on the process of electing the deputies for the 28th CPSU Congress. It is there that things must change. For the time being, the only document published, the "CPSU platform" produced by the last plenum, is merely a cosmetic attempt to patch things up. If this party can still be saved, we must do something now.

Medvedev Discusses CPSU Platform

LD2302201390 Moscow TASS in English 2003 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 23 TASS—The platform of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee for the 28th party congress and its importance in the context of the present-day political and socio-economic situation in the country was discussed during a meeting of member of the Politburo and secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Vadim Medvedev with the collective of the Moscow Power Institute.

At a meeting with members of the institute's party organisation, Medvedev said that public opinion about the platform is wide-ranging.

He said that acute problems and contradictions should not eclipse real changes in society that have taken place over the past years.

There can be no doubt that the line at perestroyka is correct and should be continued, he said. It should be implemented more consistently, criticising and correcting errors and relying on experience of perestroyka. This idea is contained in the platform for the congress.

Medvedev emphasised that the party does not claim political monopoly, that it is governed by standards of a rule-of-law state and is prepared to conduct a dialogue on a centralised democratic basis and cooperate with all who are for socialism.

Cardinal questions of the transformations of relations of property have been raised in the economic area, he said. The platform of the Central Committee initiates a transition from economic competition.

The platform clearly sets out the directions, principles and mechanism of a radical renewal of the Soviet Communist Party as a truly political, effective, self-governed organisation.

Man, his interests, aspirations and ideals are in the focus of the party's attention, and the party will not abandon this road of renewal, Medvedev said.

Politburo Discusses New Party Rules, Congress

LD2302173890 Moscow TASS in English 1711 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 23 TASS—At its session on Thursday, the Politburo of the Communist Party's Central Committee examined new party rules drafted on the basis of proposals by party organisations, communists and non-party people and in accordance with provisions of the Central Committee's platform for the 28th Congress.

Following a lengthy and detailed discussion, the Politburo decided to add finishing touches to the draft rules and submit them for consideration to the Central Committee's plenary meeting.

The Politburo also discussed matters connected with the convocation of the 28th Party Congress, including the norm of representation, the order of electing deputies and a report-and-election campaign in party organisations.

Proposals on these issues will also be considered at the planned plenum.

The Politburo considered measures connected with the results of the February, 1990, plenum, which must be implemented in the centre and in the periphery.

It attached prime importance in political and organisational work to starting an in-depth discussion of the Central Committee's platform for the Party Congress and other related issues and use preparations for the Congress to restructure the party and consolidate sound forces in society to handle tasks advanced by perestroyka.

Practical results should be achieved in all areas and the activity of primary party organisations and work collectives should be raised.

Draft Rules for Choosing Congress Delegates

PM2602214690 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Feb 90 First Edition pp 1, 2

["Draft Procedure for the Election of Delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress" prepared by the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Party Building and Cadre Policy]

[Text] There has been extensive discussion in the party of the procedure for electing delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress. Communists attach great importance to this question, rightly believing that the outcome of the congress will depend primarily on the body of delegates. They are widely in favor of holding multiple-candidate elections of delegates to the CPSU congress and to the congresses of union republican communist parties and kray and oblast party conferences and want every communist to be given the chance to participate in composing the country's supreme party forum.

Taking the opinions of party organizations, communists, and the public into account, the following procedure for electing delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress is proposed.

Primary party organizations will nominate candidate delegates. Communists of small organizations will be able to do this at group meetings conducted by party raykoms [rayon committees] and gorkoms [city committees]. It is necessary to ensure competition, multiple choice, and an objective assessment of candidates' political and moral qualities. And it is important that they should be authoritative party members, worthy representatives of the working class, peasantry, or intelligentsia, who have made a good impression during the perestroyka process and are capable of actively participating in elaborating and implementing party policy.

Candidates must be given the opportunity to say at party organizations and in the media how they stand on the basic issues of party policy and practical work. Party organizations can carry out work to support their candidates in other party organizations.

Depending on the procedure for electing delegates, the nominations can be considered at rayon or city party conferences. The size of CPSU membership in the rayon or city will be taken into account, as will the possibility of alternative proposals' being submitted. The breadth and vigor of support for a particular candidate will also be considered. Decisions to nominate candidates at meetings and conferences will be taken at the discretion of the participants by public or secret ballot. The list of nominated candidates will be published.

The procedure for electing delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress will be determined by plenums of oblast and kray party organizations and union republican communist parties in accordance with the situation in party organizations and the conditions of their activity and taking into account the opinion of communists. Direct elections of delegates in one-seat and multi-seat party electoral okrugs are possible.

Elections in one-seat electoral okrugs. In this case the plenum elects a commission to run the elections of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress. At the request of primary party organizations and party raykoms and gorkoms and taking into account the party structure and representation norm approved by the CPSU Central Committee, the commission will form party electoral okrugs. The okrugs can cover several rayon (city) party organizations. Okrug electoral commissions will be set up in the okrugs.

The okrug electoral commission will monitor the elections in primary party organizations and create conditions for acquainting communists with the aspiring congress delegates, approve the ballot paper for the okrug, ensure that the ballot papers are printed and primary party organizations are supplied with them, and ascertain the election results for the okrug.

The secret ballot paper for the election of a delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress will include all the candidates nominated at primary party organizations in the okrug and, where okrugs cover several rayons (cities), candidates supported by rayon (city) party conferences.

Within the framework of the electoral okrug the secret ballot to elect a congress delegate is carried out in primary (or shop with primary status) party organizations. They will elect counting commissions. The voting procedure is similar to the election of delegates for rayon and city party conferences, from lists of communists registered in the given organization.

The election is deemed valid if more than one-half of the CPSU members in the okrug have participated. In okrugs where none of the candidates has obtained more than one-half of the votes, there will be a second ballot involving the two candidates who obtained most votes in the first round.

The commission formed by the party committee plenum will report the results of the election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress to the oblast or kray party conference or union republican communist party congress. If the okrug election is deemed invalid or when none of the candidates running in the election has obtained the requisite number of votes, a CPSU congress delegate is elected directly to the vacant seat by the oblast or kray party conference or union republican communist party congress.

Elections in multi-seat electoral okrugs. In this case the plenum considers all the candidates supported by rayon and city party conferences and approves a common list of candidate delegates for all party organizations in the oblast, kray, or republic. The plenum will form an oblast, kray, or republican commission to conduct the election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress.

The list of candidates will be published in the press, together with brief biographical data on each. On the basis of this list the commission will approve the secret ballot paper, print the requisite number of papers, and send them to the party raykoms and gorkoms, which will organize the voting at primary party organizations. To this end, party raykoms and gorkoms will set up counting commissions. Counting commissions will also be elected in primary (shop) party organizations.

The commission formed by the party committee plenum will report the results of the ballot to the oblast or kray party conference or union republican communist party congress. The election is deemed valid if more than one-half of the oblast (kray) party organization or union republican communist party membership has participated. In cases where an election has not taken place or seats remain vacant, the delegates will be elected directly at the oblast or kray party conference or union republican communist party congress.

Multi-seat electoral okrugs can be set up on the basis of groups of rayon (city) party organizations. In this case an okrug electoral commission will be formed in each.

The plenum of the party obkom, raykom, or union republican Communist Party Central Committee may decide to give primary party organizations in which the number of communists meets or exceeds the representation norm set by the CPSU Central Committee the direct right to elect congress delegates. In this case the party organization will create a one-seat or multi-seat electoral okrug. The elected delegates will join the rest of the 28th CPSU Congress delegates from oblast or kray party organizations or union republican communist parties.

In accordance with the existing CPSU Statutes, delegates to the party congress can be elected by closed (secret) ballot at oblast or kray party conferences and union republican communist party congresses. If this procedure is adopted the electoral process will be democratized to the maximum extent. There will be a choice of candidates at the elections, nominated at primary party organizations and supported by rayon (city) party conferences.

When determining the results of the voting, in contrast to the procedure envisaged by the current CPSU Statutes, candidates should be deemed elected 28th CPSU Congress delegates if they have obtained the most votes compared with the other candidates and more than one-half of the votes of CPSU members participating in the ballot or congress conference delegates.

It is necessary to amend the procedure for electing delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress from party organizations in the Soviet Army, Navy, and internal and border forces. Formerly they were elected along with delegates from territorial party organizations. This time it is proposed that they be directly elected at party conferences in military districts, fleets, formations, branches of the Armed Forces, directorates of the internal forces, and border forces districts. As for communists in party organizations in Soviet Army or Navy units abroad, as before they will elect 28th congress delegates at military formation party conferences. Communist servicemen will participate in the work of territorial conferences and union republican communist party congresses in line with established practice and can elect and be elected to the relevant party organs, but they will not participate in the election of delegates to the CPSU Congress from territorial party organizations.

It is advisable to enable party organizations of Soviet institutions operating abroad to elect congress delegates at a party conference that could be held in Moscow.

In the commission's view, the proposed procedure for the election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress could be used when electing delegates to other party congresses and conferences.

It should also be stipulated that oblast and kray party conferences and union republican communist party congresses will send to the 28th CPSU Congress proposals on candidates for party central organs, elaborated taking into account party organizations' opinions.
[signed] The CPSU Central Committee Commission on Party Building and Cadre Policy.

Zaykov Visits Mikoyan Aviation Works

LD1502165190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1530 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Text] Today, Comrade Zaykov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, visited the Moscow machine-building works named after Mikoyan. A meeting took place with representatives of the working people of that collective. As you know, the works produces the famous MIGs and represents the intellectual potential of Soviet aviation construction, the talents and golden hands of our working class.

Participants talked a great deal about the great political and economic significance of conversion. The impermissible delay in preparing its state program was noted. The task of transferring production to state rails should not be treated in an oversimplified manner. One should not expect immediate and universal abundance from it. Conversion should be conducted in a well-thought-out and well-organized manner and should harmonize with economic measures for the social protection of production and scientific collectives that work in the defense sector.

Comrade Zaykov answered questions put by communists and workers at the works.

Council of Minsters Issues Auction Response

LD2402223990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 24 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The USSR Council of Ministers Presidium has examined the appeal made to the government by the trade unions on matters of auctions and commercial trade in consumer goods.

The USSR Council of Ministers Presidium deemed it possible to exclude several items from the list of goods permitted to be sold by auction to the population this year. What are they? They are Volga cars, Rubin, Elektron, and Gorizont fourth-generation televisions, refrigerators, and twin-compartment freezers—Minsk and Biryus.

As far as commercial prices are concerned, no decision has yet been made on these matters. With the discussion borne in mind, agreement has been reached that the sale of goods for children, foodstuffs, and Soviet goods for which there is mass demand must not be allowed in commercial shops. The specific lists of goods to be sold at commercial prices will be determined by the councils of ministers of the union republics, in coordination with the republican trade union councils.

Nina Andreyeva, Gidaspov Comments Derided

PM2302204990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Yuriy Makarov article under the rubric "What They Say About Us": "Principles for Export"]

[Text] It is extremely interesting to find out what is being said about us abroad from our own lips, so to speak.

Our readers have heard plenty from our own press about the principles which N. Andreyeva just cannot bring herself to waive. But recently, evidently feeling that the domestic market is now saturated, Nina Aleksandrovna has launched her "principles" for export.

"All our problems in the Soviet Union today are connected with the fact that elements of capitalism are being introduced into socialism." I do not know how anyone else feels about this, but for me personally this statement comes as a complete revelation. I had naively supposed that we have recently been trying to introduce at least some elements of socialism into our society. But it transpires that the society in which you and I live is already a society of real socialism which certain forces are trying to destroy.

"Andreyeva believes," the Finnish weekly VIIKKOLEHTI continues, "that capitalism began to infiltrate the country after the death of Stalin in 1953 and that this process has accelerated in the Gorbachev period." Having read these lines, I looked in alarm out the window: During these 37 years of insidious infiltration, we could very well have built developed capitalism without even noticing! But I was reassured by what I saw: There was not the faintest hint of anything remotely resembling any developed "ism" outside the window. With the exception of our line waiting outside their McDonald's.

"In the Soviet Union," she says, "a class of capitalists has appeared, numbering 150,000 millionaires who are getting rich by exploiting people."

These figures inspire hope, even if they are conjured out of thin air. This means, damn it, that we must be living in a wealthy country if we have such a host of millionaires! Even in Finland you would look in vain for this kind of number. But why am I going on about Finland? The United States is going to explode with envy when it finds out! So it should, incidentally.

But there is a hitch with these "isms." If we have that many millionaires in our country, it must mean we have built capitalism. On the other hand, N. Andreyeva claims that we now have socialism which is under threat from "elements...." So where on earth are we all living now?

However, everything is crystal clear as far as the rest is concerned:

"With no capitalist class, one party, the Communist Party, is sufficient. For it is precisely the existence of the bourgeoisie that leads to a multiparty system."

She even offers a recipe for solving our interethnic problems: "The secession of the Baltic and Transcaucasian republics from the Soviet Union should be prevented by destroying all signs of capitalism by means of legislation and 'isolating' nationalist-minded leaders." She includes the People's Front leaders among those who should be isolated. Here the Finnish journalists are slightly perplexed: "Andreyeva does not make clear whether she is referring to imprisonment in this connection."

The Finnish colleagues have no reason to be perplexed about the interpretation of the word "isolate." It is easily deciphered if you discover Nina Aleksandrovna's dream:

"The country needs a leader capable of assuming responsibility for solving our problems: Many of our problems have arisen because the country has no real leader like Stalin."

Here, as we can see, the Finns are again dubious and hesitant about the methods of "solving problems" which were skillfully exploited by this real leader, who was au fait with linguistics and, in particular, with the meaning of the word "to isolate." But....

"In Andreyeva's opinion, the people repressed and murdered under Stalin were counterrevolutionaries. Innocent communists and Komsomol members also perished at that time, but the representatives of the bourgeoisie who had infiltrated the Soviet Government were to blame for this, and not Stalin."

To all appearances, they "infiltrated" our ranks by the million rather than in isolated instances. But here Nina Aleksandrovna reassures the Finnish public about the scale of the repressions, exaggerated by enemies: "In her opinion, a mere 3.7 million people were arrested... of whom 650,000 were shot."

Well, if it was this "mere" number, one wonders what all the fuss is about? So that was the real socialism which gave us all a good life and which must now be protected by further "isolation."

In fact, if we did not go out into the street at all but just read about ourselves in the Finnish newspapers, we would feel perfectly reassured. Last week their newspaper ILTALEHTI carried an interview which, by complete coincidence, also carried a Leningrad dateline. The following lines in this interview with the first secretary of the Leningrad CPSU oblast committee and city committee are particularly encouraging: "Comrade Gidaspov said in connection with the food shortages problem that 'the shortages are a joke invented by journalists. Although we live in conditions that cannot be compared with those in Finland, the food supply situation in Leningrad is satisfactory....'"

We would like to heartily congratulate those Leningraders who do not read Finnish newspapers.

Andreyeva Comments on Gorbachev, Stalin

PM2602114690 Paris LE FIGARO in French 22 Feb 90 p 6

[Interview with Nina Andreyeva, described in editorial introduction as "52-year old chemistry teacher from Leningrad," by Pierre Bocev—date and place not given]

[Text] [Bocev] Is the CPSU "platform" and the recent Central Committee plenum a victory for Gorbachev?

[Andreyeva] This is a betrayal of socialism, an enormous step toward social democracy. And social democracy has never solved problems.

[Bocev] Has socialism solved them?

[Andreyeva] Largely. It would probably have solved them all if there had not been distortions and deviations. The beginning of the end came with Khrushchev who introduced capitalist elements into the economy and who demolished agriculture. Over the years, the extraordinary planning machine has been destroyed.

[Bocev] Is the advent of a multiparty system also a "betrayal of socialism?"

[Andreyeva] It is a bourgeois idea. We must not be surprised by that, because the bourgeoisie has become a new class in the Soviet Union. There are 150,000 millionaires in our country, and some are even multimillionaires. Like every class, they are seeking the legalization of their policy, in this case by the establishment of a multiparty system.

[Bocev] It is not just millionaires who want the establishment of a multiparty system....

[Andreyeva] All the parties which will be formed will be in opposition to the CPSU. The social democrats, the "Cadets" [Constitutional Democrats] who are returning 72 years after the revolution. In 1917, when we moved from private ownership to collective ownership, the dictatorship of the proletariat was necessary. We are now moving in the opposite direction.

[Bocev] What about Gorbachev's role?

[Andreyeva] It is simple; it is to increase his personal power. Under the cover of moving toward bourgeois democracy, he is creating the post of president of the USSR.

He also wants to be chairman of the CPSU, and we are witnessing the same thing: "All power to the party masses," he says. But in reality, the Central Committee will be reduced and emasculated so that it becomes a body for interminable demagogic discussions, like the Supreme Soviet.

[Bocev] Despite all that, the situation in the USSR is still lagging behind what is happening in Eastern Europe....

[Andreyeva] This is the disintegration of the socialist camp, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact. This clearly leads to an imbalance of forces between East and West. If one of the sides is strengthened to the detriment of the other, who can guarantee to us that revanchism will not rear its head again? How can we not foresee economic pressures, political diktat, and perhaps a military diktat?

There is only one way out. We must not dismember the planned economy, or legalize private ownership, or introduce the damaging principle of regional self-management. On the other hand, we must democratize the CPSU through democratic centralism, the reaffirmation of Lenin's principles, and complete obedience.

[Bocev] There is now very little in common between the party line which you uphold and that advocated by the reformers. Do you fear a split in the party?

[Andreyeva] It already exists. It reflects the split within society. Since 1987, there have been some people who are in favor of restoring capitalism and some who defend socialist ideals.

Gorbachev is adhering to classical right-wing positions. He is an opportunist, a revisionist, and a renegade. There are only three people in the Politburo who support him—Yakovlev, CPSU head of international affairs, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, and ideology chief Medvedev....

[Bocev] And yet, they succeeded in imposing the denunciation of Stalin's crimes....

[Andreyeva] The press, which is in the hands of counterrevolutionaries favorable to the market economy, only reports the negative aspects of Stalin. It does so by denigration, distortions, lies, and abuse.

[Bocev] But the important historical victims, people like Kamenev and Bukharin, who have all been rehabilitated, were not saboteurs....

[Andreyeva] They ought never to have suffered repression. They were not spies or saboteurs, but they were political enemies at a time of life or death for the country.

[Bocev] Nonetheless, a whole people lived in fear....

[Andreyeva] That is an exaggeration. The workers were not afraid. They were quite calm. Those who were afraid were the thieves and corrupt people. You could enter his office a general and come out an ordinary soldier.

[Bocev] Did your family suffer under Stalin?

[Andreyeva] No. I was born in a worker-peasant family and we never had any problems. My maternal uncle was one of the Kronstadt sailors.

My husband's father spent 10 years in prison. He was in the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] (the forerunner to the KGB—LE FIGARO editor's note). He was accused of having plotted an attack on Stalin, but he was rehabilitated before the 20th Congress under Khrushchev.

[Bocev] Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, one of the greatest critics of Stalinism, has virtually been pardoned and might return to the USSR. What do you think of that?

[Andreyeva] Solzhenitsyn is not a patriot, he is an anti-Soviet. His artistic qualities cannot be denied, but he uses his talent to fight his country. If he returns, he will swell the ranks of the anti-Soviets who are denigrating their socialist fatherland.

[Bocev] A section of the Soviet press regularly accuses you of anti-Semitism. Is that true?

[Andreyeva] I am opposed to any oppression based on arguments of nationality or race. The Jews no longer have the status of political refugees and they are losing their privileges. They are, therefore, artificially trying to create an atmosphere of anti-Semitism which would enable them to regain that status.

[Bocev] What about the anti-Semitic demonstrations staged by Pamyat, the all-Russian organization which claims to follow the conservatives?

[Andreyeva] There was a trial after allegations of anti-Semitic activities by Pamyat members. It was proved that the people who chanted those slogans had nothing to do with Pamyat. Moreover, most were of Semitic origin....

[Bocev] One last word: What does the future hold for your country?

[Andreyeva] The people can no longer tolerate indiscipline and anarchy. The workers are suffering more and more; they are tired of being the hostages of a corrupt mafia. It is no accident that Stalin's picture is appearing everywhere. It was he who turned impoverished Russia into a superpower. We are now hearing widespread calls for more democracy. But democracy is not talk, it is discipline, public spirit, and responsibility, otherwise it degenerates into anarchy.

Yakovlev on CPSU Platform, Need for Compromise

PM2102152090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
21 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Perestroyka: Action Needed"]

[Text] The times insistently demand a consolidation of all healthy forces in society. This was stressed by A.N. Yakovlev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at a meeting with the collective of the Moscow Higher Party School on 20 February. It was devoted to the topic: The party Central Committee platform and the prospects for improving socialism.

Giving an all-around analysis of the draft CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th party congress, A.N. Yakovlev noted that the platform sprang from the experience of perestroyka. From the enormous scope for information that it opened up for us. From the frank and honest analysis of the state of affairs. From the new social atmosphere created by perestroyka. From the outlook that also became possible thanks to perestroyka. Of course, from its practical actions.

It is sometimes said that five years is a long time. Why are the benefits of perestroyka as yet more modest than was expected? But let us ask ourselves: Expected by whom, when, and on what grounds?

It is clear that many such expectations were developed under the key influence of the mentality, ideas, and atmosphere of the pre-perestroyka times. When many people quite sincerely believed that all you had to do was to make certain amendments to existing practice, and things would start moving. Given the level of information then available to us and the ideas current at the time, such expectations were only natural.

But today, as the ruling party, we must recognize that the ailments afflicting the economy and society are too closely connected. Far too many problems have accumulated, and serious problems at that. Miracles do not happen. Only competent and painstaking work can take us forward. Faith in miracles, reliance on miracles can only end in one thing—violence.

The political value of the platform in current conditions is to help to unify everything healthy, responsible, sober, industrious, and conscientious that exists in the party and the country. Yes, refusing to close our eyes to differences in views and approaches. Yes, allowing for the fact that the conservative and the radical, the Stalinist and the perestroyka-ist may appear side by side in the same party and even in the same party organization. Yes, realizing that our society is divided in every sphere by disagreement, confrontation, and conflict. This appeal is not merely naive. It reflects an urgent need in society and in the party—the need for unity.

Naturally, I am not calling on you to flirt with those whose views and behaviour do not evoke sympathy, A.N. Yakovlev said. But if the framework of the law is observed, everything else should be organized in a civilized way. Herein lies, ultimately, the art of compromise, without which it is impossible to build a normal human society.

In this respect the party's precongress program offers grounds for a very broad social coalition. The political balance inherent in the document points to its feasibility. As for the actual content of the document, naturally it is open for constructive amendments. The main requirement is for it to teach us to cooperate with the whole of society, to collaborate with all its components.

Ideally, this is how it should be: Everything healthy that exists in society, everything new and promising that is born in society—all this should find a place, a reflection, an expression in the CPSU. Nothing else is possible in the socialist society. Since today we realize that society will become more complex, rather than simpler, the party's capacity to integrate everything new within itself and to foresee and anticipate its emergence is a very important political condition of the normal course of social development.

The party's draft precongress program, for the first time in our history, offers us a basis and an opportunity for the broadest constructive dialogue, practical actions based upon it, and the consolidation of all society in the process and for the sake of its self-renewal. That is the platform's merit.

A.N. Yakovlev answered many questions from participants in the meeting.

Leaders' Special Privileges Cut Further

PM1502091590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "'No' to Social Elitism"]

[Text] Henceforth state dachas are only to be given as residences to the chairmen of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers. All the other leaders of the supreme echelon of power will have dachas in settlements belonging to the appropriate departments and organizations. These dacha buildings are being put on a boarding house footing. Some 24 state dachas which previously belonged to the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet, and USSR Council of Ministers Administrations of Affairs, and certain departments, have been transferred to public health bodies.

These facts were cited 13 February at the latest session of the USSR Supreme Soviet commission examining the privileges enjoyed by individual categories of citizens. The session, in which representatives of a number of parliamentary committees, commissions, ministries, and departments took part and which was chaired by Ye.M. Primakov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Union, discussed the progress made in fulfilling our parliament's recommendations.

The people's deputies heard a report from A.P. Biryukova, chairman of the government commission on the elimination of the USSR Ministry of Health Fourth Main Administration and deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Dwelling briefly on this main administration's history, she familiarized the meeting with what had been done since it was abolished last October.

Here are just a few facts. In accordance with the recommendations of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies a considerable proportion of Fourth Administration medical and sanatorium establishments have been transferred to general use and converted to treatment and diagnosis centers and rehabilitation centers for children, invalids, and war and labor veterans. Thus a consultation and diagnosis center for children living in the Baumanskiy and Sokolnicheskiy Rayons of Moscow has been set up on the premises of a children's polyclinic. Approximately 10,000 children, many of whom have also obtained the requisite treatment, have been examined there over the past few months on referral from the rayons' polyclinics.

Another step is as follows: A maternity home building and all its equipment have been allocated to meet the needs of the capital's health service. One of Kiyevskiy Rayon's antenatal clinics has been housed there. The USSR Ministry of Health has been given one of the largest establishments—a second polyclinic. The intention is to develop a consultation and diagnosis center here for the capital's residents. Quite recently, in February, the USSR Ministry of Health was given a combined hospital and polyclinic where an all-union diagnostic clinic center will be set up. It is not only Muscovites who can come there for help.

A.P. Biryukova also said that 12 well-equipped, luxury sanatoriums and rest homes have been transferred to the jurisdiction of the USSR Ministry of Health, the V.I. Lenin Soviet Children's Foundation, and the Leningrad City Soviet Executive Committee. More than 2,000 children injured as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Electric Power Station have already visited a number of them. Some 15 medical and sanatorium-health resort establishments in all—approximately one-half—have been transferred from the former Fourth Administration system. Moreover, another 15 state dachas in Livadiya, Gagri, Palanga, and the Moscow area have left this system.

In view of the recommendations made by the privileges commission the transferred establishments have retained their material and technical supply conditions, the staff payment system, and rated norms for expenditure on food and medicines.

People may ask: How will medical services be organized for the people who previously received treatment from the Fourth Administration? A general health association has been set up for this purpose under the USSR Council of Ministers. It will treat approximately 35,000 people—half its former quota. An individual, very attentive approach, along with careful consideration of every specific case is required for anyone who has to go to departmental polyclinics and polyclinics in their place of residence, it was said at the session.

Incidentally, the USSR Council of Ministers instructed the association to expand the practice of admitting patents for specialized treatment on referral from public health bodies and to allocate more places in sanatoriums and rest homes for workers, kolkhoz members, and other citizens.

As is well known, many complaints have been made about the higher norms for expenditure on patients' food and medicines in the former Fourth Administration's medical establishments in comparison with the ordinary medical network. Steps have also been taken here. There is, in fact, to be a phased increase in all-union norms. As of 1 January this year the norms for expenditure on food were increased in maternity homes, children's hospitals, sanatoriums, endocrinology wards, and day clinics. The capitation for buying medicines in maternity homes has risen by almost one-third.

The session also cited other government measures aimed at eliminating concessions and privileges for individual categories of citizens. Thus, official motorized transport for leaders of ministries and departments is in the future made available only on the basis of a conveyer system for a set period. Delivery of special enterprise food products to party, soviet, economic, and other organizations in the capital has ceased. This produce is sent to children's establishments and the consumer cooperative trading network. Provision of materials and amenities—the state dacha system, provision of transport, food orders, and servants—for former party and government leaders who have retired on pension has been abolished.

Summing up the results of the session, Ye.M. Primakov pointed out that the work of the privileges' commission centers on supervision of the implementation of the recommendations made by the country's supreme organ of state power. The essential point is to ensure that the whole system of privileges is strictly regulated. Glasnost must be total in this matter. In this context Ye.M. Primakov read out a cable from Sakhalin party oblast party committee. Of late, it says, there has been much said in the newspapers, on radio, and on televison about city and rayon party committee and oblast and central party organization leaders' enjoying privileges in the form of official dachas, hospitals, hunting lodges, catering facilities, and other features of the stagnation era. This is not the case in Sakhalin, the cable says. That is why we have a clear, undisputed right to appeal to the conscience of communists, citizens, and all party leaders who still enjoy special benefits. Stop discrediting the party and communists, most of whom have never enjoyed any privileges. Hand over all these special buildings right away to those who have a more acute need of them, free journalists of this subject and give them time and opportunities to ascertain in greater depth the true reasons for our failures and the means of extricating ourselves from the political and economic deadlocks. After all the party, which began perestroyka under Lenin's banner, must complete it without special dachas and special rations, the cable's writers urge.

The participants in the session reached the unanimous view that a working group must be set up jointly with USSR Supreme Soviet committees and commissions to analyze and check on how the process of eliminating privileges is proceeding and how the resolutions adopted for these purposes are being fulfilled.

Government Commission Discusses Medical Supplies

LD0602175690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1626 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 6 Feb (TASS)—The difficult situation evolving in the country's health service concerning the drastic reduction in the production of medicinal preparations was examined at the USSR Council of Ministers state commission for emergency situations. A shortage of raw materials means the production of medicaments in the country will decrease by approximately 30-40 percent.

The commission has charged the governments of the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Azerbaijan, Lithuania and Armenia, and a number of ministries with taking all the necessary measures to achieve the immediate resumption of the operation of enterprises and production facilities producing raw materials for the medical industry. They have been warned that when they halt production an emergency situation is created with regard to satisfying the needs of the country's population for medical preparations.

Deputy Criticizes Recourse To Rally Democracy

PM2602163790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Feb 90 Second Edition pp 1-2

[Interview with USSR People's Deputy V. Maksimov by PRAVDA parliamentary correspondent Yu. Ursov under the rubric "Topical Subject": "Why Are 'People's Orators' Causing A Sensation. Opinion of USSR People's Deputy V. Maksimov Worker on the Political Situation in the Country"; date and place of interview not specified; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Perestroyka processes in society are proceeding with difficulty and in a contradictory fashion. Periods of relative political quiet give way to stormy rallies involving tens of thousands of people. V. Maksimov, who was recently a shaft sinker at the "Severnaya" Mine in Vorkuta and is now a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, contemplates the political situation in the country and the prospects for its development.

[Ursov] Valeriy Nikolayevich, the events of the last month seem to have tested state authorities for durability. Blatant and covert violations of the USSR Constitution, numerous rallies and demonstrations, and increasingly intolerable attacks on the CPSU....

[Maksimov] I am not a party member and will, therefore, not evaluate the processes taking place within the CPSU. I will only say that, whether this is good or bad, the reality is that the party has grown together with the executive and the separation of functions is only beginning at this moment. Every blow inflicted on the party is also a blow to the state. That is partly why it is not experiencing the best of times. Moreover this is happening amid a general economic crisis. Count the "hotspots" where people are not working for various reasons. You'll have almost half the country! What if you consider the fact that the national economy is the sum of specialized and highly cooperativized sectors? Clearly all society will have to pay tomorrow with a catastrophic reduction in its standard of living for today's stoppages, rallies, and ethnic conflicts.

The picture is by and large a depressing one. In my view, economic and political processes are closely interconnected. Administrative coercion in the economy founded on fear of punishment has not as yet given way to economic compulsion founded on a reluctance to lose work paid in weighty rubles. In politics the party is abandoning direct management of the state and society, and soviets at all levels have not as yet taken up this management. Yet, historical experience indicates that the intermediate period, the interregnum, is always an extremely dangerous period which gives rise to various adventurers and demagogues with, as a rule, narrowly egoistic aims. Using as their cover slogans about prosperity for the people. There is no power without a master, so the main task now is to ensure that the people become the masters.

[Ursov] Yes, political struggle has become a reality. But I personally am surprised that some of your colleagues—USSR people's deputies and members of the country's Supreme Soviet—have been calling for wide-ranging political actions which cannot be described as constructive by any means. A somewhat strange role for legislators....

[Maksimov] In my view, the democratically formed corps of people's deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet correspondingly reflect the disposition of forces in society. If we analyze the debates at the sessions and the congresses we can definitely say that deputies can be divided into interest groups—moreover, very often regardless of the voters' wishes.

Many laws have been adopted, but they are operating in a very sluggish fashion. Or they are producing unexpected results. In my view, that is why we are short on professionalism and competence in many respects. Including those economist deputies who made a name for themselves in the years of "stagnation." At one time, incidentally, not so long ago, a particular economist won renown by "making a major contribution" to the theory of socialist finances, for instance. But today he issues prescriptions with equal confidence as to how to improve a financial system which has been totally rubbished as a result of these efforts. Moreover he substantiates his views as he did in the past without making calculations, without statistics, without mentioning the strata that possess the real economic power. I personally distrust such arguments. And I'm not the only one. So when various proposals made by individual USSR people's deputies concerning policy and the economy are rejected by the Supreme Soviet or the Congress, these deputies submit them to rallies, thus appealing to the people. You see what happens: They could not convince their colleagues who represent the people, they failed to prove their case during a thorough discussion, so let us manipulate outwardly attractive concepts at rallies. That is what "people's orators" are like.... At rallies, of course, there will be no discussions or particular objections. On the other hand emotions are fired up and the "enemy image" is formed—be the enemy the local authorities or the "overwhelming majority" in the USSR Supreme Soviet.

A word about something else. Maybe no one today would deny the need to switch to a rule-of-law state. Including my colleagues who vigorously urge the people to take to the streets. But can we foster respect for the law in this way? The law may be bad but it is the law. If we forget this principle I fear that we may be left without a state at all—not to mention a rule-of-law state.

[Ursov] All the same people obviously find some attraction in rallies and in demands for further democratization. What is more, I believe that the by no means unfounded criticism of the central apparatus and the local authorities is falling on prepared ground.

[Maksimov] Rallies, I repeat, are not the main sign of democracy; on the contrary, they indicate the lack of it. But talking of results, we must find out who benefits from the increasingly frequent demands for the existing political system to be dismantled immediately, at a stroke. Demands for one apparatus to be replaced by another are groundless, since the people who are aspiring to power today lack a precise and clear action program. Their motives are also dubious.

I personally am put on my guard by some general trends in the development of "regional" crises, so to speak. Above all by the fact that they are exacerbated as a result of holdups in the supply of food and commodities, and shortages. Facts of the large-scale concealment of commodities within the trade system are constantly coming to light, although imported and Soviet footwear, clothing, and household equipment are not extinct on "stalls" or in the cooperative "commission stores"—admittedly, at amazing prices. Moreover this comes from state stocks. Such cases indicate that the distribution system is virtually totally controlled by the "shadow economy." Its traders were never and will never be concerned about the general well-being and progress, they are the bearers of an antipeople mentality. Yet whoever controls the distribution system has a wealth of opportunity to influence the social atmosphere. Let us consider who benefits from hotting up the social atmosphere.

[Ursov] I predict a skeptical smirk from some readers: "Once again you've dragged out the omniscient ordinary worker who upholds the interests of the apparatus."

[Maksimov] I have spent several years underground "providing the country with coal." I am not ashamed of my working class profession, although things are also rather hard for me now in the Supreme Soviet. But I believe, like most people, that I can see whose interests are "served" by particular proposals and juridical wordings. Incidentally, I always cleaved to the view that there is no need to consider people absolute ignoramuses incapable of ascending to some radiant truths. The people ultimately assess everything in a pretty sober fashion. Those people who see someone else's machinations in every speech by a worker which goes against their own opinion are usually accustomed to appealing to the working class when it suits them, using allegedly working class interests as a cover.

There is no point in forgetting that people have also grown weary of sluggishness on the part of the local organs of power and, equally, of endless fruitless rallies with dubious slogans. The situation may develop quite unexpectedly for their organizers.

Uralmash Committee Adopts Emergency Resolution

PM0202170690 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Own correspondent Aleksandr Pashkov report: "Extraordinary Party Conference at the Uralmash Plant"]

[Text] Sverdlovsk—Some 500 delegates, on behalf of the 8,000 Uralmash Communists, adopted a resolution "On Emergency Measures To Overcome the Crisis in the CPSU" at an extraordinary party conference convened at the request of primary organizations.

"The reality is this: People are losing their faith in perestroyka, in the party's ability to finish what it started," B. Khimich, deputy secretary of the party committee, says. "We recorded that in the resolution. We believe that our conference is only a link in a chain of events taking place in the party. The Sverdlovsk City Party Committee tried at one time to take control of the situation and rally the communists, but all the enthusiasm somehow evaporated rapidly. Nor have the oblast committee [obkom] plenums clarified the matter. Ordinary party members have begun to feel pessimistic—once again their opinion, their demands are left hanging in the air."

A group of activists at the plant drew up its own draft party statutes. For a long time people went from one office to another, proposing that the draft be published as a discussion document. Nothing came of it. A number of communists refused to pay their membership dues, believing that these only go to maintain the party apparatus. No notice was taken.

Tension increased in this organization of many thousands of people. Communists believe that the gulf between the basis of the party—the primary organizations—and the leadership has deepened to a dangerous point.

Speakers stressed that the main cause of the crisis is the extremely undemocratic intraparty policy, which has led to a situation in which ordinary communists, without being able to influence the decisions of party apparatuses at various levels, are forced to bear responsibility for the bankruptcy of those decisions. There was much talk of secrecy in the work of the oblast party organization.

The Uralmash Plant communists demanded the suspension of the norms of the CPSU Statutes stipulating the procedure for electing the party's leadership organs, and also of decisions adopted earlier that retard the development of intraparty democracy, including the CPSU Central Committee instructions on the conduct of elections of party leadership organs.

In the conference's 5 hours of work many proposals were put forward which became part of the lengthy resolution, which A. Korolev, a member of the CPSU Central Committee from Uralmash, was instructed to bring to the attention of the participants in the forthcoming February plenum.

The last point in the resolution says: "Expressing the opinion of the majority of Uralmash Plant communists, the party conference expresses its lack of confidence in the Sverdlovsk CPSU Obkom Bureau headed by L.F. Bobykin and insists on the publication of this decision in the oblast party newspaper URALSKIY RABOCHIY in the near future."

Such an event certainly cannot be called ordinary for the city and oblast. I tried to find out how it is assessed by the CPSU obkom, where an extraordinary bureau session was held the next day.

I called V. Andriyanov, obkom ideology secretary. "He is out visiting the oblast," the reception office told me. Although I knew very well that Vladimir Vladimirovich was in. I contacted G. Alekseyev, chief of the party organizational and cadre work department, who redirected me to the general department. There, the chief was sick. I dialed L. Bobykin's office: "He is on the way to Moscow." Obkom Secretary N. Talalayev, with whom I eventually managed to speak with, was brief: "Internal questions were discussed. Uralmash was not discussed."

I know the bureau discussed very urgent matters—conferences similar to the Uralmash one were held at many enterprises in the oblast. Some kind of tactics and strategy were formulated. There were proposals on convening an extraordinary obkom plenum, and the question of resignation was touched on. But apparently the people from the plant are right—for ordinary communists, the work of the higher instances is a closed book. It is a pity.

State Examination in Marxism-Leninism Replaced

PM0602151790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 3

[A. Zverev report: "Examination Abolished"]

[Text] The USSR State Committee for Public Education has abolished the state examination in Marxism-Leninism. This decision applies to all the country's higher educational institutions [VUZ], starting with the second semester.

The new order, signed by G. Yagodin, chairman of the State Committee for Public Education, after the All-Union Students Forum—and this is especially stipulated in its "banner headline"—was adopted with due regard for the suggestions and remarks made by the delegates to that forum.

Henceforth every VUZ, faculty, department, or even student has an opportunity to make its or his own amendment to the schedule of state examinations, replacing a subject which has aroused so much criticism among students with courses in 20th-century sociopolitical history, theory of modern socialism, philosophy, or political economy. All these disciplines, as V. Kuptsov, chief of the Social Sciences Teaching Administration of the USSR State Committee for Public Education, specified at our request, have been making themselves at home in VUZ's for almost six months now; their appearance in the student schedule is provided for by the all-union concept of perestroyka in the teaching of social science disciplines adopted by the State Committee's collegium last April. Textbooks for three of them—"Introduction to Philosophy" under the editorship of I. Frolov, "Outline of the Theory of Socialism" under the editorship of G. Smirnov, and "Political Economy" under the editorship of V. Medvedev—are already being put to the test in VUZ lecture halls. Several authorial collectives are working at once to create a teaching aid on the political history of our century.

It is also probably important to note the fact that the state examinations in the new disciplines will, as before, assess the student's knowledge, not his convictions. A discrepancy in the philosophical positions of the examiner and the examinee, I was assured at the State Committee, must not influence the size of the mark given.

'Fetish' of Socially Owned Farms Repudiated

PM1402151190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences A. Kiva, sector chief at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies: "Polemical Responses to an Interview with V. Starodubtsev: We Cannot Protect Ourselves Separately"]

[Excerpts] Moscow—Alarm, alarm.... "We in the countryside follow with alarm the increasing polarization of the interests of town and country," V. Starodubtsev says (PRAVDA 6 January). How is this to be understood? Or the following: "Now the city-dwellers, driven by interest based on economic accountability, often act as the enemy of the land. They supply poor-quality equipment and make people pay through the nose for it." If I had heard such talk in a suburban electric train or a village club, I would not have been surprised. But from V. Starodubtsev, a man who is well known in the country, a USSR people's deputy, someone who should know the prime causes of many of our misfortunes? [passage omitted]

I am a social scientist, not an agronomist. But I grew up in a village, where my parents live to this day. I pay them regular visits there and chat to people. I do have an idea of what has happened and is happening, at least in the Ukrainian countryside. Let me make it clear from the outset. I am in favor of keeping viable collective farms [kolkhozes]. I see no alternative to them—as suppliers of marketable goods—in the short term. But that does not mean there can in principle be no alternative to them in our country. I favor the most diverse forms of ownership and am against any monopoly. But first things first. [passage omitted]

Take any village or, more accurately, a group of villages the inhabitants of which constitute a kolkhoz or state farm [sovkhoz]. You have very different people there. You have good specialists in their field, real hard workers. They are not afraid of leasing or individually owned farms. You also have weaker people. These always dither. You also have those for whom kolkhoz-sovkhoz ownership represents manna from heaven. It supplies their everyday wants and does not clothe them so badly. Although it is true, this is not always achieved by legal means. It is ludicrous to think that these champions of public ownership will voluntarily forsake such a rich vein.

It is they who shout loudest about the danger of the emergence of kulaks, hired laborers, and property owners. But there is also another category, and in some regions a very large one. These are drunks, blatant slackers, freeloaders, and inveterate social parasites. Perhaps we should take our bearings from them? They want no changes whatsoever. They envy everyone who works hard, has two or three cows, or buys a horse. Reliance on the kombed peasantry [committees of poor peasantry set up in 1918 to seize land, subsequently assimilated by rural soviets] has already done its sorry work.

I had almost forgotten: You also have those servants of the agrarian sector command-administrative system. They, too, favor the particularization of the system, so to speak.

You feel bitter and insulted: V. Starodubtsev, who has himself suffered from the practices of regimented socialism, complains at the anarchy of kolkhozes, unaware or pretending to be unaware of where this anarchy comes from.

There can be no return to capitalism. Our country has gone through that stage. The capitalism with which the defenders of the command-administrative system intimidate us no longer exists in the West.

What, then, is happening to us? Some people have, as it were, bewitched us. We idolize values, describing them as Marxist, which the founder of scientific communism would be aghast to see. He, after all, wanted a society built on his theory in which people would have a good life. Not just a good life, but a better life than under capitalism. For him the forms of ownership were a means, for us they have become an end, a fetish. However, why say "us?" It is not so! Most people understand everything correctly. But is it not the case that those who have thrown in their lot with the command-administrative system and who conceal their own selfish interests behind the people's interests are seeking to bamboozle us?

Deputies Discuss Semipalatinsk Test Site

LD0102203390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 1 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] A group of USSR People's Deputies has been on a visit to study the situation connected with the work of the nuclear test site in Semipalatinsk oblast. It has been visiting local sites, holding a number of meetings with work collectives, and conferring with specialists.

[Correspondent G. Sytykh, identified by caption] This is the final meeting and it is with people's deputies in Semipalatinsk Oblast. It took place at the oblast party committee. [video shows people at meeting]

The people's elected representatives spoke with anger and pain about the pernicious effect of nuclear explosions on the environment and individuals. [Video cuts to show interview with Yu.N. Shcherbak, chairman of the Nuclear Ecology subcommittee of the USSR Supreme Soviet and a USSR People's Deputy, identified by caption]

[Correspondent] Yuriy Nikolayevich, there have already been many commissions visiting this land, but the question of the closure of the nuclear test-site still remains open. When, then, will it be resolved?

[Shcherbak] This question should be resolved in the very near future, some time before March. We have been shocked by all that we have heard here. We were particularly shocked by the speech of the respected elder (Immukhanov), who related how 15 members of his family had died of leukemia and cancer. Our view is unequivocal: Nuclear tests at this test-site must be halted immediately, and ways must be sought to improve the health of people and create some kind of new and more healthy sociomedical climate for supplying the population. These people must be repaid the debt that the state incurred with them in conducting the nuclear tests. This is the position of all the members of our commission, our parliamentary group, which have come here, and they will defend it both in the Ecology Committee and in the Committee on Protecting the Health of the People.

Media Coverage of 4 Feb Moscow Rally Rebutted

PM1202152090 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 9 Feb 90 Second Edition p 6

[TASS correspondent K. Yuryev article: "About a Certain 'Sensation'"]

[Text] Occasionally glasnost in certain mass media organs gives rise to really strange twists and turns! Last Sunday, as is well known, there was a mass rally in Moscow organized by the so-called bloc of democratic forces. Reports about this event were comparatively short, and were published in by no means all Moscow's newspapers. But 7 February at the initiative of the Moscow Voters' Association [MVA] several dozen people came to the TASS building to express their dissatisfaction about how our agency covered the rally. And then it suddenly turned out that this action was almost a kind of "sensation" for some of our fellow writers....

For instance, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA can find nothing better to do than to put photographs of the "pickets" on the first page—apparently, in the editorial office's opinion, no event is more important than this for our youth of today. TASS, MOSCOW NEWS writes, "demonstrated in its report a negative attitude to events." And LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, for its part, complains about the "hasty," as it expressed itself, TASS article...

The publications are various, but the aim is the same: To suggest to the reader that TASS allegedly "made a mistake," "put the emphasis in the wrong place." That is why, they say, the "pickets" assembled by the agency building near Nikitskiye Vorota...

Well, of course we are not insured against mistakes, but such claims need evidence. What "evidence" is contained in the publications mentioned? "Focusing on individual flaws of this mass demonstration of the people's true will, the authors failed to see its creative, constructive origin," LITERATURNAYA GAZETA writes. Why, pray, failed to see? The TASS report said clearly that businesslike and reasonable speeches were heard at the rally, and the extremist sentiments were not supported by most of the rally's participants.

But we at TASS, in striving for prompt and at the same time objective reporting of events, focused attention not only on this. As is known, the most diverse informal associations took part in the rally—from the MVA to "monarchists." And the slogans there were various, including offensive and frankly extremist ones. "Down with the CPSU," "Today we are by the Kremlin walls—tomorrow we will be in the Kremlin," "The leaders must be called to account like Ceausescu!" "The KGB and the CPSU are the mafia"—these are just some of the slogans, and what is more they are by no means the most "extreme."

Incidentally, many representatives of the Western press who accompanied the march tried to bring to the fore precisely such slogans and expressions by the rally's participants. So, a U.S. AP correspondent reported the appeals to "Take the Winter Palace or the Lubyanka," THE NEW YORK TIMES newspaper reported the "proposal" by one of the rally's female participants to "shoot" those with whom she is dissatisfied. And a BBC correspondent cites a statement by two of the rally participants, moreover USSR people's deputies, who were discussing when, in their opinion, the "ruling clique" would be thrown out by force. In this connection one person, Yu. Afanasyev, talked about a "February revolution," while another, T. Gdlyan, believed that the situation for an overthrow would "ripen by May." Citing her conversation with Gdlyan, the BBC correspondent did not conceal her surprise that her interlocutor, although a people's deputy, nonetheless appeals just as openly for "nonparliamentary action."

One can understand this surprise: You don't get a pat on the back for appeals for violence even in "democratic

Britain." It is much more difficult to understand some of our Moscow colleagues: Do they really believe that glasnost and pluralism of opinion can be combined with overt extremism? By the way, by all accounts, the idea of "picketing" TASS and the subsequent publicity for this action by no means came to fruition in the newspapers' editorial offices. As West Germany's DPA reported, the first person to call for a "demonstration against false information" was that same Yu. Afanasyev, who called so zealously at the rally to overthrow in February for the "clique" which give him grief to be overthrown thuis very February.

The headline of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA's article is "In Defense of Democracy." It is a good headline. But can democracy be defended if the appearance of a handful of "pickets" outside the TASS building is turned into a sensation and at the same time those clearly illegal appeals and slogans raised by certain extremists at the thousands-strong rally in the center of Moscow are outrightly "ignored?"

Democratic Party Chairman Interviewed

LD1102183890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 11 Feb 90

[From the "Seven Days" program]

[Text] [Presenter] You know, I want to show you now an item, an interview with one of the leaders of the so-called, well, Democratic Party.

[Unidentified correspondent] Lev Grigoriyevich Boshkakh, 56. Trained as a physicist and lawyer. One of those who in the past were called dissidents. Spent 17 and ½ years—from 1970 to 1987—in detention and compulsory treatment in psychiatric hospitals. Is now seeking rehabilitation. In November 1989, he was elected chairman of the Democratic Party at its inaugural congress in Moscow.

Lev Grigoryevich, the question immediately arises, whether the creation of the Democratic Party is not a hoax: Does the Party really exist?

[Boshkakh] My answer is that it's no hoax. If you now ask, has your party been registered, I answer, No. But we really do exist, and we are not being dispersed.

[Interviewer] Your party is not only active in Moscow?

[Boshkakh] No, it is finding more favor in other cities.

[Interviewer] How many members does it have?

[Boshkakh] Around 2,000. But as yet it's very hard to say, because we based our count on telephone calls and so on. There are groups of 30, 20, 10 in one place, and somewhere else one or two.

[Interviewer] Have you already got a charter, a program?

[Boshkakh] We have all that: A program, charter, declaration—it's all there. I have in my hand our declaraton, and then three pages further on there's our party program, and at the end our charter, which takes up just two pages. It's all precise and clear.

[Interviewer] I have here a leaflet of your party. As I understand it, it's an excerpt from your program documents. The question that occurs to me immediately is this: A good half of what is said here is in general either already being implemented, or has even been implemented. In one of the program documents, for instance, you demand condemnation of the war in Afghanistan: The last congress passed a decision to that effect. The question that we shall have a law on freedom to leave the country and return has practically been decided. We now have a working parliament, we have alternative elections, we have a whole package of laws, we've signed international agreements on human rights and humanitarian liberties; and the list could be continued.

[Boshkakh] Yes, we have a lot, but that is not yet the main thing. The main law probably is on land, ownership, the press, a multiparty system....

[Interviewer, interrupting] (?So it's not all in the past)

[Boshkakh] No, no. We still have to....[changes thought] Most of it's still as it has been in the past. We see this: That for five years there's been nothing but talk, a talking-shop, nobody does anything....

[Interviewer, interrupting] So what should be done, specifically? What stages do you propose?

[Bashkakh] Economics without politics is nothing. After all, politics is a superstructure, and the most active one. It will affect everything. So what we need above all is, precisely, a multiparty system, we must change this political structure, and that will bring with it freedom of ideas, of thought. People will begin to reflect. People will begin to think, use their brains. We have the fine example of the West, we see that, and if we have bare empty shelves while in U.S. shops there are 3,500 varieties of food, and in Japan 12,000; if in the FRG families have four cars, then we can see all that very well, that that is not a capitalism which is rotting away, that it's....

[Interviewer, interrupting] But what needs to be done so that we can have full shelves and our families can have three or four cars? Can you be specific? Do you have a specific economic program?

[Bashkakh] Yes, we do.

[Interviewer] Excuse me, all I've heard so far has been declarations.

[Second unidentified interviewer] Yes.

[Bashkakh] Excuse me, but all programs consist of declarations. Every party makes declarations.

[Interviewer] But do you consider yourselves a radical party?

[Bashkakh] Yes, radical, yes. Because we want to do it all concretely, quickly and precisely.

[Interviewer] What is the fundamental difference between you and the other parties, organizations and associations that are now springing up like mushrooms?

[Bashkakh] Well, I think probably there is no fundamental difference.

[Interviewer] Thank you, I have no more questions. [video shows initial glimpse of two interviewers in studio, and Bashkakh on a television screen; interviewers are mostly off-screen, with Bashkakh shown in closeup.]

Plekhanov Views Party Reform in Siberia

PM0702091890

[Editorial Report] London ITV Television Network in English at 1900 GMT on 5 February, on the Channel 4 "News" program, carries a 30-minute video report from Siberia by David Smith on the attempts of the Communist Party to reform itself.

David Smith opens his report by describing Siberia as "the land of opportunity, the land of untold riches—gas and oil." He goes on to say that "it is in such places so vital to the economy that the fate of Mr Gorbachev's revolution will be decided." As the video shows footage of oil and gas fields, Sergey Plekhanov, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' United States of America and Canada Institute, speaking in English, tells Smith: "Siberia has a special aura in the Soviet mind: That's like the new frontier, so you 'go east, young man,' just as in America you 'go west, young man.' And when you look at the regions which are newly developed and which are so important to the economy, then you look at the political changes there and the political climate there as perhaps a sign of things to come for the nation as a whole."

Smith goes on to emphasize the importance of the oil and gas fields to the Soviet economy as a whole and says that stability there is imperative for the Kremlin. He talks to some of the oil men, who express their fears that perestroyka is grinding to a halt. Viktor Sidorichev, secretary of the Tyumen Oblast party committee, tells Smith: "As a party leader as well as a citizen, I have an extra responsibility, but I see empty shelves, and I feel the irritation of the people: Just one spark could ignite the whole situation."

Smith explains that as far back as September 1985 Gorbachev visited Tyumen and said that the Communist Party had to show the country the way by reforming itself. He adds that Mr Gorbachev has had to wait nearly five years for the party to listen, but in the past month the party has finally purged itself.

On 19 January the cameras were allowed in to an "emergency session" at party headquarters in Tyumen, where the ideology secretary demanded the resignation of the first secretary, Gennadiy Bogomyakov. The camera shows the ideology secretary—unidentified—standing before the committee. He tells the session: "Today we have to review not just socialism, but the party as well. We have to consider what sort of man should be first secretary here; what sort of politburo we should have; and how the party should behave. Should it behave as it has in the past when the leadership ran everything?" An unidentified speaker continues: "I'm in favor of the leader resigning, but everyone should take responsibility. Comrades, I can't accept semi-glasnost in our leadership's work: How long can we go on saying we are for democracy and glasnost? As a communist I demand that every member of the leadership account for what he has done for perestroyka in the last five years." Another speaker says: "Today we have a chance to begin perestroyka in ourselves to choose the right direction for the future: That's why I'm in favor of the whole leadership resigning, and for the choice to be given to the party's grassroots."

At this point the video report shows a luxurious hunting lodge used by Siberia's oil minister until recently and a party clinic with superior facilities, pointing out the privileged lifestyle of party members. Returning to the party committee session in Tyumen, an unidentified speaker says: "Communists in my district have been suprised at how many comrades can change their positions. In October we gave the leadership a vote of confidence: Now in January we're blaming men we trusted yesterday. Shifting positions like this won't win popular support." Another speaker tells the session: "Today we don't have any real base for democracy: We don't even have laws for it, so it's necessary for people to obey one will. It's frightening how people are saying: More disorder equals more democracy. Someone's profiting from this. In Czechoslovakia the word 'comrade' has been replaced by 'mister': We're now moving towards doing that here, too."

Party secretary Sidorichev tells Smith: "We have to decide now what the party's main task is, and we have to hurry up, otherwise we'll only have months left to act in, not years. Why do I say this? Because for too long economics has been sacrificed to politics. Today we have to give more time to economics." The video report shows footage of the conditions in which people live in Tyumen, then returns to the party committee session to show the resignation of Gennadiy Bogomyakov, Tyumen Oblast party committee first secretary. Bogomyakov says: "As you know, I've been in the party committee for over 25 years and its first secretary for 17 years. The people are waiting for something: They want something new; they want changes in the party's work, and in the life of the region. Many Communists want changes and that has made me decide to resign."

Smith interviews the new party first secretary, Viktor Katayev, and asks him: "What do you personally stand for? What sort of party do you want?" Katayev answers: "The party, first of all, has to give up its dictatorship and give up its monopoly on power. It's this monopoly that has caused us problems everywhere—in culture, in science, in the economy, in politics. This monopoly has never brought positive results; has never paid back what it owed; it has never given people the freedom to create. There must be competition now: Both in the party and in politics there should be alternatives and competition."

Smith says that party reform is happening in other places in the Soviet Union. Plekhanov tells him: "It is part of a much wider picture. We've seen similar rebellions in the party ranks in other areas of the country, and I'm sure that there'll be more, and it's what we have been expecting for quite a while because the party must catch up with the train of change which has left the station." Smith asks him: "How much of a breakthrough is this for Gorbachev, and how important is it for him?" Plekhanov answers: "Well, I think it's a very important piece of good news because it shows that his scenario of change, his scenario of reform, is working, is being vindicated. He has always maintained that the party can lead this revolution; that the party is not destined—is not sentenced by destiny—to remain the party of the status quo; that there's a huge progressive potential; and that the issue is how to uncork it."

Smith warns that the people in the oil fields are becoming impatient. Sidorichev tells him: "We've built a society of beggars. For all these 72 years someone's been begging something from someone else: towns from the region, regions from the union, managers from ministers. Everything has to change now—everyone must be rewarded according to the work he does."

Smith concludes by saying that "the CPSU has never spoken quite like that before. It is doing so now because the people are demanding action: Promises will no longer do. Mr Gorbachev's waited a long time for this—too long, maybe—and it shows he's not doomed to failure and that after five years his revolution is finally getting off the ground." All cited speakers, with the exception of Plekhanov, speak in Russian, with either English subtitles or superimposed English translation.

Gdlyan, Roy Medvedev Debate Gorbachev, Ligachev

LD2702031490

[Editorial Report] Budapest Television Service in Hungarian at 2025 GMT on 26 February carries a feature program on political developments in the Soviet Union. No video is available. The program begins with the presenter stating that CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev is under attack by conservative party bureaucrats for "disintegrating the socialist camp and the Warsaw Pact," while Telman Gdlyan, the very popular prosecutor-investigator, member of a group of radical reformers, accuses him of "abusing his power."

The program continues with a report on the mass demonstration on 25 February in Moscow, during which Gdlyan is interviewed.

Gdlyan, in reply to the unnamed reporter's question, first describes the way he was expelled from the party. He says it was an attempt to get rid of the opposition. He then says that the demonstrators are not members of the extremist faction; this is only an accusation by the apparatchiks.

The reporter then asks Gdlyan why he classified Gorbachev and Ligachev as belonging to the same group, while the world sees Gorbachev as a reformist, the champion of perestroyka, glasnost, and progress; but Ligachev as an arch-conservative.

Gdlyan replies: "Not only myself, but many people in this country believe that Ligachev is the other face of Gorbachev; only in a much cruder form. We are talking about the same, identical parish, or if you like, tandem bicycling; only it is Gorbachev who is doing the finer work while poor Yegor is given the rough, cruder task. But it is beyond doubt that both of them are the true protectors of the rotten, corrupt party apparatus."

He then adds that Gorbachev has made a mess of the economy, and even the thin democracy which he gave was only a mistake; at the start he only wanted to "rearrange the shop window" after realizing that the state of affairs could not continue. He says that Gorbachev' mistake is that now the democratic process is irreversible.

Gdylan then continues with Ligachev:

"I really like Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev. As an old apparatchik, he has always worked well. For, you remember that, in the committee investigating the Tbilisi events at the second session of the parliament, he wanted to clear Gorbachev, saying that Gorbachev had nothing to do with the Tbilisi tragedy. However, Ligachev then betrayed him without an eyelid when he said: But comrades, we have made a collective decision, and in this Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev too had taken part." Gdlyan adds that there should not be a need to seek scapegoats instead of Gorbachev. "For, it is impossible that the general secretary of our country, who is also the chairman of the Defense Council, should not have taken part in the decisionmaking that the resolution should have been brought without his consent."

Discussion then moves on to Gdlyan's other accusations that Gorbachev wasted money on building dachas amidst a difficult economic situation.

The reporter then turns to the other interviewee, who is later identified as Roy Medvedev. Medvedev denies that Gorbachev is a conservative.

The reporter notes Gdlyan's remarks that "Gorbachev and Ligachev do not differ from each other in essence."

Medvedev comments that he "would not say that Gorbachev and Ligachev are on bad terms. They started perestroyka together, the transformation. They fought together in 1985 for power and, therefore, in their personal relationship, they have no great debate, as far as

I know. But their political concepts are completely different. Gorbachev's stance is one thing, Ligachev's is something else—for Ligachev, in the present situation, is willy-nilly the leader of conservative forces in the Politburo."

The reporter notes that Gdlyan also accuses Gorbachev of allegedly participating in the decision of deploying the Army in Tbilisi. Shevardnadze and several members of the Politburo have denied this charge."

Medvedev then says: "Gorbachev was at the time touring Cuba and Britain. When he arrived in Moscow, he was informed at the airport about the Politburo's already adopted decision. He simply took cognizance of it. He could not change a decision already adopted on his way home from the airport, off the cuff, without a rest. He was simply informed about the decision, i.e. he knew about the decision but he did not participate in its making."

The discussion then turns to the other accusations Gdlyan made about the dachas and Ligachev, which Medvedev denies and recalls that the parliament also cleared Ligachev. Medvedev hints that Gdlyan told the Uzbekistan mafioso who was the star witness what to say about Gorbachev and Ligachev. He also rebuts Gdlyan's charge against him.

Economic

Abalkin Questioned on Economic Policy

PM2502152790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Feb 90 p 1

[Dispatch from The Hague by own correspondent L. Chernoshkur incorporating answers to journalists' questions from Deputy Premier L.I. Abalkin: "'Is the Government Wrong?' L.I. Abalkin Answers Foreign Correspondents' Questions"]

[Text] The Hague—"If the Soviet Government does not show that it is capable of stabilizing the situation in the country this year, then... new claimants for the stock of trust will appear," Deputy Premier Leonid Abalkin said in the Netherlands, where he was taking part in the "Prospects of Including the Soviet Union in World Economic Ties" conference.

[Question] There are insufficient goods in Soviet stores. Doesn't this affect Gorbachev's position?

[Abalkin] The answer is obvious. The problem I am faced with is not how to answer the question, but what I must do before the middle or, at the latest, the end of the present year to stabilize the situation on the consumer market, give people the possibility of feeling an improvement, strengthen perestroyka's authority and protect it, and at the same time strengthen the authority of Gorbachev as the author and organizer of this process.

[Question] Isn't one year too short a period to fulfill all the outlined tasks?

[Abalkin] The government has received a stock of trust on credit—the parliament has approved its program. But any credit has a time limit. If, during this year, the government does not prove its ability to stabilize the situation in the country (and resolve all the problems in a short time), and return a trend for the better, then it will prove uncreditworthy. New claimants for the stock of trust will appear.

[Question] The Soviet Government now has many advisors—Bogomolov, Popov, Shmelev, and Aganbegyan—who have an influence on Ryzhkov's position. Whom do you consider the strongest among them?

[Abalkin] Someone who was not on your list—Academician Shatalin. Academician Aganbegyan was also previously very active in giving advice. Professor Shmelev supports cooperation with the government above all, not confrontation. And the government's program, approved by the Congress, includes a whole range of proposals made at various times by these important economists.

[Question] What economic mistakes has Gorbachev made, in your opinion, in the past five years?

[Abalkin] You must not present Gorbachev as a demigod who makes decisions alone, without any advice. I would put the question like this: What mistakes has the leadership of the Soviet Union made? Unfortunately, there were many. They are both of a strategic nature and they concern individual tactical decisions. We did not take the experience of a number of countries into account in carrying out our reforms, namely: We should have started the reform with agriculture, with light industry, and with the services sphere. If the decisions adopted in March last year on agriculture had been adopted four or five years ago, we would be in a completely different situation today.

Another mistake was the fact that reforms were not carried out universally or energetically enough. For example: Although we adopted a number of very progressive decisions on the independence of enterprises and the development of cooperatives, we failed to resolve a number of questions that were vital if they were to function. Therefore the correct measures produced negative results in many ways, and they met with a negative reaction in society.

One of the biggest mistakes was the clumsily implemented antialcohol campaign.

The mistakes occurred because many decisions were adopted hastily, without taking advice from experts or scientists, and without assessing the possible consequences. This is a lesson for us.

[Question] Leonid Ivanovich, the government program was a disappointment to many Western businessmen. What can you say about this?

[Abalkin] Some of them get the impression that we are putting off the reform, including the transition to the market, for two or three years. Maybe because they were expecting the inevitable elimination of state ownership and the introduction of the market. But can a market be introduced by decree or by voting in parliament?

To transfer to a market mechanism ownership must be denationalized, an appropriate infrastructure must be created (commodity and stock exchanges, and information and commerce centers and so on), anti-inflation regulators and methods for providing the population with social security must be put into effect, and the relevant cadres must be trained. At the moment none of these conditions exist. And this means that a market that is developed to any extent whatsoever cannot exist.

Talk of a market in the Soviet Union has been going on for 25 years. But it is only now that we are moving from words to action.

[Question] We have assessed the West's economic experience. But doesn't it seem to you that we are not in a hurry to adopt it?

[Abalkin] Western experience is diverse. We will adopt some things perhaps very quickly, introducing them before others. The biggest problem is not slowness, in my view, but the fact that we are trying to acquire experience in little bits, and not as a whole. We are trying to impose it mechanically instead of working it in organically with all our specific historical traditions, national peculiarities, dimensions, and many social and cultural values characteristic of our people.

[Question] In your view, what caused the rising wave of active rejection of private ownership and radical reforms in agriculture? Was it just a fear of "nonsocialist" things?

[Abalkin] It is not just that. It is a human characteristic (and every political and economic leader is still human) to see their own or another's experience as absolute. That is one of the shortcomings of traditional thinking and is characteristic of both radicals and conservatives. Some see private ownership and tenant farms as a cure for all ills and the only way out. Others see it in collective farms, state farms, agricultural firms, and so on. However, the truth cannot not be found by thinking in black and white, but in color.

[Question] Do you consider Abalkin's "team" to be successful?

[Abalkin] No large-scale reform is within the capacity of isolated individuals. It is only within the capacity of a "team," as we say, that is, an alliance of people united by a common plan, an idea, and so on. There is no official team, of course. This is a very mobile concept. It includes scientists, workers at central economic departments, and so on. The collective is not chosen like a closed order of sword-bearers. It is a "team" of intellectuals and is characterized by freedom of thought. Do I believe in its success? History confirms that truth will sooner or later be victorious. If I believe in the scientific grounds of the decisions proposed, then it is quite natural for me to count on success. But the way to the truth is through fire.

[Question] Is it easy to be a deputy premier?

[Abalkin] The expression "Ryzhkov's team" has also already come into existence. Ryzhkov invited me into this "team" and proposed that I become his deputy. These are not just new opportunities for me, this is also a great responsibility to the country for myself and for the "team." And other members of the government will bear responsibility for my actions. It is a cabinet. And that is how it should be. I believe that we have here a very beneficial possibility for discussion. But when we reach some kind of consensus (politics, unlike science, demands a transition from words to action), then we need to act. Of course it is not easy to take responsibility on yourself. Often doubts remain in the depths of your soul. But that is the rule of the "team" game. And once I have embarked on this path, I must understand all its consequences both for the country and for my own authority. But this has been done consciously because the Fatherland is in danger.

Economic Policymaker Discusses Reform Measures

LD2302084990 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] The half-empty shelves in the stores give the critics of the government's economic policy much reason to censure it from the right and left alike. Now an interview with the architect of this policy, Dr. Abdel Aganbegyan. Here is how he himself assesses the state of the Soviet economy:

[Begin Aganbegyan recording] The economy is in disarray with the acute crisis of the consumer market, money circulation, and financial system. The situation is unfavorable but not hopeless. The negative trends to my mind have not become irreversible so far. Effective measures to revamp the economy mapped out by the government could with some extra measures lead the country out of the deadlock. [end recording]

Some more zealous official policy critics allege that without abandoning the socialist foundations of the economy it is impossible to lead the country out of the crisis. Dr Aganbegyan explains:

[Begin Aganbegyan recording] I stand on a socialist position and in this sense I believe the country can be lead out of the crisis quite easily because the current crisis is not too deep. The crisis has been at its peak in the last two years. Even three years ago, the market was relatively normal by our standards. Since the deterioration has occurred over the two years everything can be returned to the initial stage in some three years. [end recording]

In Dr. Aganbegyan's view the retail prices should be reformed. The bulk of them should be geared to the market and commercial trade should be adopted. So, there is a way out, Dr. Aganbegyan noted in conclusion.

Measures To Normalize Market, Money Circulation

PM2602145390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 1

[V. Romanyuk report under the rubric "At the USSR Council of Ministers": "So That Prices Do Not 'Bite'"]

[Text] The USSR Council of Ministers has adopted a resolution on urgent measures to normalize the consumer market and monetary circulation and to increase state control over prices. According to calculations, the realization of the proposed measures promises an additional increase in commodity resources to the tune of approximately 8 billion rubles [R].

In fact, this is the latest of a package of government decisions and instructions associated with stabilizing the market and monetary circulation in the country. Measures were taken as long ago as last December for the state regulation of foreign economic activity in order to limit exports abroad of commodities which we ourselves need. Then steps were taken to create a securities market. Later a decision was adopted to hold auctions for the sale of such popular items as Volga cars, personal computers, fourth-generation color television sets, and a number of others. Finally, the procedure for calculating the increase in wages when paying a regulating tax was specified.

The just-published resolution is aimed at consistently realizing the government program for improving the country's economy. It enshrines a minimum number of administrative measures and a maximum number of economic measures. In particular, it ensures the priority supply of raw materials and semimanufactures to enterprises which are geared to increasing production of goods for the market. Growth in enterprises' incomes is now made directly dependent not on productivity and other abstract categories but only on the increase in goods on store counters. As regards products for children, it is proposed to leave all the profits (income) from sales of them—above the level reached last year—at the disposal of the producers.

However, it is not only a question of ensuring greater abundance on counters. The population's social protection against an unsubstantiated increase in the prices of goods which are today being sold at socially low prices is being stepped up. The list includes dozens of items of clothing and footwear for children, as well as older people. Let us take, for example, veterans living on not very large pensions. It has been laid down that the price of suits for this category of purchasers must not exceed R80, that of pants R23, dresses R45, leather boots R40, and shoes R15. Thus, the buyer on a fixed income is at last enabled to have a choice of commodity.

Add to this the measures directed against the "flushing" of inexpensive goods from the range and unsubstantiated increases in the prices of new items and socially significant commodities. Incidentally, contract prices can also be set for a whole number of products. But the price markup must not exceed 30 percent (with the exception of imported goods or products manufactured with imported equipment or from raw materials purchased abroad). Incidentally, a number of commodities will be sold through the commercial trade network.

Let us name one more measure—of an administrative rather than an economic order. It is a question of strengthening discipline in deliveries of food to large industrial centers, including Moscow and Leningrad. As is known, interruptions have recently been occurring more frequently, creating discontent in the population. Apart from anything else, the following measure has also been envisaged now: If a region has supplied less meat, let us assume, then it will receive less feed.

As is known, resolutions in themselves do not increase the number of commodities in the stores. I have noticed that certain points in the latest resolution have migrated from those adopted earlier—one or two years ago. The urgent measures probably require tougher organizational backup today. It is also a bewildering fact that practically one and the same set [nabor] is proposed for the imminent auctions and then for the liquidation of the interest-free loan.

The package of urgent measures is calculated for just one year—1990. And what then? Will loud decisions again be adopted and unfulfilled instructions duplicated? The resolution contains the necessary words about "stepping up control." It is important that it—this control—be real, including on the part of parliamentarians and consumer societies.

Statistics Show Decline in Consumer Goods Yield

PM2602165590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[A. Protsenko "Commercial Review": "The Consumer Market in January"]

[Text] One of two things: Either we are printing more money than we are producing goods or, conversely, we are producing fewer goods than we are issuing money. This does not change the crux of the matter: People are being crushed, in the literal sense of the word, in lines for scarce commodities. Precisely this is why the program proposed by the government to improve the financial health of the economy provided for an increase in consumer goods production this year to the tune of approximately 66 billion rubles [R]. Let us recall that the growth last year amounted to R30 billion.

The start of a year, quarter, or month in our economy has never been considered indicative. It is, as a rule, a so-called startup period. This January is no exception.

Whereas for the year as a whole consumer goods production is to increase 14 percent, the growth during the first month amounted to just 5.6 percent—this is compared with January last year. There are certain "statistical successes": S. Komarov, deputy chief of the USSR State Committee for Statistics, Industrial Statistics Administration, has reported that production of washing machines, tape recorders, color television sets, cameras, bicycles, and certain other "cultural and consumer" goods, as they are called in accounting documents, increased significantly—by 13-21 percent—this January. Production of batteries increased 15 percent, and women's tights 36 percent.

Why do I call these successes "statistical"? Certainly not out of a desire to offend the USSR State Committee for Statistics, which merely records what is happening in the economy. Only it is our custom to compare today's successes or failures with "the corresponding period of last year," but not with the previous month—December, which for very many enterprises resembles "the last day of Pompeii." In real figures the picture is as follows: Last December 591,000 color television sets were produced, for example, but just 559,000 this January. In December 687,000 washing machines were produced, and in January 544,000. But we need constant stable growth today! Such as happened in the production of cameras, for example: At the end of last year 240,000 of them were made, and at the beginning of this year 255,000. But there are not as many examples of this kind as we would like.

There was a drop in production of certain kinds of consumer goods even compared with last January. For example, fewer items of footwear and motorcycles were produced. Production of safety razor blades fell five percent, that of cigarettes and papirosy [Russian cigarettes with cardboard mouthpiece] eight percent, toothpaste two percent, terry towels three percent, and shaving cream 17 percent.

Naturally, the winter months are not the most favorable season for increasing food production. But, compared with last January, the country received five percent less meat and edible food products in the first month of this year, seven percent less high-grade packet tea, six percent less vegetable oil, and three percent less groat crops. True, there was an increase in production of butter, margarine, wholemilk products, sausages, and confectionery. Production of fatty cheeses and all types of canned foods was maintained almost at the level of last January.

Of course, we can and we would very much like to hope that the lag will be made good in subsequent months. But is there time for this? For the original rough outlines have already been amended in the course of detailed elaboration of the government program for increasing consumer goods production. At any rate, the USSR State Committee for Statistics is geared to the following figures: In 1989 consumer goods were produced at the value of R426 billion (including alcoholic beverages and beer), and this year they are to be produced at the value of R486.7 billion. The overall increase is just over R60 billion. This is the guideline, and it would be desirable to exceed this sum. But at the beginning of the year, in January, the country secured an increase of just approximately R2 billion instead of R5 billion: an increase of R1.1 billion for nonfood goods, R400 million for foodstuffs, and R400 million also for alcoholic beverages and beer.

This increase is even less in meters, units, and kilograms—producers are still being helped out by the overstating of prices for products. This is an attractive and profitable exercise, which "showed itself to advantage" last year too. In Belorussia, for example, production of products at contract prices in enterprises of union subordination almost doubled during last year, and in Moscow Oblast the production volume of goods sold at these prices increased 48 percent. The examples could be continued, as the saying goes. And, by all accounts, the overall growth in consumer goods prices proceeded at the former pace this January.

The results of such activity are most clearly visible in trade. During this January the increase in total commodity turnover amounted to R3.8 billion. It seems that almost half of this was secured as a result of reducing commodity stocks in warehouses, as well as selling imported goods—the very ones that lay in containers and cars in large cities' goods stations for long weeks and even months. In January a considerable proportion of them at last made their way to the store counters. Additional sales of alcoholic products (including imported ones) and beer produced an increase in commodity turnover of R500 million. And approximately R800 million was obtained as the result of a sharp hike in the prices of jewelry and a smoother but stable rise in the prices of many other goods.

Scientific

Slyunkov Opens Conference on Scientific Management

PM2602140790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
21 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[TASS report: "New Set of Ideas Needed"]

[Text] Moscow, 19 Feb—The need to strive for a fundamental breakthrough in the pace of scientific and technical progress determined the agenda of the scientific and practical conference which opened today in the House of the Unions Hall of Columns. Prestigious academics, production workers, enterprise and sector leaders, and party workers at various levels had met to discuss ways and means of optimizing the management of scientific and technical progress during the restructuring of the economy.

Taking part in the conference's work are L.N. Zaykov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU

Central Committee; CPSU Central Committee Secretaries O.D. Baklanov, G.I. Usmanov, and I.T. Frolov; and G.I. Marchuk, president of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

The conference was opened by N.N. Slyunkov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

We will have to discuss a wide range of issues, he said, linked with the further improvement of the management of scientific and technical progress under the conditions of radical economic reform. This is the main task today. Only by resolving it will we be able to ensure the profound modernization of the national economy.

Over the past few years there have been definite positive changes in the development of science and technology; several examples could be cited of major economic and social problems being resolved on this basis. At the same time, if we assess the state of affairs from the standpoint of the need for high dynamism in the process of economic perestroyka, we can say quite unambiguously that the results cannot be considered satisfactory.

What are the main reasons for this, what is preventing us from advancing scientific and technical progress to the extent we had hoped when we began perestroyka?

Above all, it is a result of the slow progress on economic reform and the poor economic interest in utilizing the achievements of science and technology. The system of measures to improve the economic mechanism did not spotlight the key issues whose resolution should have directly influenced the acceleration of scientific and technical development.

A certain scholastic idea also emerged of scientific progress as a concept divorced in some way from the economic base and as an independently existing and operating factor.

We were also distracted from the strategic problems of science and technology by current issues. All this is leading to a need to return to an examination of the fundamental question of the party's economic policy—the question of accelerating scientific and technical progress.

The CPSU Central Committee draft platform for the 28th congress devotes great attention to the decisive role of scientific and technical progress in renewing our society. The situation requires a fresh look at the essence of scientific and technical problems and, above all, at improving the management of this process. We need a new set of ideas on how to deepen perestroyka in this highly important area and on how to double again and again the pace of our progress. It is important to correctly define the main principles and goals of state scientific and technical policy. Briefly, it is not simply a question of restructuring the administration of scientific and technical progress but of formulating a new system for it.

The problems of scientific and technical development are inseparable from the problems of socioeconomic development—they are closely bound up with one another. It is becoming more and more obvious that we need to make use of the entire economic mechanism and all of its elements for managing scientific and technical progress without exception.

We need to find effective ways to implement state policy in the sphere of scientific and technical development and to clearly specify its main principles and goals. The CPSU Central Committee Commission on Socioeconomic Policy Issues recommended as preparation for this conference the elaboration of a concept for improving the administration of scientific and technical progress under the conditions of economic reform.

The draft concept was drawn up by the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology with the participation of scientists and specialists from the USSR Academy of Sciences, the USSR Union of Scientific and Engineering Societies, and a number of interested ministries and departments. It has been published in the press on a preliminary basis, and has been discussed in scientific organizations and at enterprises both centrally and locally.

The aim of our conference is to enrich this concept with new proposals and to define the most acceptable approaches to administering scientific and technical progress. We must answer the question of what the mechanism for giving enterprises an economic interest in producing competitive high-technology output should be. What taxation, financial, credit, price, and other privileges need to be brought into play?

It is no less important to discuss the tasks of the new state scientific and technical policy and the methods of defining the priority directions for scientific and technical progress and giving it comprehensive support. All this needs to be seen in close conjunction with structural and investment policy.

We attach immense importance to the organization of science itself and the strengthening of the integration of its academic, higher educational institution, and sectoral units. This area is the leading edge of scientific and technical progress.

We must also define our attitude to legal backup for scientific and technical progress. Provisions on the regulation of scientific and technical development are poorly reflected in the basic USSR laws on the enterprise, ownership, the tax system, and republic economic independence submitted for examination by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The problems of scientific and technical progress are inadequately covered in the list of USSR draft laws planned for development and examination and in the work plans of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Economic Reform. We hope, N.N.

Slyunkov said, that the conference participants will make constructive proposals and additional points on these and other issues.

The main idea of the conference proposed in the report by N.P. Laverov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology, is to extensively democratize management processes in the sphere of science and technology and to develop alternative approaches, competition, and competitive instances when ever possible. These are the methods that will be effective in overcoming the monopolism and departmentalism which were inherent in the former system of managing scientific and technical progress.

The mechanism that impeded scientific and technical progress was largely linked with the desire to strictly plan research and development work from above. Life has shown the futility of this approach. It should be fundamentally different. The state should not issue orders to science but merely provide support for priority and promising developments in the scientific collectives which have undergone independent expert appraisal.

The speeches by I.S. Silayev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Machine Building Bureau; K.V. Frolov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences; V.I. Radin, chief designer at Moscow's Vladimir Ilich Electrical Engineering Plant; V.A. Durasov, first deputy chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee; USSR People's Deputy V.S. Bolbasov, deputy laboratory chief at the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic Academy of Sciences' Electronics Institute, and others were devoted to the key problems of improving the management of scientific and technical progress and to strategy and priorities in this most important work.

A "roundtable" session and work by sections will be held within the framework of the conference 20 February.

Models of Activity Debated

PM2302112790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[A. Pokrovskiy "Notes from All-Union Scientific and Practical Conference on Problems of Managing Scientific and Technical Progress": "What Emerges From Arguments"]

[Text] I received the materials for this conference while the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum was in progress. And it was with great interest that I read these words in the plenum speech of Academician Ye. Velikhov: "Science—I mean fundamental science—must not be managed either from some external organization or from the Committee for Science and Technology. Science must not be managed," the vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences continued, "even from the Academy of Sciences. Science must be self-managing."

And now a conference on managing science. Organized by the State Committee for Science and Technology, the USSR State Planning Committee, the USSR Academy of Sciences, the USSR State Committee for Public Education, and the USSR Union of Scientific and Engineering Societies. I am not sure that even the organizers were unanimous in their opinions.

The arguments began even before the conference opened, for the draft concept for improving management of scientific and technical progress under conditions of the radical economic reform had been widely discussed beforehand in scientific and production collectives.

The conference was opened by N.N. Slyunkov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. He pointed out that it has not been possible to achieve a fundamental breakthrough in the pace of scientific and technical progress. As a result, our technical lag behind the industrial developed countries is noticeably increasing. It is necessary to find effective ways to implement state policy in the sphere of scientific and technical development and clearly explain its main principles and aims. By way of preparing for this conference the CPSU Central Committee Commission for Questions of Socioeconomic Policy recommended formulating a concept for improving management of scientific and technical progress under conditions of the economic reform.

Academician N. Laverov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology, delivered the report at the conference. He endeavored to sum up not only the ideas thrown up in the committee but also the suggestions and remarks formulated during the preliminary discussion.

The basic conclusions drawn by the main speaker may be formulated as follows. Fundamental changes in the organization of all work on shaping and implementing state scientific and technical policy and in all innovative activity in the country are required today. A new system for the management of scientific and technical progress is needed to meet the demands of perestroyka and to take account of the special features of scientific and technical development. Characteristic features of this system must be the decentralization of managerial processes, their democratization on a profound legal basis, and the use primarily of economic incentive methods.

The main speaker singled out three models for the management of various aspects of scientific activity. In his view, in the sphere of basic research, the scientific community itself must exercise management. Here the state must give financial and material support over the entire front of research, particularly encouraging the development of those promising areas which, in the opinion of scientists themselves, can ensure breakthroughs and give a boost to the creation of equipment and technology on a fundamentally new basis.

It is proposed, as a rule, to conduct applied research and development aimed at creating, assimilating, and widely disseminating new equipment and technologies on an economically accountable basis, under contracts with specific clients, utilizing the mechanism of the market and indirect state regulation.

And, finally, it is proposed to realize large-scale intersectoral scientific and technical programs of statewide significance, including ecological, defense, and social programs, by means of centralized planned influence through state orders.

Speaking of democratization in science, the main speaker pointed specially to the need for the possible development of alternative approaches, competitiveness, and competition principles as the chief antidote to monopolism and departmentalism. At the same time scientists and engineers must work vigorously to shape public opinion on the selection of scientific and technical areas of economic development which are of appreciable social significance. For it is no secret that the recent serious exacerbation of problems in the development of power generation, chemistry, and microbiology has largely been occasioned by inadequate information for local organs of power and the public.

In this connection the question of competent and objective expertise comes to the fore. The Public Expertise Committee, which was recently established by a number of organizations, is called upon to play an important role here. It is becoming necessary to step up cooperation between legislative and executive organs of power and public organizations. A proposal to create a Council for Science and Technology under the USSR Supreme Soviet chairman (the country's president) as a top-level institution of expert advisers is also being examined.

But what is to be done about the notorious "unreceptiveness" of enterprises to the achievements of scientific and technical progress? It can be overcome only within the framework of a radical economic reform, the efficient functioning of all forms of ownership, the development of economic accountability, the creation of a stimulating taxation system, and improved price formation. Of great interest here is a proposal to create technopolises and technoparks in a number of the country's cities with the introduction of a preferential management regime in them so that the scientific, educational, and production potentials there form the "critical mass" necessary for the snowballing creation and assimilation of the latest technologies. A number of organizations in the city of Zelenograd have already initiated such an undertaking.

And finally a few words about scientific and technical cooperatives. Some 8,900 of them have already been formed, involving a total of 250,000 people and with a volume of work estimated at approximately 1.9 billion rubles. Even though many financial violations, difficulties, and problems are still encountered here, it seems a promising business.

As you see, many new ideas aimed at appreciably raising the scientific and technical level of Soviet production have been submitted for consideration at the conference. Will they all prove tenacious of life and justify the hopes pinned on them? Specialists have to discuss this. And not in the debate, as is usually customary, but also in various sections and at "roundtables," for which two days have been set aside. After this, at the final plenary session, we will learn which decisions will be "passed."

Participating in the work of the conference are L.N. Zaykov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; O.D. Baklanov, G.I. Usmanov, and I.T. Frolov, secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee; and G.I. Marchuk, president of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Mangyshlak Nuclear Reactor Plant Repairs Planned

904E0060A Moscow TRUD in Russian
9 Feb 90 p 4

[Article by O. Kvyatkovskiy: "Get Ready, 'Atomic Oven Repairman'"]

[Text]**The world's first nuclear breeder reactor has functioned on the peninsula of Mangyshlak for almost 20 years. Now the decision has been made to shut down the "BN-350" for major repairs.**

What is the "BN-350"? Academician I.V. Kurchatov described it this way: It is an oven in which firewood can be placed, but instead of ashes you retrieve twice as much firewood from it...

Yes, the "BN-350" is not only a consumer of uranium fuel but a producer of it too. They put a kilogram of atomic fuel into the reactor, receive warmth and electric energy from it, and after a certain period of time they extract more than a kilogram of atomic fuel from it—plutonium in this instance. It is as though fast reactors stretch out the stores of nuclear fuel.

None of the associates attending to the "BN-350" collected more than one rem in a year. It can be said for comparison that watching a color television for three hours every day over a year gives six millirems, and one x-ray gives 20.

"It is also important to remember," says Valeriy Bolgarin, director of the reactor plant, "that we have 'different physics' here in comparison to thermal reactors. Even if the unexpected happens—the sodium circuit that removes the heat breaks down or the body of the reactor loses its seal, the nuclear process will die out. And this is the chief ecological advantage of the 'fast reactor.'"

And now the "atomic heart of the peninsula" is being overhauled. It is a unique oven. After the repairs, a special commission will decide how much more the reactor can be utilized. But it is clear that for the foreseeable future the physical and technical life of the "BN-350" will end.

"The closing of a reactor plant is a very new and crucial matter," comments V. Bolgarin. "But you will not hang a lock on our plant... The world has seen few examples of this type: In France and England they closed down small-capacity experimental reactors... And that, very likely, is all. As a result we are trying to unite the scholars of various countries around the problem."

Figures for Nuclear Power Problems in 1989

PM2202145890 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 3

[A. Illesh feature incorporating interview with V. Sidorenko, first deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Supervision of Safe Working Practices in Industry and the Atomic Power Industry and corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences; date and place of interview not stated: under the rubric "Statistics and Our Commentary": "Nuclear Power Station Safety: Last Year's Results"]

[Text] Staffers of the USSR State Committee for Supervision of Safe Working Practices in Industry and the Atomic Power Industry have just finished compiling specially for IZVESTIYA a full summary of incidents occurring at nuclear power stations [AES] last year. Thus, in the past year there were 118 unscheduled stoppages and 100 unscheduled reductions of capacity at the country's AES. The figures for each power station are as follows:

[In the following table, column A represents "total number of stoppages at the AES"; column B represents "stoppages due to human error"; column C represents "stoppages due to equipment malfunction"; and column D represents "average frequency of stoppages at the AES per power unit per year of operation, based on actual time in productive operation"]:

AES	A	B	C	D
Balakovo	30	14	16	10
Beloyarsk	3	1	2	1.7
Bilibin	3	nil	3	0.7
Kalininskaya	5	2	3	2.5
Kola	5	4	1	1.2
Leningrad	1	nil	1	0.2
Smolensk	7	3	4	3.5
Ignalina	1	nil	1	0.5
Zaporozhye	11	4	7	4.2
Kursk	5	3	2	1.2
Novovoronezh	6	5	1	1.9
Rovno	13	5	8	4.3
Khmelnitskiy	7	3	4	7.0
South Ukrainian	12	7	5	6.0
Chernobyl	8	3	5	2.6
Armenian	*1	—	—	—

*decommissioned in first quarter of 1989

Commentary on the summary: V. Sidorenko, first deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Supervision of Safe Working Practices in Industry and the Atomic Power Industry and corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, answers our correspondent's questions.

[Illesh] Viktor Alekseyevich, last year our newspaper published monthly summaries of incidents at all the country's nuclear power facilities. At first information of this kind affected the reader in the same way as reports about earthquakes. But judging by the mail, by the end of the year people had ceased to feel excessive emotion and instead began to study the reports of the State Committee for Supervision of Safe Working Practices in Industry and the Atomic Power Industry intently. And now they ask us numerous questions. Among them is this one: Do the published summaries permit a judgment about the operational efficiency of a given nuclear station?

[Sidorenko] Yes, I think so. For instance, the frequency and cause of power unit stoppages point to weak aspects of operation, personnel not doing their jobs properly, and the indolence of managers. Today we can also say that there is a clear "leader" in the nuclear power industry—the Balakovo AES. And this "leadership" has not gone unnoticed. The situation concerning the operation of the station has just been discussed in detail by the collegium of the USSR State Committee for Supervision of Safe Working Practices in Industry and the Atomic Power Industry. I hope that the conclusions we drew will be taken on board quickly.

[Illesh] Any statistics can be judged only by comparison. We do not know your figures for 1988. So has the state of affairs in the nuclear power industry improved or deteriorated?

[Sidorenko] On the whole it has improved: Objective figures for 1989 are significantly better than analogous figures for 1988. Thus, the average frequency of stoppages per year decreased by 35 percent. I think that the technical improvements carried out after Chernobyl and, dare I hope, our supervision of AES work have made an impact.

[Illesh] In Vienna I had occasion to discuss the safety standards of Soviet AES's with eminent specialists working for the International Atomic Energy Authority [IAEA]. Every time the reference point in such a conversation was the worst disaster of the 20th century—Chernobyl. As you know, the explosion occurred in the high-power pressure-tube reactor [RBMK] type of reactor, 16 of which are still operating in the Soviet nuclear power industry today. But many IAEA experts think it would be hard to find a reactor in the world which would withstand such incompetent work as that carried out in the fourth unit at Chernobyl. Although the RBMK itself, say the experts, is of course not the height of perfection. Yet from the yearly report it is clear that in the Soviet Union most incidents do not occur in RBMK's. Viktor Alekseyevich, please compare generally the operational standards of all our reactors with world standards. Are there generally objective figures by which the operational efficiency of AESs can be compared in a world context?

[Sidorenko] As regards RBMK's, it is natural that after Chernobyl it was specifically they that were subjected to maximum attention— that had its effect. About world criteria. They exist. The IAEA sends its specialists to various countries to determine them and to monitor operational standards. They have been here repeatedly—to Rovno AES, Zaporozhye AES, and other stations. In brief, this is their assessment: Radiation contamination of equipment, emissions of radioactive substances into the environment, the individual radiation dose for personnel—figures for these in the USSR are low. They list the following shortcomings: confusion and complexity in the management of AESs, the lack of modern staff instruction and training facilities, weak operational support from planning and design organizations, and extremely outmoded forms of operational documentation. These conclusions were reached by experts from the United States, France, Britain, Japan, and Finland.

[Illesh] A significant share of the blame for events at Chernobyl—at any rate, so the court decided—lies with the operators. Yet at the IAEA I heard kind words about our specialists...

[Sidorenko] Yes, all experts note the high technical standards of training of operations personnel. But I want to add my own opinion to that of foreign experts—we are still substantially lagging behind international standards in technical methods of diagnostics, monitoring, and automation of operators work.

Now, do our reactors meet world standards? Here I will again resort to the foreign specialists' assessment: The water-cooled water-moderated power reactor [VVER-1000] meets world standards but needs a number of modifications to enable it to cope with unforeseen accident situations, enhance its fire resistance, and increase equipment reliability. Experts assess another reactor design—the VVER-440—very critically. We are talking about first-generation reactors. There are four such units in the country and another 10 in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria.

[Illesh] What can be done in such a case?

[Sidorenko] They need substantial modification [rekonstruktsiya]—and this is in preparation.

[Illesh] But all the same, Viktor Alekseyevich, the explosion here occurred in an RBMK-type reactor. And in Vienna I met people who are categorically opposed to such reactors...

[Sidorenko] You are right: Foreign specialists have paid particular attention to those of our stations where these reactors are in operation. As has been noted, their greatest disadvantage is the lack of a containment structure. Therefore we no longer build them in such a way. And we are modifying those already operating.

[Illesh] Which AES units have already been decommissioned and for what reasons?

[Sidorenko] Of the latest ones I will mention: The second unit of the Beloyarsk AES was shut down in October 1989 (the unit's life was at an end and reconstruction was deemed not worthwhile). In March 1989 the Armenian AES was shut down (its fate was finally decided by the catastrophic Spitak earthquake). This year the operation of the second unit at Novovoronezh station is ceasing (its reconstruction is not worthwhile and its technical safety facilities are inadequate).

Military

Yashin on Future of Military Reform, Conversion

LD2302094790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Interview with Colonel General Yuriy Alekseyevich Yashin, USSR deputy minister of defense, by Tatyana Chemodanova, with Nikolay Agayants as presenter; date, place not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Agayants] Hello comrades! In what state will mankind enter the 21st century? Thoughts about this not-so-distant future are coming to dominate the minds of people, wherever they might live, whatever views they might hold. [passage omitted] It has to be noted, that during the period just over a year since Comrade Gorbachev's address at the UN General Assembly, our country has accumulated a certain positive experience in the area of conversion. I think it would be very useful to find out about some of the results of the activity in this important field. Our correspondent Tatyana Chemodanova has met Colonel General Yuriy Alekseyevich Yashin, USSR deputy minister of defense and candidate Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic people's deputy for Arkhangelsk National Territorial Constituency No. 25. I would add that the man she is speaking to is a doctor of technical sciences, a state prize winner, and a man who has had occasion to work with outstanding scientists, the creators of Soviet space rocket technology, and also many cosmonauts. So we have for you information on conversion, as they say, at first hand. Here you are.

[Begin recording] [Chemodanova] Yuriy Alekseyevich, it would be interesting to know how you assess the state of conversion at the present time.

[Yashin] Conversion cannot, of course, be a panacea for all shortcomings, but it can provide a great deal; primarily, an enhancement of the technology of all production facilities which produce so-called civilian output in the interests of the national economy and for mass consumption. The conversion of military production has to be, it is my deep belief, primarily directed toward the creation of agricultural machinery, machinery for light industry, and various medical equipment. Some people believe conversion will provide some additional material profits which can be used in the interests of the further development of the national economy. That's a delusion. Conversion as such, that is, the redesignation of the military industry to the production of civilian output will, in itself, require additional capital investments. In order to alter a factory's equipment, in order to alter the direction of the activity of design bureaus, in order to alter the direction of fundamental and basic research at various industrial establishments, in order, as appropriate, to retrain and train staff, to process and reprocess documentation for the technology—this requires investments, and large investments. It seems to me totally impermissible that certain enterprises in the military sectors of industry are not being charged with the production of the sort of consumer goods which those enterprises ought to be producing. For example, is it sensible when aviation works, in the Ministry of the Aviation Industry, manufacture saucepans? Is it sensible when individual factories produce mousetraps? Is it sensible when rocket works, that is space rocket works, manufacture some kind of bedsteads or something else? Do we need these household items? Of course we do. But, surely, the military sectors ought primarily to address and tackle tasks at the level of technology which these defense enterprises have achieved, and where this technology has been developed.

[Chemodanova] That's true, it's the most advanced technology.

[Yashin] Of course, this has to be the basic direction of conversion. And as a general principle, if we now stop scientific research, the conduct of experimental design work, the improvement of technology, then we, irrespective of whether there is conversion or not, and the more so if there is conversion, we might not only not gain positive development in our national economy, but even fall far behind in our economy. Everyone has to have a thorough realization of this. This is my attitude toward conversion.

[Chemodanova] What do you think, what will the law on conversion give the military?

[Yashin] This is an interesting question for me, of course, and unexpected. The law on conversion—the first positive thing, it seems to me, is that we will know quite specifically and definitely which sectors of industry, in what volume, in what areas, and on what timescales, can work in the interests of the Ministry of Defense. The second thing is that we should know quite definitely what research, what scientific developments, including fundamental research, what experimental design work, and what serial production will be able to be used in the interests of the qualitative development of our military science and the creation of our armaments and military equipment. That is, it will provide definite specifics.

[Chemodanova] You are a deputy minister of defense. At the present time the press is saying a very great deal about implementing military reform. How is the development of the military and technical aspect seen, how so you see your participation in the development and implementation of military reform?

[Yashin] I would reply like this: When they say the implementation of military reform is being proposed, that isn't quite accurate, because military reform as such is already under way. And if we are to speak of its sources, this is our policy. Our policy is peace, and on the basis of the new political thinking we have determined our position that our political strategy is the prevention of war. This is perhaps the first time that it is said in our documents that political strategy is the prevention of war. Our defensive doctrine is created on the basis of these political postulates. Our defensive doctrine presupposes that we must never be the first to use weapons, and primarily strategic weapons. That is, we are for defense, and accordingly as a consequence of this, views have changed on the form of conducting combat operations. In accordance with this, views and requirements concerning the creation of armaments and military equipment have changed; in accordance with this, of course, the organizational and manning structure of our units and formations are changing; and in accordance with this, the training of officer personnel has to change. So, as such, reform is already under way. But, we probably have to classify, concentrate, interpret in scientific terms, and present this reform as a document, present it for examination by the Supreme Soviet, so that the Supreme Soviet can sanction the main positions and main avenues of this reform. What are the main avenues that I would see? They are changes in the administration of the Armed Forces; reorganization of the organizational structure of the Armed Forces, perhaps; changes in the procedures for conducting scientific research and for ordering military equipment; changes to, improvements, in officer training. Well, perhaps, I would say that the attitude of party and soviet organs toward the Armed Forces, and toward the patriotic education of young people under way in the Armed Forces, probably has to be reviewed. The next point is that regulations need to be issued, confirmed by the Council of Ministers, on military service by officers. And in conclusion, a law on defense has to be adopted by the Supreme Soviet. These are the main areas which have to be reflected in the reform.

[Chemodanova] What do you think, what is the principal distinguishing feature in the provision of weapons to our forces in the long term, if the question is raised that they should be not offensive but defensive, and in this regard can we expect a reduction in military expenditure, or will it increase?

[Yashin] That isn't a straightforward question either. I support a reduction in spending on the development of armaments and military hardware, and that applies particularly to series production. But, I wouldn't want theoretical, basic, and applied research and experimental design work to be reduced in any way, nor the financing of them. That does not mean that one can spend money indiscriminately. Not in the least. But, one of the main ways to achieve reasonable defense sufficiency today is to carry out research and development work. So let me stress and reaffirm once again that we must reduce our Armed Forces, and we have initiated such a reduction. After all, we were the first to propose the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles, something that is currently being implemented most vigorously. Second, taking into account the new political thinking, we proposed a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons. And new demands for the development of armaments and military hardware are already being made. This will be reflected in the qualitative aspect of our complexes, our armaments, without a doubt. And, come what may, this qualitative reflection must uphold our country's defense capability. Come what may, our people must be certain that the Armed Forces will perform the tasks facing them, taking into account and on the basis of a defensive doctrine. [end recording]

Fedorov Discusses the Status of Interior Troops

LD2602172290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1607 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 26 Feb (TASS)—TASS parliamentary correspondent reports from the Kremlin:

It is possible that the USSR interior troops will be the first military formations in the USSR to be equipped fully on a voluntary basis. This is envisaged by the draft law on the duties and rights of interior troops in guarding law and order.

Deputy Nikolay Fedorov (he is a member of that committee), reported that the transfer of internal troops to the voluntary principle of formation, according to preliminary calculations, will lead to a minimum five-fold increase in expenditure for their maintenance. Initially, in the years 1990-91, it is proposed to man five military units on a voluntary basis. For the time being, the rest will be formed, as now, on call-up.

The necessity of giving the form of law to provisions which govern the status of the internal troops, is particularly striking against the backdrop of the unceasing conflicts on interethnic grounds which, not infrequently, result in people being killed, noted Nikolay Fedorov. The procedure for using firearms has, in particular, been made more precise: It is planned to allow the soldiers to open fire without warning on those who violate the law, attacking Army personnel or citizens using fighting equipment, means of transport and seagoing vessels, and also on armed persons who refuse to comply with legitimate demands of representative of internal troops to surrender arms.

The draft was broadly supported by deputies. Many spoke in favor of staffing being based upon the principle of professionalism. "Additional resources will yield dividends many times their value, reckons Deputy Vladislav Shapovalenko, a scientific employee from Orenburg in the Urals. It is immoral to call upon our 18-year-old children and grandchildren to restore order in the country. It is a matter for professionally trained soldiers." Deputy Viktor Gubarev, deputy director of one of the factories in Krasnodar Kray in the south of Russia, having lent his support to the professional principle of staffing of internal troops, also suggested that calling up reservists to serve in the subunits of internal troops ought to be banned.

Members of the Soviet of the Union sent the draft law to be discussed in another chamber—the Soviet of Nationalities.

Lizichev Discusses Future of Army Komsomol

LD2402202790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2028 GMT on 23 February carries the "View" program presented by Vladislav Listev.

An unidentified female correspondent standing outside a building says: "The future of the Army Komsomol, [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] that complex issue, is being tackled here today, at the first plenum of the Pan-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations. Also taking part in the plenum are the top military leaders of the USSR Ministry of Defense."

The camera switches to the inside of the building to focus on A.D. Lizichev, head of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, addressing the conference from the rostrum:

He says: "The fact cannot be ignored that there is a process going on in the country—both overt and covert—of political force being built up in all the unofficial movements and fronts. The leaders of these movements are striving to penetrate working collectives and to dominate the student fraternity, the young people at school and even young soldiers. Extremist, nationalist, and separatist forces have mounted savage attacks on the party, on the Army, on the Komsomol, and on the organs of the KGB and the Interior Ministry. They strive mightily to mainly discredit the political organs of the Army and the Navy, too. We are, to be sure, aware of the political objectives of the fierce critics of the Army: a social demand on the part of political adventurists and demagogues, of socialism's opponents, of nationalists, and of separatists of all hues. They are trying to drive a wedge between the Army and the people, and to isolate it from the social processes going on in the country. All the talk of the need to have a small, professional army, of the formation of republican armies and ethnic troop formations, and of boycotting military service and the spring or fall draft in the Baltic and the Transcaucasus is directed at this. We are dubbed occupationists and there is much, much else. You know this perfectly well."

In the studio, presenter Vladislav Listev chats to two young officers: Aleksey Reshetnikov, a leader in the Army Komsomol, and (Sergey Ilshenko), a candidate of philosophical sciences and a lecturer in the Philosophy Department at the Lenin Military Political Academy. Replying to a question as to why there are no youth organizations in the Army other than the Komsomol, while in civilian life there are, Reshetnikov claims first that the circumstances of Army life are different and in any case the Komsomol is proving perfectly capable of tackling all the tasks facing it.

(Ilshenko), author of the book "Unofficial Organizations: a Chronicle of Events," takes a different view, although he does agree that Army life does not lend itself to pluralism: "Nevertheless, there are individual unofficial organisations in the Army, although it is true that few people know about them. That said, the organization "shield" is generally pretty well known in the country, and it does not just contain those who have been discharged from the Army. 'Shield' also includes very many servicemen." He is not convinced that the Komsomol successfully fulfills its tasks.

Reshetnikov does not believe the repeal of Article 6 will lead to the disappearance of political organs and the Komsomol from the Army, and nor should it.

(Ilshenko)'s belief is that the political organs should not be abolished, but should be reorganized. In view of the likelihood of a multiparty system, they should not be subordinate to any single party. They do, however, fulfill many functions today and should certainly not just be abolished.

Finally, (Ilshenko) says: "I believe that the Army should have strictly delineated functions. The use of the Army in Tbilisi, Novocherkassk, and other towns was not what the Army is intended for. The Constitution sets out clearly why the Army was created, and incidentally this is in line with the CPSU program that, from the point of view of internal functions, the Army should not get involved in our country. But in actual fact we have seen a totally different situation. Above all, it is essential that the Army should tackle those problems for which it is intended. Not in accordance with some ideological directives and not from the point of view of suppression, but from the point of view of actually carrying out its functions. That is, to be a reliable guarantor safeguarding the defense capability of the country against external sources of aggression."

Nuclear-Powered Cruiser Discovers Boiler Defect

LD2402175190 Moscow World Service in English 1600 GMT 24 Feb 90

[Text] The Soviet nuclear-propelled missile cruiser Kirov has returned to its base in the seaport Severomorsk beyond the Arctic Circle. In the course of a long voyage a defect was found in its boiler. Later, rumors spread that an accident occurred in the ship's reactor section which left the crew with high doses of radiation. Once back at the base, radiation was measured aboard the cruiser, on the crewmen, and also on the shore. The gamma radiation in the first two cases varied between four and 20 microroentgen per hour—that's no higher than the background radiation.

Moscow TV Shows Far East Air Defense Subunit

LD2302221990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian in its "Vremya" newscast at 0930 GMT on 23 February carries a video report by Correspondent V. Plotskiy on a day in the life of a military subunit defending Soviet airspace near Chukotka in the Soviet Far East.

The video pans across frozen waste showing two devices, possibly antennas, located on hills some distance apart. These are later shown in close-up. A rocket-carrying vehicle is shown in motion. Various pieces of stationary artillery and rockets are shown, later seen being elevated. Servicemen are shown running to man them in what is later said to be a red alert exercise. Interior shots are shown of what appears to be a control headquarters, where orders are given to fire during the training exercise and servicemen are shown marking positions on a map.

Plotskiy praises the efficiency of the subunit, then goes on to interview A.N. Shchukin [identified by screen caption—not further identified], who laments that many negative things have been said about the Army recently. He stresses the importance of subunits stationed on Soviet borders and highlights the fact that there are men of 25 nationalities in the subunit and that "the weapons are collective," but the men are united in the task of defending the homeland.

Reader Deplores Media Attacks on Military Life

PM2602163590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Feb 90 First Edition p 1

[Letter from reader I. Zonin under the general heading "Law, Order, and Responsibility": "'Slamming' the Army"]

[Text] It is no secret that any army is the main support of a modern state. Today the reality is such that a country's strength is determined by the strength of its army. The disintegration of an army invariably leads to the disintegration of the state. There have been many historical examples of this.

It was no accident that I decided to mention these truths. Recently the press, radio, TV, and speakers at rallies have made a real effort to rock the foundations of our Armed Forces. Which foundations am I referring to? Above all, patriotism, a sense of duty, and pride in belonging to the Army and Navy. If people continually hear calls not to serve in the Army, how can there be any question of a sense of duty? If, of course, they see people's attitudes to men in uniform and how they live compared with others, then it is understandable if young people have no ardent desire to devote themselves to military service.

This all produces a sorry result—young people lose their interest in military service.

The unrest in city streets, the flouting of the law, and so forth—all this dirty scum on the top of perestroyka sometimes produces the kind of new recruits that even the most talented training commander will not be able to take in hand in a year. It is no accident that the number of military crimes has leapt or that cases of desertion and violations of military discipline have become more frequent.

Even today, I am sure, our Armed Forces are one of the few social institutions where concepts such as discipline, order, and organization still exist. And if people go on "slamming" the Army with irresponsible slogans and wholesale attacks, I do not know what will happen in the future.

[Signed]I. Zonin, Khimki, Moscow Oblast.

Baltic Republics

Independence Day Rally Held in Estonia

LD2402215290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 24 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] National Independence Day, which was declared by the Presidium of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet in connection with the restoration of a memorable date, the formation of the Estonian Republic in 1918, is being marked in Estonia today.

[Correspondent H. Lenk] A ceremonial rally devoted to this day took place in the old town, at the foot of the Long Herman tower, on which the blue, black, and white national flag of Estonia is raised each morning as the sun rises. Arnold Ryutel, chairman of the Presidium of the republic's Supreme Soviet, dwelt in his speech on the history of the Estonian people. A manifesto to all the peoples of Estonia was proclaimed 72 years ago today. That event is considered the beginning of the Estonian republic. On 24 February, 1918, Estonia became a state of its own for the first time in its long history. Soviet Russia was the first country to recognize Estonia as an independent state.

Rallies and demonstrations took place throughout the republic today, and in the churches there were services and concerts of religious music. A ceremonial soiree devoted to that important, historic date in the life of the people of Estonia was held in Tallinn.

Anti-Russianism Seen in Removal of Militia Leaders

PM2202144590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Own correspondent L. Livitskiy report: "Who Will Protect the Militia?"]

[Text] The Tallinn City Soviet proposed that the Estonian Ministry of Internal Affairs relieve almost all of the city Internal Affairs Administration leadership from their posts. The reason is a sharp growth in crime.

This draft decree was a surprise even to the majority of the members of the deputies' commission for the protection of law and order and socialist legality. The deputies were assured by Kh. Aasmyaz, chairman of the city soviet executive committee, who said that the question had been agreed with the ministry.

A meeting held by the staff of the Tallinn Internal Affairs Administration sharply condemned the city soviet's decree. In the opinion of the speakers at the meeting, the deputies, instead of strengthening the milita subunits and helping them, are participating in discrediting the militia, particularly Russian-speaking specialists.

"We see the city soviet's decree as one step toward the implementation of a policy of purposefully getting rid of Russian-speaking cadres in the militia...," the adopted resolution says

The participants in the meeting expressed their full support for the city administration leadership—Ya. Tsupsman, the chief; V. Serov, his deputy for operational work; and others. It was decided that until the decree is repealed, administration collectives will work strictly to rule—eight hours a day, refusing any extra work. It was decided to immediately create an independent professional union of certified militia workers in order to protect professional and civil rights. As is well known, the regulations do not provide for such an organization in the militia.

"I did not give my consent to the dismissal of the Tallinn Internal Affairs Administration leadership. I consider the city soviet's decision to be erroneous," M. Tibar, Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic minister of internal affairs, commented on the conflict between the city soviet and the city militia.

Estonian Party Conference Viewed

90UN0997A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 18 Feb 90 p 2

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent S. Tarakanov: "A Bird With a Burned Wing"]

[Text] Last week, a conference of the CPEs [Communist Party of Estonia] convened by a decision of the 16th plenum of the CPEs Central Committee was held in Tallinn. The issue of ideological and organizational basis for preparing the congress of communists of the republic was on the agenda.

In his opening remarks, First Secretary of the Central Committee V. Vyalyas said: "We planned the CPEs conference as a certain intermediate stage on the way to the 20th Congress, as a forum which would help us come to a better understanding of our political and ideological origins and would take our intraparty discussion to a new level."

The need for such a step is obvious because at present disparate opinions on fundamental problems of the present day and future of the party are heard more and more distinctly within the party, and different attitudes prevail which at times rule each other out. I will quote certain "stats" on the results of sociological polls published by the Lyaene Virumaa newspaper VIRU SYNO in order to get a better feel for the background against which the conference was held. In mid-January, over 2,200 communists were polled in Rakverskiy Rayon. One-fifth of them have firmly resolved to stay in the Communist Party. Among them, non-Estonians accounted for 45 percent. Approximately one in 10 of those polled sees no future for himself in any party. Approximately 100 persons have not formed an opinion yet, and the same number intend to join other organizations. More than two-thirds are waiting for the CPEs 20th Congress in order to make their choice depending on its decisions. Estonians account for 71.3 percent of them.

What decisions do those polled expect the congress to make?

A CPEs with its own statute and program is favored by 46.5 percent. More than one-fifth would like to change the name of the independent party. The same number of respondents envision the CPEs within the framework of the CPSU; 63.1 percent of the Russian-speaking communists would like to stay in the CPSU.

Similar processes are under way in other regions of the republic as well. The only difference is in percentage shares depending on the ethnic composition of party organizations. It is no accident that for each of the draft documents offered to the delegates for consideration there was an alternative version. Among those making reports, pairs emerged. For example, co-reports were heard "On the Program of Renewal for the CPEs" by First Secretary of Vilyandiskiy Rayon Committee of the party, Member of the CPEs Central Committee Bureau J. Allik and "On the CPEs Action Program" by Deputy Secretary of the party committee of the Estonian Maritime Shipping Line V. Kovtun....

The report asked the following question: "What would have happened as recently as yesterday if a similar meeting had been given two drafts differing in principle?" and immediately provided an answer: "Those supporting one draft would have left the auditorium immediately through one door, and the rest of them through the other door. A dialogue, as well as a search for constructive solutions, would have been impossible."

When one of those making co-reports, G. Israelyan, declared: Let those who are going to join it discuss the program of renewing the CPEs, it became clear that the alternative documents will not be caught in the crossfire but will rather be submitted for a parallel discussion. We know from geometry that parallel lines never cross though such a crossing is a vital necessity for the communists of Estonia.

In brief, the opposite points of view were reflected in the choice between the CPEs being an independent organization within the CPSU and outside it; between Estonia being an independent state and a sovereign republic belonging to a renewed USSR federation. There are differences in principle in the drafts of organizational structure of the party as well, specifically, the membership, organization, and principles of formation. For example, the draft statute of the independent CPEs does not include a point on working in the primary organization. It is enough to belong to it. The very notion "primary" has disappeared because it is proposed to organize the party on a territorial basis and that of the type of occupation. However, these provisions were virtually not discussed at the conference. First Secretary of the Pyarnusskiy Rayon Committee of the party V. Gaylit started the argument.

He said: "The time has come for the self-determination of the CPEs. We should do so in the course of the discussion and make a decision at the 20th congress. We cannot repeat the mistakes of the past. The communists of our rayon want an independent republic. As our experience shows, obedience to the mythical center is a way to nowhere."

Director of the "Baltiets" Plant in Narva, Member of the CPEs Central Committee Bureau V. Chetvergov took the floor after him. He believes that the truth should be sought in a response to the question of whether Estonia is going to be within the USSR or outside it. There can be no compromise on that. In his opinion, tossing aside and ignoring an opportunity for solving the ethnic, economic, and political problems of Estonia within the union in a way less painful for the people amounts to politicking and neglect for the needs of common people.

The others spoke in more or less the same vein. Several speeches containing accusations leveled at specific politicians and attempts to defame them stood out in the overall sequence. Let us not discuss the credibility or falsity of the facts and petty facts mentioned. They are not the issue here but rather the fact that many of us have yet to learn what the culture of discussion is. Besides, these speakers did not dominate the conference; they did not determine its content of the conference. Their speeches caused nothing but bewilderment and short flare-ups of emotions. The arguments of the parties defending a particular position are much more important. Here is the logic of discourse about the future of the party by one of the authors of the CPEs renewal program J. Allik.

He proposed four possible avenues for a decision of the 20th Congress. The first avenue is to discontinue the use of the name "Communist Party of Estonia" because it will not be registered without a statute and a program under the law on parties which, in his opinion, will have been adopted by that time. The second avenue is to restore the operation of the independent CPEs which was discontinued in 1940. The third avenue is to create a new CPEs with its own statute and program on the basis of the territorial organization of the CPSU. The fourth is to create on the same basis some other party, for example, a democratic reform party.

J. Allik tried to predict the immediate future of the new party.

He stressed: "It is not a part of the CPSU. If the CPSU becomes at its 27th Congress a Union of USSR Communist Parties, a congress of the Communist Party of Estonia will consider the issue and conditions for belonging to this union. In all of this, we cannot rule out the possibility of a split in the CPSU itself and the emergence of two parties based on it. Therefore a solution to this question requires time...."

The adherents of the CPEs action program stated quite unambiguously that the idea of federalism in the structure of the CPSU which supposedly is the shortest route to renewing the party is a direct course toward a dead end. They also evaluated the predictions by J. Allik. In their opinion, given the current situation of aggravated social contradictions, interethnic relations, and economic difficulties, splitting the unified CPSU in the guise of some union of parties is a dangerous and irresponsible game.

The conference shed light not only on the opposing views of the communists on vital issues but also on the grave symptoms of an imminent crisis in the depths of the party. Calls to immediately resolve the issue of separating the party came from both sides.

There were attempts to find a compromise. Senior research associate of the Institute of Physics V. Myurk suggested that a third set of draft documents be worked out which would be acceptable for an overwhelming majority. First Secretary of Kalininskiy Rayon Committee of the party B. Yulegin circulated the theses of the CPEs platform which, in the opinion of the communists of the rayon, are capable of rallying a majority.

Forty people in all took the floor in the debate. Significant issues were raised: Economic issues, the army, ecology, the moral purity of communists. However, they were eclipsed by the issues which I have tried to dwell on in more detail.

The resolution "On Procedures for Holding an Intra-Party Debate to Discuss the Program Documents for the 20th CPEs Congress" instructed the CPEs Central Committee Bureau to set up a working group for developing an historical evaluation and conclusions for the future operations of the party. The CPEs Central Committee Bureau was charged with setting up a working group which will furnish relevant materials to the commission for preparing the 20th CPEs Congress because the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 27th CPSU Congress and the discussion at the conference may create certain prerequisites for the unification of forces interested in cooperation on the basis of respect for mutual interests into the Communist Party of Estonia. In other words, the last attempt is being made to unify the communists of the republic on a basis acceptable to a majority.

This is going to be difficult because there still is a lot of mistrust in relations between party members. This came to light particularly at the point when Secretary of the Party Committee of the Estonian Maritime Shipping Line A. Labasov proposed a draft resolution on electing delegates to the congress by a direct, competitive secret ballot in primary party organizations or in party electoral districts. This quite democratic draft was "dumped" by an overwhelming majority. As J. Allik said at a press conference, the results of voting revealed the apprehension: What if 51 percent of Russians and 49 percent of Estonians will be elected to the congress, or the other way around?

The course of voting was similar in the case of a draft resolution proposed by Secretary of the Party Committee of the Association "Estonslanets" Smirnov which demanded that the draft law on parties be withdrawn from the Presidium of the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet for a discussion of it in party organizations. This law will actually ban the operation of the CPEs on the Platform of the CPSU, provided, of course, such is formed, because no party can be financed from abroad.

The final critical symptom: A political declaration read by First Secretary of Morskoy Rayon Committee of the party A. Gusev which said that the drafts of renewing the CPEs and its status are the documents of a new party which is not communist at all. Submitting these documents for a discussion in the party organizations will essentially amount to a split in the party. Those prepared to sign the political declaration continue to adhere to the position of the 15th CPEs plenum which proclaimed the course for a sovereign Estonia within a renewed Soviet federation, for expanding the independence of the CPEs within the CPSU.

To be sure, materials submitted for a discussion by the conference are not documents in their ultimate form. However, the response to them by the delegates is quite instructive. In his report, V. Vyalyas said that at present the Communist Party of Estonia is going through a cleansing fire. One cannot but agree with him. However, let us imagine for a second that the party is a bird with two wings, as is the case at present. Could one of the wings be allowed to get burned in flight?

Demonstrations in Riga Precede Conference

LD2402195790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 24 Feb 90

[Excerpt] A party conference called by those advocating setting up an Independent Communist Party of Latvia is under way in Riga today. Our correspondent Ninel Meshkun reports:

[Meshkun] The political winter in Latvia has turned out to be a hot one at the moment. The events that got off to a turbulent start from the very first days of the new year are continuing to gather speed. Only yesterday, a demonstration of many thousands of Rigans, gathered together on the intiative of the Inter-Front of Working People of Latvia and the Council of Veterans of the USSR Armed Forces, proclaimed the unshakeability of the unity of the people and army. Today communists have traveled to Riga from all over the republic, summoned by the initiative group of those advocating setting up an Independent Communist Party of Latvia, essentially aiming at a schism of the republican Communist Party. The party conference is being held in the Riga political education club: 1,080 delegates, representing groups of communists from all the towns and rayons of Latvia and from the Latvian maritime shipping line, are discussing the political report and interim statute and program of the Independent Communist Party of Latvia.

At a briefing for journalists before the conference, the working group of the forum briefed press representatives on the results of polls held among communists of various nationalities. The idea of a Communist Party of Latvia united with the CPSU is condemned by 86 percent of the Latvian audience polled, and by 68 percent of the non-Latvians polled. [passage omitted]

20,000 Protest

LD2302230790 Moscow TASS in English 2212 GMT 23 Feb 90

[by TASS correspondent Valeriy Zaytsev]

[Text] Riga February 24 TASS—Some 20 thousand residents of the Latvian capital gathered Friday evening for a meeting under slogans: "End attacks on the Soviet Army," "People and the Army are united," "For Latvia within the Soviet Union."

The demonstration was prompted by anti-army attitudes of a number of informal organisations in Latvia. They tried to present Soviet soldiers as occupiers, and the very presence of armed forces in the Latvian territory as a cause of trouble for local residents...no mention is made of the fact that more than 150,000 Soviet soldiers were killed in action, driving fascist occupiers out of Latvia.

The participants in Friday's meeting expressed their negative attitude to the anti-army campaign in the republic and called for the consolidation of all progressive forces, for the quest for a compromise in the complex socio-political situation in the run-up to the elections to Latvia's Supreme Soviet to be held on March 18.

The meeting adopted a resolution addressed to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR defence minister. The resolution, specifically, says that confidence of the people in their army should not be undermined, that this might lead to the erosion of the country's defence potential.

According to the information of militia no violations of public order were registered during the meeting.

Poll Irregularities Leave Riga Without Mayor

PM2202121990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Irina Litvinova report: "Riga Without a Mayor"]

[Text] Riga—Feelings have been running high at the first organizational session of the Riga City Soviet.

The campaign for seats on the Riga City Soviet was the most dogged in the election campaign that has just been held in Latvia. According to preliminary figures, 61 deputies are running on the platform of the Latvian People's Front [LPF], while 59 are running as part of a group uniting deputies from Riga party city committee, the center for democratic initiatives, Interfront, and independents.

At the first session Group-59 proposed that the elections of chairman of the soviet and chairman of the executive committee [ispolkom] be by secret ballot, believing this to be an important democratic principle.

The first round of the elections brought a surprise: The votes for the two candidates for the post of chairman of the city soviet were equal—60-60. This came as a shock to supporters of the People's Front.

Representatives of Group-59 discussed the further progress of the session at a news conference.

Deputy T. Zhdanok: During the second round it was decided to find out who the "rebel" was. During the vote representatives of the LPF monitored their supporters and the independent deputies while they were filling in their ballot papers and putting them in the ballot box. A special official recorded the deputies' names and indicated the people for whom they had voted.

A prosecutor who attended the news conference explained that such instances are a blatant violation of the principle of a secret free vote. As Group-59 stated, during the repeat election the pressure on deputies from the LPF faction increased and to all intents and purposes turned the secret vote into an open vote. The correlation of votes changed to 61-59 in favor of the LPF candidate.

Deputy A. Gaponenko: During the election of the ispolkom chairman the violations of the voting procedure were repeated. They became even more obvious and were directly implemented by members of the accounting commission. The ballot papers were checked twice—before the deputies entered the voting booth and before they put the ballot paper in the ballot box. We do not advocate "voting with our feet," but we were forced to suspend our participation in the session's work.

In their statement the deputies running on the LPF platform did not admit any violations of the secret ballot procedure and condemned the Group-59 walkout from the session.

Group 59 has appealed to the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium to hold direct and secret elections for the chairman of Riga City Soviet Ispolkom involving all the city's voters. It is proposed that an urgent decision be made on this matter, since the city cannot remain ungoverned.

Poll Shows Baltic Conscripts' Wishes Respected

PM0502111990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Feb 90 First Edition p 1

[TASS correspondent V. Zaytsev report: "Who Is Sowing Discord? Lessons of the Latest Draft in Latvia"]

[Text] The issue of military service has become particularly topical for many sociopolitical organizations in Latvia. True, this cannot be called a healthy interest. As Colonel V. Teymer, chief of the republic military commissariat political department, writes in the newspaper SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA (30 January this year), there are people who stigmatize the Army, calling it a "stronghold of lawlessness, violence, nationalism, and chauvinism." Well, let these assessments remain on the conscience of their authors. We will turn to the facts.

On the eve of the fall draft, the republic military commissariat polled more than 5,000 young men. Precisely 51 percent of those polled replied that they were going to serve not because they wanted to but because "it is required by law"; 2.2 percent unequivocally declared that they did not wish to serve. One in three expressed a desire to serve on the territory of the Baltic region, more than 40 percent in Latvia, while the rest were prepared to serve in any region. Approximately 40 percent of the young men in the fall draft have now become servicemen in units in the Baltic Military District—which, as we see, is close to the poll data.

Colonel V. Teymer drew attention to articles in certain mass media in the republic which, in describing negative phenomena in the Army, sometimes draw fundamentally wrong inferences and conclusions. And such "propaganda" yields fruit.

Last year a group of young men refused, for so-called political reasons, to serve in the "army of occupation." In so doing, they all—there were 47 of them during the draft campaign, according to military commissariat data—set out their refusals on a standard printed form with a previously prepared text, to which they had only to add their surname and the number of their draft registration slip. This means that someone was purposefully directing the process. Similar instructions were disseminated by the national women's league, the Latvian national independence movement, and the "Helsinki-86" group.

The republic youth newspaper published a statement of refusal of military service from 54 young men in the city of Liyepaya. V. Teymer writes that today just eight of the people who signed that "document" have not gone to serve, and the material on them, as on everyone who has dodged service, has been forwarded to the prosecutor's office. The rest are either serving already or have received draft deferments for various reasons.

People who have been released from military service and whose actions do not come under the corresponding article of the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Criminal Code usually become the "refuseniks'" advisers and coordinators.

The spring draft will begin in 3 months' time, and the chief of the republic military commissariat political department writes, addressing readers: "Under the conditions of building a rule-of-law socialist state, let us be more restrained and let us not push young people into illegal actions concerning their upcoming service."

'Anti-Army Hysteria' in Lithuania Charged

PM2602154990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Own correspondent L. Kapelyushnyy report: "Other People's Soldiers and Their Own Children"]

[Text] Vilnius—The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet resolution "On the Status of the USSR Armed Forces in the Republic and Military Service by Citizens of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]" has been published.

As is known, a recent session of the republic Supreme Soviet deemed Lithuania's incorporation into the USSR illegal. It follows from this that the presence of the USSR Armed Forces on Lithuanian territory is "juridically groundless." Henceforward, "any actions by the USSR Armed Forces which might hinder the organs of state power and management of the Lithuanian SSR in the performance of their constitutional functions will be regarded as interference in the Lithuanian SSR's internal affairs."

If the resolution stopped there, this document could be considered an internal matter for Lithuania. There follow two binding points: The first obliges the republic military commissar to submit proposals concerning the recall of Lithuanian SSR citizens serving in the Transcaucasian republics. The second obliges the republic prosecutor not to forward criminal cases in respect of Lithuanian SSR citizens serving in the USSR Armed Forces and quitting their military units as a result of violence being committed against them, to the country's Military Prosecutor's Office without the consent of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

To tell the truth, until now I had believed that the military commissar was guided in his work by the Armed Forces regulations, and the truth is that for a prosecutor there is no authority higher than the law.

There is a fair share of national egoism in the anti-Army hysteria being fueled in Lithuania in recent months: Children of Lithuanians must serve in the republic or, at any rate, in the European part of the country. All the rest is not our problem.

The inability of the USSR Ministry of Defense to maintain a level of order and discipline in military units that would rule out violence and tragic outcomes during service was the basis for a compromise: Following talks between the republic leadership and the ministry, Lithuanian SSR citizens were accorded certain benefits according to where they serve. In my view, there should be no privileges in military service on ethnic grounds.

Lithuanian parliamentarians have gone still further in their demand for their children's recall from the Transcaucasus: What is happening there, what functions the troops are fulfilling, what mission the soldiers are on there—this is unimportant. What is important is that our children should not be there.

A report by the Lithuanian SSR KGB on criminal acts against soldiers serving in Lithuania was published simultaneously with the republic Supreme Soviet resolution. People are starting to shoot at these soldiers.

It turns out like this: They feel sorry for their children if they freeze or wilt in the heat, but it is possible to shoot at other people's children. Even a very harsh law is still the law, and until it has been repealed it has to be fulfilled.

It is not hard to imagine what consequences the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet resolution might have and what floodgates will be opened. A number of legislative acts adopted in Lithuania recently are at variance with union laws. From time to time, even the Supreme Soviet Presidium deems them to be at variance and advises repealing them, but this advice is not heeded locally. And the republic's citizens find themselves "between two laws"—one permits, the other prohibits. Given the declared course toward a rule-of-law state, such a situation is absurd. The latest Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet resolution is directly linked with citizens' obedience or disobedience to the law. The country's government is obliged either to recognize this as a legally entitled way of putting the question or to find a common language with the republic government. Citizens must not pay for the governments' inability to find a common language.

Lithuanian Commission Discusses Military Service

LD2702122390 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0100 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Rima Jakutyte report]

[Text] The first session of the state commission for the preparation of proposals concerning the status of the USSR armed forces in Lithuania, and of military service by the citizens of this republic, was held today. The commission was set up at the last session of the Supreme Soivet of the previous convocation. It had been stated by the Supreme Soviet that the presence of USSR armed forces in Lithuania was, in legal terms, indeterminate. Working groups have now been set up and concrete proposals concerning military service by young Lithuanian men were discussed at the commission, which was headed by Liudvikas Sabutis, secretary of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Vidmante Jasukaityte, a writer, and chairman of the Women's Union of Lithuania, who is also a member of the commission, informed Lithuanian Radio that the commission is to prepare a draft document this week, which would be handed to the USSR Supreme Soviet after it has been approved by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Presidium. We invite the USSR parliament for negotiations, V. Jasukaityte said.

An agreement was reached by the commission that the following demands would be regarded as being the most important:

Lithuanian citizens do their military service only in Lithuania; alternative service should be allowed: Young Lithuanian men serving in the Transcaucasian region, and those soldiers having nonstatutary relations in the army, should be urgently returned to Lithuania.

According to V. Jasukaityte, if these conditions are accepted then Lithuanian men would do their military service in Lithuania. Failing this, the validity of the law on the recruitment to the Soviet armed forces would be cancelled on the territory of Lithuania, and our young men would not serve in the Soviet armed forces.

The next sitting of the commission is to take place next Monday [5 March]

Lithuanian Economic Debate Reported

PM2702105590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Leonid Kapelyushnyy: "Freedom Without USSR in Rubles and Dollars"]

[Text] Vilnius—The Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers has discussed the economic concept of Lithuania under conditions of independence. Without camouflaging the true situation with political terminology, what was discussed was the question of how Lithuania and the Lithuanians will live after withdrawal from the USSR.

The first thing I want to note is that talk in general was not about divorce terms, that is about what will remain "for free" in the republic of that which was created during the years of Soviet power and what compensation will have to be paid for. I heard two viewpoints on this score. Some people believe that Lithuania will be left owing a lot, others that the USSR will owe Lithuania a lot—for the moral damage caused, the repressions, the lost advantage. As for advantage.... They are saying that if we had not been occupied we, who in the forties were in approximately the same economic position as Finland, would now be living in the same way. Consequently, the Union owes us....

I mentioned this also because during the discussion of the reports delivered by A. Zhukauskas and B. Zaykauskas, members of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet commission for the restoration of Lithuania's sovereignty (it was created in the fall of last year), Finland was mentioned quite often—as an example for emulation and for borrowing experience. It is true that V. Sakalauskas, chairman of the Council of Ministers, noted that today the world situation is absolutely different and the Finns began to create their economy in postwar Europe under absolutely different conditions. Nonetheless, during the discussion there were supporters of both the Western aspect in the economic concept and the Eastern aspect. But the former and the latter insisted equally that a Lithuania integrated into the economy of the Soviet Union cannot and should not break off ties with it. All were unanimous that it is essential in the immediate future to embark on the elaboration of the terms for talks with the USSR on the conclusion of a treaty on cooperation.

To judge by the discussion, I would not say that a life of idleness and wealth awaits Lithuania in the foreseeable future. In almost every line of the concept you can detect a gap of hundreds of millions of dollars. Today the republic's economy is characterized by the following indicator, for instance: Lithuania imports goods and produce worth R1.5 billion more than it exports.

Considering the transition to world prices in the fuel economy complex, specialists have calculated the difference at $1 billion. They will not be able to make ends meet even in a developed sector like agriculture. It will be necessary to produce approximately 1 million tonnes more grain than at present. The way to do this is to increase yield, because there is no surplus land in the republic. It was said that they will have to create, restore, and develop a number of their own sectors and avenues. For instance, modernize sugar refineries and construct new ones and expand sowings of sugar beet. Examples were cited: At one time Lithuania used to sow 94,000 hectares to flax and exported linen and flax articles. But now only 28,000 hectares are sown to flax and industry is geared to cotton. Today this is no misfortune, R3 a kilogram is paid for it. But on the international market it costs $20....

The republic's economists and scientists spoke the tough truth about expensive manufacturing methods, about the lag behind Western neighbors in terms of enterprise and the ability to see advantage. Now, it seems to me, Lithuania is teaching us all a very useful lesson. The country's economy has been organized in such a way that dependence has eaten into the flesh and blood of everyone—from janitor to minister and even higher. Everyone is standing with outstretched hand saying—give me. Monopoly dependence has not only "tied" everyone with the same chain and aim. It has been a convenient ecological niche for the system's servants: We give, you are given, there is no need to think.

In my old notebooks I find the inscriptions: Agricultural specialists complained that plans are being issued for sowing sugar beet, which does not grow, produces a small yield, and is not advantageous. I can hear the same complaints at home, in the Ukrainian steppes: It is labor intensive, requires special attention, and everyone together, with one voice, is cursing perestroyka for... the sugar coupons.

Sugar beet will grow in Lithuania. They will have to remember the secrets of their flax-growing grandfathers. Most likely the third unit of the Ignalina Nuclear Electric Power Station, closed down at the demand of the Lithuanian Government to the applause of all Lithuania, will be taken out of mothballs. There has already been talk about how it is necessary to develop nuclear power engineering. It is entirely possible that the "Greens" will not lie down on the railway tracks near Klaypeda, "barring" the rolling stock from the oil base.

The lesson of Lithuania is also useful in that we have all finally begun to calculate advantage and disadvantage. Regional accounting will remain an empty sound without this work. Only such accounting can ultimately rid us of the universal suspicion that the entire country is living at the expense of one republic, oblast, or even village....

"Theoretically the economy should and can be depoliticized," Vilyus Kazanavichyus, deputy chairman of the council of ministers, said. "To our demands to withdraw the occupation troops from Lithuania the young soldier says: Do you know what I will do? I shall complain to my mom.... His mom, incidentally, is in Tyumen. And we intend to go to Tyumen to conclude contracts on oil deliveries."

Lithuanian Democratic Party Presidium Member Dies

LD2602102690 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0100 GMT 24 Feb 90

[Summary] Member of the Presidium of the Lithuanian Democratic Party, Povilas Peceliunas, died on 23 February. He was former political prisoner and one of the party founders. Perceliunas spent eight years in a concentration camp and in exile in Siberia. Having returned to Lithuania in 1987, he immediately joined the struggle against the regime. Peceliunas was 61 years of age.

Lithuanian Citizenship Petitions Increase

90UN0898A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 4, 22-28 Jan 90 p 18

[Article by TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Zenkovich: "To Lithuania in Search of Happiness?"]

[Text] By now, nobody finds unauthorized meetings and alternative demonstrations, hunger strikes, and collecting signatures for various petitions surprising. However, when residents of various areas of our country begin to approach the Permanent Mission of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] with requests to grant them Lithuanian citizenship and leave for independent Lithuania for permanent residence after it secedes from the USSR....

R. Virbitskas, deputy permanent representative of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers at the USSR Council of Ministers, said: "Indeed, we do get such applications. I cannot give you an exact number. They are not registered. However, lately their number has increased considerably.

"The Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR has jurisdiction over the issues of Lithuanian citizenship. We cannot help those who have this wish in any way because our mission reports to the Council of Ministers of the republic and, in addition, does not have relevant powers.

"Our employees try to explain to the citizens that there is the USSR Constitution and a number of other laws according to which any citizen of the USSR has a right to live in the territory of any union republic. This right has not been taken away by anyone! Lithuania has not seceded from the USSR thus far, and the laws of the USSR are still in effect in the territory of Lithuania, along with the laws of the Lithuanian SSR. As has been the case before, thousands of people in our country swap their dwellings.

"Let us imagine that from tomorrow on, receiving and registering those who wish to become Lithuanian citizenship is our responsibility. However, what will this accomplish? In Lithuania, people spend decades on waiting lists for apartments. Where will these new citizens live? The situation in Lithuania with foodstuffs, soap, and clothing is as "tight" as elsewhere in the country. The difficulties of everyday life are the same as in the entire union. Besides, why approach us? After all, one would hardly approach the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Permanent Mission in order to move from Moscow to, say, Belorussia....

RSFSR

KGB Prevents Raid on Military Depot in Barnaul

LD2402144890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1555 GMT 24 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 24 Feb (TASS)—On 22 February military counterespionage bodies of the USSR KGB along with the KGB directorate for the Altay Kray foiled an armed attack by a group of people upon a military depot in Barnaul, the aim of which was to seize a large batch of firearms and ammunition.

Just before the attack on the depot, six local citizens were detained at a meeting point and sawed-off shotguns with cartridges, instruments and equipment were confiscated from them which revealed that they were preparing to carry out a crime.

According to available information the members of the group were intending to sell the captured weapons and ammunition to an intermediary for 200,000 roubles and they would then be transported to one of the country's southern republics. It was intended to carry out a criminal act before 25 February.

Criminal proceedings have been instigated and an investigation has been started. The materials which are available provide grounds to suspect the detainees of committing other such crimes.

Picket Organized To Protect Investigators

LD2202115990 Moscow World Service in Russian 1030 GMT 22 Feb 90

[From the "INTERFAX" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program]

[Text] On the morning of 21 February members of the mass public organization Democratic Choice, from the town of Zelenograd, organized a picket next to the building of the USSR public prosecutor's office in Pushkin Square. The aim of the picketing, as (Aleksandr Gornok), a representative of that organization, told an INTERFAX correspondent, was to defend investigators Gdlyan and Ivanov from being victimized by the leadership of the public prosecutors office.

Vilnius Radio Reports Leningrad Rallies

LD2102153690 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0800 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] According to a Sajudis information agency report from Leningrad, (Piotr Filipov), member of the directorate of the Leningrad People's Front, says that despite the protests launched by creative unions and the public, the Russian meetings scheduled for 17 and 24 February were sanctioned by the party city and oblast committees; the meetings are organized by the "ecological committee for protection of the Neva River and Ladoga and Onega lakes," which is so far little known.

According to the Leningrad People's Front, the ecological committee is a national-patriotic organisation with chauvinist tendencies. MOLODAYA GVARDIYA and NASH SOVREMENNIK, two magazines published by the central press, are also taking an active part in the Russian meetings. These magazines are known for their chauvinistic attitude towards other nationalities living in Russia.

Standing out from the rest in Leningrad is the block of party bureaucrats and local national patriots who have united their forces in order to defend the command and administrative system. The public understands that the proposed scapegoat—the conspiracy of Jews, and Masons—is an attempt to retain power by the party bureaucrats.

On 17 February a meeting of protest against the Russian meetings took place [words indistinct]. This meeting was organized by the pre-election club Election 90, by members of the People's Front, the association the Democratic Platform of the CPSU, Leningrad Scientists' Association, the Memorial Society, and the Social Democrats Association.

Leaflets were distributed in the city which called for preventing the plague of national socialism.

About 7,000 people took part in the rally; Russian people's deputies, writers and scientists spoke at the rally; statements against Jews and people of other non-Russian nationalities were condemned. The speakers stressed that nationality is not decided by blood or an inscription in the passport; the decisive factor is a person's determination and his attitude to his nation. Therefore, division into Russians and non-Russians is mere fascism.

Far East Military Leader's Impressions of Plenum

PM1402142590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Feb 90 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Lieutenant General A. Voronin, member of the Military Council and chief of the Far East Military District Political Directorate, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel O. Nikonov: "Time for Thought and Action"; date and place of interview not specified; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Excerpts] Lieutenant General A. Voronin, member of the Military Council and chief of the Far Eastern Military District Political Directorate, shares his first impressions of the work of the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum.

[Voronin] I believe that the plenum secured its main aim. The country expected it to assess the state of the party and the prospects for society's development. It was very important to talk about all the sensitive issues. I liked some of the speeches. That by V. Brovikov, for instance—although I disagree with him on a number of points—and also B. Gidaspov, and V. Vorotnikov. Ye. Ligachev raised a number of very acute questions. V. Saykin voiced several constructive ideas.... But, I stress, this is my personal impression. Judge for yourselves—61 people spoke, including 11 of the 12 Politburo members. A mass of both useful and occasionally unexpected information. This has not happened before. This was a plenum of fundamental importance for the party and the entire country. As you know, a document was adopted which orients communists and the country to achieve positive results in the restructuring and renewal of the party. What is the main thing now? To get through the report and election stage in the party's effective renewal before the congress. [passage omitted].

You realize that we must not hide from the people any mistakes or changes to the left or to the right. It is time to tell people honestly why their lives are bad.

The situation in our kray's economy is very complex. Working conditions are hard. Particularly for women. The Food Program is marking time. There are difficulties with housing. There is another acute problem now—lack of heat. Decisions have been adopted and things have simply not gotten moving. We castigate the administrative-edict system. Yet often this is only a subterfuge and eliminates personal responsibility. There are specific repositories of responsibility. They are to blame for things going to pieces. We must be frank here.

That is the lesson I learned from February's plenum. I have tried to convey this spirit, this mood of resolute struggle and work from the plenum, to the district's communists and their voters.

Far East Deputies Meet in Khabarovsk 13 Feb

LD1402220990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian, in its "Vremya" newscast at 0930 GMT on 14 February, broadcasts a two-minute video report by correspondent L. Stroykov on a meeting of USSR People's Deputies of the Far East region and Chita Oblast held in Khabarovsk on 13 February. The video shows participants and speakers at the meeting.

The aim of the meeting was to work out a single platform for the USSR People's Deputies, Stroykov says. Their regions have many common economic, social, and ecological problems. Decisions by the center do not fully take into account the acute nature of these problems, Stroykov adds, citing the state program for comprehensive development of the Far East, Chita Oblast and Buryatia. The more the current version of this program is implemented, the deeper the region will get stuck in the rut of old contradictions.

V.M. Desyatov, a USSR people's deputy from Khabarovsk Kray says in an interview that even 20 years ago the Far Eastern Region possessed immense natural resources in terms of timber, fish, and fur. These have now fallen into such decline that "there is barely enough for local inhabitants to earn a subsistence living." Centralized planning has meant that the resources have been dissipated while the social foundations of life have not been created locally. People have been left with five or six percent of resources for their own existence, so that the social sector has not been developed, he maintains. Decentralization is necessary, Desyatov continues, and an economic center for managing the Far Eastern region must be set up here and now.

The next interviewee, V.D. Yudin, a USSR People's Deputy from Magadan, considers that the prosepcts for development of the region lie in economic association on a voluntary basis for mutual interest. RSFSR and USSR People's Deputies must legislate to create the potential for the region's development, he adds.

Decide To Form Regional Group

LD1402221190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0930 GMT 14 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] At the meeting of People's Deputies in Khabarovsk it was decided to form a Far Eastern regional group of USSR People's Deputies, to combine with the People's Deputies of Siberia to form a parliamentary group of USSR People's Deputies of Siberia and the Far East, and to consider it expedient to give the Far East the status of special region.

Ligachev Visits Aviation Industry Plant

90UM0316A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 18 Feb 90 p 2

[V. Sevastyanov report: "The Village Homesteads Are Waiting"]

[Text] Moscow—Ye.K. Ligachev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, visited the Moscow V.V. Chernyshev Mechanical Engineering Production Association. He toured the shops and talked with workers and specialists and then addressed the enterprise's party-economic activists. There was a concerned discussion about the results of the Central Committee February Plenum, the draft CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th party congress and the ways of developing the agroindustrial complex and solving the food problem.

These lines do not, of course, convey the emotional, candid, and businesslike atmosphere in which the meeting took place. The workers and engineers put to the Central Committee secretary pointed and, at times, unexpected questions. And received exhaustive answers.

But nor did he miss the chance to sharpen the discussion and showed that only by the joint efforts of town and country was it possible to enrich the counters of our food stores....

"Last year we manufactured 25,000 'Krot' motor cultivators. This year we intend producing 30,000," Anatoliy Nikolayevich Napolnov reported.

And drew fire.

"Is this growth?" Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev interjected.

Valentin Filippovich Yermakov, chairman of the Russian Consumer Trade Cooperatives Union Board, continued:

"With us there is one motor cultivator for 2,000 homesteads. Were we given 600,000 of them today, I would be reporting the next day that they had all been sold."

A stir in the hall. Each person had come to better understand the need in the Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, Uzbek, and other villages for Moscow's motor units. There are in our country currently 36 million private subsidiary plots and 18 million horticultural plots and truck gardens. The waiting list for miniequipment is enormous. It is, perhaps, one of the scarcest commodities. And a special commodity. It returns to the cities as food.

"We need to increase the manufacture of motor cultivators and not wriggle out of the government target. This year the association is to produce 60,000-65,000 machines, yes?"

"Yes. But, please understand, capacity is insufficient, there is a shortage of equipment, components are not being received in the full amount," Anatoliy Nikolayevich Napolnov attempted to defend his position.

This, it turned out, had been the position of the USSR Ministry of Aviation Industry also. To build up production gradually and reach the peak by 1995. It was not supported. The leaders of the ministries and departments whose enterprises are involved in the work assured the association's work force that the allied subcontractors would not let them down.

Alas, these are as yet only words. Both last year and this many of the enterprises supplying components have let the Muscovites down. The association's work force is having to make the units and parts itself under difficult conditions. This is leading to price increases and is falling on the prime costs of the motor cultivators.

While in the hall, I recalled a letter from A.S. Solovyev from the village of Chuvashotary of the Mary ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], which he sent the newspaper: "We peasants are being called on to expand the truck gardens and set up homestead livestock sections. We are ready to do so, there is a desire to work on the land. But, bear in mind: As the days go by there is on the kolkhoz [collective farm] increasingly much powerful equipment, but in my barn I have a spade, pitchfork, and scythe. That is the extent of my mechanization. I would like to have a small tractor with a set of mounted implements. But where could I obtain this? No one sells small equipment anywhere. Is there no one to take care of us?"

This is a cri de coeur. Is this not why one-third of peasant homesteads are without poultry, on half, no cows? How can only the village residents be blamed for this? We cannot bring ourselves to do so. They, after all, also would like to experience what culture of labor and mechanized work means at their homestead after a difficult day at the kolkhoz. So they are waiting for good-quality small equipment from the plants. This is, after all, somewhat embarrassing: In the United States currently there are 12 million small tractors, but with us, not one. Unless, of course, we count the articles of village craftsmen.

Undoubtedly, neither are we at a standstill, we are acting. The same USSR Ministry of Aviation Industry has this year oriented a further three plans toward the production of motor units. This in addition to the Leningrad "Krasnyy Oktyabr" Association, the Perm "Motorostroitel", and Moscow's V.V. Chernyshev, which began their manufacture this year. Supplies and the sale of small-scale equipment should grow sharply.

What specifically is being done for this? This is what I heard from Leonid Ivanovich Mayorov, chief of a shop of the Moscow association:

"You have seen the old bay. Cramped quarters, much manual labor. It is hard increasing production under such conditions. We will be handing over a new bay in April, then we will get going."

I both saw it and compared it with the shop where the powerful "MiG" engines are assembled. These are hard to compare. Aircraft engines are the pinnacle of engineering progress and the embodiment of the thought and labor of gifted designers, engineers, and workers. I heard at the enterprise that only four states: We, the United States, Britain, and France make such engines. We are not, consequently, lagging behind. But I wondered: What if the energy of these talented people and the material resources could be used in peaceful production! And they are. Perestroyka has enabled us to embark in earnest on a reduction in military production and transfer the capacity thus released to the manufacture of products necessary for the national economy, the agroindustrial complex primarily.

The new bay makes an impression. The huge, spacious building is without any equipment as yet. But an assembly line will be installed here which will put out a "Krot" motor cultivator every 60-90 seconds.

"You know that we are sending our machine operators and specialists to American farmers to gain practical experience. What strikes them most here? The high reliability of the equipment," Ye.K. Ligachev observed.

Yes, quantity today is essential. This is a fact. But growth must not be to the detriment of the quality and reliability of the machines. But as yet, as the editor's mailbag testifies, the plants are producing neither quantity nor quality. There are very many complaints. About the equipment manufactured by enterprises of the defense complex included. With their tremendous intellectual and engineering potential, this is unforgivable. Ye.K. Ligachev's meeting with the work force of the Moscow V.V. Chernyshev Mechanical Engineering Production Association was reassuring: the village homesteads will be receiving small equipment, dependable, convenient and at a tolerable price.

"We will not remain aloof, we will do all within our power," enterprise veteran Yuriy Timofeyevich Slavin declared. "We realize that the village needs solid help."

Svetlogorsk Dachas Taken Over by Homeless

LD0202161290

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0600 GMT on 2 February carries a five-minute telephone report by correspondent Stanislav Chekalin from Kaliningrad Oblast. Chekalin reports that people who "do not have normal housing" have taken the "desperate step" of taking over country dachas belonging to the oblast party committee and executive committee in the resort town of Svetlogorsk. There are a number of private houses, described as "small palaces" by the correspondent, some of which were used by sanatoriums, but 20 of which were used as state dachas. The mansions were used by oblast party and executive committee functionaries and by the military; whole houses and rooms in them were apportioned according to rank.

After the illegal occupation by Svetlogorsk citizens, the Svetlogorsk town party committee and town executive committee called the townspeople to an assembly and "announced that all state dachas and private houses for guests will be handed over to those in need of housing."

This pubilc assembly grew into a mass meeting at which "people demanded the resignation of the apparatus of the executive committee of the town soviet." The studio announcer and the correspondent comment on the need to end privileges for functionaries and on the injustice of luxury mansions standing empty while people live in difficult conditions.

Murmansk Obkom First Secretary Resigns

LD2602133390 Murmansk MARITIME PRESS SERVICE in Russian 1500 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Excerpts] The sixth oblast plenum of the CPSU obkom has taken place in Murmansk. [passage omitted]

A.K. Balagurov made a statement requesting to be released from his duties as first secretary of the oblast party committee. In explaining this request, he said that he is unable to lead the oblast party organization, that he is not accepted by communists, and that he has not managed to influence the economy or social policy in the oblast. He described his appointment as a mistake.

After lengthy discussion, the plenum met A.K. Balagurov's request to be released from his duties as first secretary and member of the bureau of the CPSU oblast party committee.

The plenum decided to hold elections for the post of first secretary of the oblast party committee at the oblast party conference and to entrust the duties of first secretary of the CPSU oblast party committee to S.A. Serokurov, oblast party committee second secretary, until the conference takes place. [passage omitted]

The plenum set up a commission to prepare proposals on the following issues for an extraordinary expanded plenum of the party oblast committee:

—The procedure for nominating candidates for membership of the party oblast committee, including candidates for the post of party oblast committee first secretary

—The procedure for nominating, discussing and electing delegates to the party oblast committee party conference and the 28th CPSU Congress.

The plenum was in favor of holding a conference of Russian Communists before the 28th CPSU Congress.

Bashkir Oblast Party Leaders Resign

LD1002223790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2030 GMT 10 Feb 90

[Text] An extraordinary plenum of the Bashkir Oblast CPSU Committee took place in Ufa today. It examined the decisions of the 10th plenum of the Ufa City Party Committee, which expressed no confidence in the buro of the Oblast CPSU Committee and its methods of guiding the perestroyka processes, and demanded its resignation. In the course of the debates that took place, it was noted that obsolete and unpopular methods of work, mistakes in selecting and placing the cadres, and intolerance to criticism were prominent in the work of Khabibullin, first secretary of the oblast committee. The plenum examined a statement by members and candidate members of the Bashkir Oblast Party Committee and accepted their collective resignation. A provisional buro was elected at the plenum; its tasks include preparation and holding of an oblast party conference scheduled for the last 10 days in April.

Kemerovo Obkom Head Refused Permission To Retire

PM2202112990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Feb 90 p 1

[Report by own correspondent A. Yermakov: "Look at Who Has Left...."]

[Text] Kemerovo—"I do not regard myself as outside the party," V.P. Zhevago, secretary of the Kemerovo Obkom [party oblast committee], wrote in a letter to the obkom plenum which yesterday examined his personal case.

However, the plenum did not believe the man who had compromised himself and the party by falsifying documents reflecting his labor activity. Zhevago is now former: Former obkom secretary, former member of the bureau, former member of the CPSU. Not a single voice was heard in his support.

Almost the same unanimity prevailed among plenum participants when the question of the retirement of A.G. Melnikov, first secretary of the obkom, was decided. Aleksandr Grigoryevich asked for support for his decision to ask the CPSU Central Committee to allow him to retire on pension. But the oblast party aktiv did not let its first secretary go at such a crucial time. Thus A.G. Melnikov (along with other members of the Obkom Bureau) will have to account for his 15 months' activity as Kuzbass party leader during the precongress report and election campaign.

Barnaul Plenum Discusses Party Organization

LD0302195490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] In Barnaul an extraordinary plenum of the party gorkom was held today. It was held according to the agenda suggested by the city party club. The plenum deemed it necessary to change the structure of the city party organization. It also proposed to the party apparatus staff that they voluntarily renounce the privileges they have. A special commission to monitor this was created. The extraordinary plenum of the Barnaul communists sent a request to the CPSU Central Committee to review the system of distributing money received from the collection of the party membership fees and to transfer part of it to the Charity Fund.

Vlasov Visits Yakutsk Constituency

LD0802190490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Vlasov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, arrived in Yakutsk today. He will hold meetings with the electorate that is nominating him as a candidate to the Russian Parliament for the central Yakutsk Constituency No. 146. Today the chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers went to the Megino-Kangalasskiy rayon where he will acquaint himself with the way of life of those working in rural areas.

Young Communist League Holds Congress

LD1402111890 Moscow TASS in English 1212 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 14 TASS—By TASS correspondents Aleksandras Budris and Galina Vinitskaya:

The first congress of Young Communist League (YCL) organisations of Russia, the biggest Soviet Union republic, will open in Moscow on Thursday to decide whether a Communist League of Russia should be formed.

The all-union Leninist Young Communist League (VLKSM), a broad socio-political organisation of the young people of the country (31 million members), was formed in 1918. It affiliates 14 republican youth unions. The Lithuanian YCL union withdrew from VLKSM recently.

Historically, only Russia's YCL organisations have not been brought together in a republican union. On Russia's territory there over 70 territorial and regional organisations which are directly under the VLKSM Central Committee. Formation of Russia's YCL union became topical when YCL leaguers in a number of republics voiced the desire for independence. Those who favour the formation of Russia's Young Communist League Union believe that if VLKSM is transformed on the principles of federalism, Russia would badly need its youth organisation.

The process of growing national self-awareness, now under way in union republics, has also involved Russia. The young people are seeking to find such organisational forms that would best satisfy their national interests and requirements.

Though preparations for the congress began a few months ago, its delegates do not have a common opinion on a future organisation of Russia's youth.

There are people who are against formation of Russia's Young Communist League Union. They believe that a fundamentally new organisation should be formed. Some people believe that the Komsomol no longer expresses the interests of the youth and is in a deep crisis since its membership went down by 10 million in the past five years.

Others assert that in the All-Union Young Communist League there are now different trends which stand on socialist, social-democratic and other platforms. A union of independent organisations, reflecting these positions, should come in place of the Komsomol. A third group of people believe that the 21st VLKSM congress, planned for April, should make the decision on the future of the Komsomol.

The congress of YCL organisations of Russia will be held in two stages, it has been learned at the VLKSM Central Committee. The first stage will deal with the expediency of forming a new union. The second stage, after the 21st VLKSM [passage indistinct].

Eruption of Klyuchevskoy Volcano Intensifies

LD0302051490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2230 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Summary] The eruption of the Klyuchevskoy volcano, which has been going on for more than 6 months, has sharply intensified. Clouds of gas mixed with ash are rising to an altitude of up to 6-8 km. A powerful outburst of lava has been observed from a side split at a height of 4,000 m on the eastern slope of the volcano. The gas-ash cloud has reached the Commander Islands. The forests and tundra in a range of 60-80 km around the Klyuchevskoy are covered with a thick layer of volcanic ash. Specialists are monitoring the developments. In their view, there is no danger so far for the residents of nearby settlements.

Western Republics

Government Postpones Rostov AES Commissioning

LD2102235390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] Here is some information that has just reached us on the TASS teleprinters. The country's Council of Ministers has adopted a decision to postpone the commissioning of the first power set of the Rostov nuclear electric power station [AES] until an ecological study has been completed. The public has repeatedly expressed concern that the station was being built without due consideration of its unfavorable consequences for the environment. For the reactor shell has been built on the shore of the Tsimla reservoir, just a few dozen kilometers from Volgodonsk. And so an expert study has been approved. It will start in the final three months of the year.

Mogilev Region Declared Radiation 'Disaster Zone'

LD2402215890 Moscow TASS in English 2130 GMT 24 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 25 TASS—An emergency session of the Mogilev regional soviet of people's deputies has declared the Mogilev region of Soviet Belorussia a disaster zone, the newspaper IZVESTIYA said on Saturday.

The session was dominated by ways of implementing the government programme to eliminate the consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident.

The situation in radiologically contaminated areas of the Mogilev region has aggravated. The local population is determined to leave immediately, especially families with children. But, they have no place to go. Although government resolutions say it clearly how much housing should be provided for the evacuees in definite areas, the housing are without conveniences and need to be repaired. No less than 7,000 families must be resettled this year.

The deputies of the Mogilev soviet of people's deputies appealed to the current session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and its president Mikhail Gorbachev that ways to eliminate the consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant be one of the first on the agenda. They also urged the United Nations, international public and all people of good will to render any possible help to the people in the disaster area.

Protestors Make Declaration

PM2502190190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Feb 90 Morning Edition p2

[Own correspondent Mikhail Shimanskiy report under the rubric "Direct Line": "At the Public's Demand"]

[Text] Mogilev—An extraordinary session of the Mogilev Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies has resolved to declare Mogilev Oblast a disaster zone.

The session was held at the demand of the participants in large rallies held in the city. At one of these rallies, representatives of the Belorussian People's Front and USSR People's Deputy S. Gabrusev essentially delivered an ultimatum to the party and soviet leadership of the oblast and city. They are blamed for the long time it is taking to solve the problems connected with eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant [AES].

Ultimatums and impassioned rallies are far from the best way to solve such serious problems, but the people are right in many respects and you can understand how they feel.

"That is why we held the session immediately after the rallies," V. Ivanov, deputy chairman of the oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee], said. "The main item on the agenda, as the rally participants demanded, is to meet the program for eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES. In regions which have been subjected to radioactive contamination, the situation has become extremely exacerbated and the population wants to move out immediately: particularly families with children. But where are they to live? Resolutions passed by the republic's government appear to set everything out clearly: in which oblasts these people should be settled and how much housing should be allocated to them. But that is on paper: In the real world there is no such clarity. The buildings being offered to us in Vitebsk Oblast and Minsk Oblast, for example, have no amenities and are in need of serious repairs, as a rule. But this year alone we must rehouse no less than 7,000 families—approximately 15,000 people."

The session resolved to declare Mogilev Oblast an ecological and radiation disaster zone. Deputies appealed to the USSR Supreme Soviet session currently in progress and to Comrade M.S. Gorbachev with the request to make the question of eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES one of their priorities. The oblast soviet session also appealed to the United Nations, the international community, and people of goodwill to give any help they possibly can.

Chernobyl Cleanup Crew Go on Hunger Strike

LD2602032790 Kiev in English to Europe 1900 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] A two-day hunger strike has been carried out by a group of people who took part in the elimination of the after-effects of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and who underwent medical treatment at the USSR center [word indistinct] in Kiev. Our correspondent met with one of the 18 participants of the hunger strike, former miner from Donetsk, (Dmytro Horovskyy):

[Begin Horovskyy recording in Ukrainian with superimposed English translation] We decided to go on hunger strike because our demands have been disregarded, says (Dmytro Horovskyy). We demand that the leadership of the radiological center should be removed due to gross violations of the reception rules, medical check-ups and treatment of those who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl accident. We demand a better supply of medicine. Besides, we insist that all the documents pertaining to the accident should be declassified and given a proper assessment. I consider that the state should repay moral and material losses inflicted upon those who suffered as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. We also demand that the question be solved of financing those who are to undergo medical treatment at foreign clinics, said (Dmytro Horovskyy].

[Unidentified correspondent] The hunger strike has been stopped. Does that mean that your demands have been satisfied?

[(Horovskyy)] The hunger strike has been suspended because we have achieved an agreement with the leadership of the Ukraine's Council of Ministers; the minister of public health of the USSR and of the Ukraine; as well as representatives of the state commission of the USSR Council of Ministers which is to consider our most urgent demands. If our demands are not considered in the agreed- upon time, we shall resume the hunger strike, said (Dmytro Horovskyy). [end recording]

Belorussia Appeals for Aid for Chernobyl Clean-Up

LD2202212990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1920 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] Minsk, 22 Feb (TASS)—The Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Council of Ministers of Soviet Belorussia have appealed to the parliaments and governments of the world, to international organizations, to compatriots, and to all people of good will abroad to give the republic all possible assistance in its efforts to clear up the aftermath of the accident at Chernobyl atomic power station. The appeal was published in the republican press today.

The accident at Chernobyl Nuclear Electric Power Station on 26 April 1986, the document states, was a great calamity for the Belorussian people. A substantial part of the republic's territory with a population of over 2.2 million people—one fifth of the republic's total population—was subjected to varying degrees of radioactive contamination. Belorussia lost about 20 percent of its agricultural land, and many dozens of settlements no longer exist—the inhabitants are being evacuated to radiation-free areas. New patches of radiation contamination are still being discovered.

The people and government have done and are doing a lot to clear up the aftermath of this tragedy and to restore the health of those affected by the radiation. But the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster have proved to be considerably more extensive and serious than many previously thought, including even prominent scientists and specialists. Any assistance will therefore be received with great gratitude by the Belorussian people.

Red Cross To Aid Belorussian Victims

90UN0912C Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 12 Jan 90 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Experts Arrive in the Republic Again"]

[Text] A group of experts from the International Red Cross Society arrived in the republic. The object of their trip was to investigate the ecological and social conditions in the rayons affected by the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station.

Just recently the republic was acquainted with the conclusions of an authoritative commission of WHO [World Health Organization]. So what was the reason for the visit to Belorussia of this next group of specialists from various countries? L. Peresypkina, correspondent for BELTA [BELORUSSIAN TELEGRAPH AGENCY], addressed this question to Z. Pavlovich, first deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Red Cross Society Central Committee.

"The problem is that a republic-wide comprehensive program to eliminate the aftereffects of the accident is being implemented very slowly, and the psychological atmosphere in the affected rayons has become heated," explains Zinaida Andreyevna. "The USSR Red Cross Society Central Committee is receiving letters from the citizens of Gomel and Mogilev Oblasts with the request that it help heal various illnesses. This is why we turned to the International League for Humanitarian Aid. The experts' visit was also accelerated through appeals to the world community by social and religious organizations of the Belorussian SSR. And although, as we know, the International Red Cross does not render aid in the event of manmade disasters, the scale and the unprecedented nature of the Chernobyl tragedy forced them to change their policy.

The group of experts includes Mr. Kelerer, director of the Institute for Medical Radiology in the FRG, Professor Gill, leader of the department of social psychiatry in the Netherlands, and Mr. Person, representative of the Swedish Red Cross.

A meeting took place at the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers on 11 January. Afterward the experts set off for the affected rayons of Mogilev and Gomel Oblasts.

Belorussian Front's Tkachev on 25 Feb Rally

LD2602141390 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1100 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Interview with Mikhail Tkachev, deputy chairman of the Belorussian People's Front, by correspondent Algis Usas, by telephone on 26 February; Tkachev remarks in Russian throughout; place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Usas] Yesterday it was briefly reported that a mass rally took place in Minsk. It was the first time that the leaders of the people's front spoke live on Belorussian television.

Mikhail Tkachev, deputy chairman of the Belorussian People's Front, told me that yesterday's rally in Minsk only by accident coincided with rallies which took place all around the country. This rally had been planned far in advance and was organized by the People's Front. Here is M. Tkachev.

[Tkachev] We gathered outside the government building. Some estimated the crowd at 90,000, others at 100,000 and more. well, we will not argue about that. It is a fact that there has never been such a number of people taking part in a rally before. Leaders of the government and of the Communist Party were also invited and this time they came.

[Usas] Was this the first time they came?

[Tkachev] It was the first time—Sokolov, first secretary of the Central Committee; Dementey, chairman of the supreme soviet presidium; members of the government, and Central Committee secretaries.

Three sets of issues were raised at the rally: the first set concerns violation of election laws by the Central Election Commission which failed to register more than 100 people who were progressively minded candidates. [passage indistinct]

Another set of issues is connected with the Chernobyl disaster. This, first of all, concerned the inertia on the part of our government which in four years failed to put the question point blank before the all-union organs concerning the payment of R18 billion in damages.

The third set of issues is political. It is connected with the elections. This is the issue of a vote of nonconfidence in the administration of this republic. Demands were made that the administration and the central committee bureau, together with the central committee, should resign. This is one of the demands.

The second demand is to remove the party committees from enterprises, offices, organs of the procurators office and the courts, military units, and the KGB. This issue was put to the vote and it was adopted unanimously. There was also a brief resolution in support of Gdlyan and Ivanov.

[Usas] What do you think of speeches made by the leaders of the government?"

[Tkachev] Well, they were not very good. Dementey is very good at speaking anyway, this is probably a natural gift. Sokolov, I think, was somewhat confused and blurted out the wrong phrase and, in general, he was given a rather cool reception.

[Usas] So, there was no dialogue.

[Tkachev] No dialogue took place. He was asked when the people's front would be registered, to which he said that he does not deal with this matter. Asked when this problem would be solved, he said that this issue was included in the agenda of the Supreme Soviet session. And you know this is question No. 21 on the agenda. Then, since there was no direct television or radio broadcast, a decision was adopted to proceed in a column to the television building and remain there until the resolution is broadcast on television for the whole republic. We all went there and our request was complied with.

[Usas] did any talks and debates take place?

[Tkachev] There were talks. They took a long time, but finally they agreed.

[Usas] Do you think the television management adopted the decision?

[Tkachev] It was not without their participation, of course, because while talks were taking place they considered what to do. They allowed our people 20 -25 minutes [words indistinct] then they said that continuation would take place in one and a half hours [words indistinct] Then Sokolov and others spoke. Then [name indistinct] said that the republic's leadership has become more sensitive, and we will [words indistinct].

[Usas] And what do you think [words indistinct] what prospects?

[Tkachev] It was demonstrated that the people are maturing in front of our eyes. There were no incidents, although party organs were spreading fear the night before that there would be pogroms, there would be hooligans, etc. There were virtually no offences. The National Front officials were patrolling together with the militia and everything was normal. And what happens next? We will see. The pre-election work is coming to an end. The elections take place on 4 March. We will see what happens. We would like to have a good parliament. So far we do not have [word indistinct]

Registration for Belorussian Elections Completed

LD1002112490 Minsk Domestic Service in Belorussian 0515 GMT 22 Jan 90

[Summary] Registration of candidates who will run in the forthcoming elections to republican and local soviets has been completed. The breakdown of the seats to the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet is as follows: 50 seats have been allocated for public organizations; in 283 constituencies, two or more candidates will compete for election; and in 27 constituencies, only one candidate will stand.

The lower the standing of the elective body, the less competition there will be. the ballots for oblast soviets will contain 1.6 candidates per seat; for rayon soviets, 1.4 candidates; for settlements' soviets, 1.3; and for rural soviets, 1.2.

Belorussian Candidates' Registration Viewed

PM1602145590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by own correspondent M. Shimanskiy: "Belorussia: Results of Registration Summed Up"]

[Text] A routine session of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Central Electoral Commission named the candidate deputies to the republican and local soviets.

There were 1,680 candidate people's deputies nominated for the 310 territorial okrugs. A further 50 deputies' seats, as is well known, were assigned to four republican public organizations—the Council of War and Labor Veterans and the societies for invalids and the blind and deaf. But 1,473 candidates were registered—207 fewer than were nominated. This is explained by the fact that in individual cases there were violations of the law on elections and some contenders withdraw their candidacies themselves and, finally, some candidates were nominated in two or several okrugs. There are 73 candidates registered for the 50 seats from public organizations.

Nonetheless, on 4 March, on election day, the Belorussian voters will indeed have the opportunity to choose—about five people are laying claim to each deputy's seat. Who are they, the contenders to the republic's parliament? Over 88 percent were not deputies of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet of the current convocation. The parliament will thus be radically renewed. The majority of candidates are representatives of the material production sphere. There are more lawyers and economists among them than ever before.

Only seven percent of the registered candidates are workers. Women are represented by the same number. Party workers account for 10 percent of those registered and soviet workers for only seven percent.

But what is the situation in those okrugs where the republic's leaders are running? Ye. Sokolov, first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee, has been registered for Stolinskiy Electoral Okrug No. 139, Brest Oblast. His rival is M. Skulovets, deputy chairman of a local collective farm and agricultural firm. M. Kovalev, chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers, is also registered in the Brest region—V. Kalluar, chief animal technician at the local collective farm named for Masherov, is fighting him for the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet seat. In 14 okrugs only one candidate has been registered and in 52 okrugs two candidates.

But how keen will the struggle be for deputies' seats in the local soviets? There are 3,541 candidates registered for the 1,339 seats in the oblast soviets—about three contenders for each seat. There are slightly more than two candidates for each city soviet seat. For the rayon and rural soviets there is virtually one candidate per seat.

I asked I. Likhach, secretary of the Central Electoral Commission for the election of Belorussian SSR people's deputies, to comment on the results of the registration.

"Nonetheless," Ivan Vasilyevich says, "there is serious competition for the republic's parliament—two-thirds of the okrugs have 4-18 candidates per seat. A keen election struggle lies ahead here. The same may be said of the situation regarding the elections to the local and city soviets. As for the rural and settlement soviets here, as we can see, the choice is not great. The main reason is that to this day no law has been adopted on local self-management and the local economy which should clearly outline all questions concerning local organs of state power. There is no law and no one knows what real power the rural soviet and rayon soviet executive committee, for instance, will have. I think the second region is an objective one: The okrugs in these soviets are small and voters know people well and have often stopped at one candidate at the nomination."

Belorussian Election Commission Criticized

90UN0943A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 19 Jan 90 p 1

[Article by S. Shushkevich, USSR people's deputy: "Is the Commission Violating the Law?"]

[Text] The Central Commission for the Election of People's Deputies from the BSSR [Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic] distributed a new publication among the district and territorial election commissions. The publication bears the title: "On Some Problems in the Work of the District and Territorial Election Commissions for the Election of People's Deputies from the BSSR and of People's Deputies from the Local Soviets of the BSSR."

Officially this document is neither "instructions", "recommendations", nor "directions", but in reality it reads like instructions which is exactly how it is treated by the local commissions. Some provisions of the document show that the Central Commission assumed certain rights which were not given to it by the Law on Elections. For instance, the commission took upon itself to create some legal regulations, i.e. rules of action mandatory for all citizens and state and public organizations. According to our constitution such regulations may be set only by the organs of state power and state control. The Central Commission is no such organ.

The Law on Elections has been considerably "amended" by the provision on the location of candidates' nominations. Here is its full text: "It should be taken into account that candidates for people's deputies should be nominated, as a rule, from citizens either working or living on the territory of the corresponding electoral district. Meanwhile, candidates for people's deputies of the BSSR and for people's deputies of the local soviets can be nominated from Belorussian citizens whose **official or public activity covers, respectively, the entire republic**, oblast, rayon, or city. In this case the nomination does not depend on where they live or where their place of work is located."

The Law on Elections says that **"candidates for people's deputies can be nominated from the citizens who, as a rule, work or live on the territory of the corresponding electoral district"**. The law obviously recommends ("as a rule") that candidates for deputies be nominated according to their places of work or residence. The Central Commission, in its turn, forbids the nomination of (and, naturally, contrary to the law, it will refuse to register) candidates for deputies from people whose activity, in the opinion of the Central Commission, does not cover the neighboring territory. And in Minsk that can be the next street! As a result, the district limits, defined by approximately equal numbers of voters, are elevated to the rank of fences which "outside" candidates cannot jump over.

This is the way the Central Commission interprets an article of a limiting character and therefore alters the Law on Elections. In essence, the commission declares that public recognition cannot serve as the reason for nominating any person as a candidate for people's deputy in an area other than the one where he works or resides. According to the commission this recognition should be reinforced by the person's official position, or membership in a republican artistic organization.

I want to cite another example of the Central Commission's rather free interpretation of the law. It is stated on page five of the above mentioned publication that nominating meetings at places of work are to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Law "On the Collectives of Workers and Their Increased Participation in Managing Enterprises, Organizations, and Institutions." The Law on Elections does not have this requirement. It was arbitrarily inserted by the Central Commission.

The Law on Elections does not set any regulations as to the quorum of workers' meetings and conferences at which candidates for deputies are nominated. The publication of the Central Election Commission stipulates that a meeting can be considered competent if its participants number more than half of the total working force of the enterprise; a conference should have not less than two thirds of the delegates present for the same purpose.

Meanwhile, to provide the required quorum of two thirds for a conference is a lot more difficult, clearly, at big enterprises than it is at meetings in comparatively small organizations. This seemingly harmless decision became a serious discriminatory measure when applied to such forces of thousands of employees as the Belorussian State University.

Whether it wanted to or not, the Central Election Commission exceeded its authority as described in Article 21 of the Law on the Elections of People's Deputies to the Belorussian Local Soviets of People's Deputies. The annoying mistakes should be corrected immediately.

Belorussian United Nations Association Formed

LD2702091690 Moscow TASS in English 0811 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Text] Minsk February 27 TASS—An United Nations association has been formed in Belorussia.

Belorussia, a United Nations founder, has been a permament and fully-fledged member of the organisation since 1945. It is a signatory of many international agreements promoting the consolidation of peace, disarmament, peaceful uses of outer space and international cooperation, including uin the sphere of human rights.

Vladimir Labynov, member of Belorussia's Academy of Science and Soviet people's deputy, was elected chairman of the association board.

Ukraine Party Plenum Speech Highlighted

LD2302121590 Kiev in English to North America 0030 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] The full-scale meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine in Kiev has centered attention on the present situation in this republic. Here are highlights from the speech there by the first secretary of the Central Committee, Vladimir Ivashko.

[Ivashko in Ukrainian with superimposed English report] The controversy of social and political processes becomes ever more evident, Vladimir Ivashko is saying. The situation has become seriously tense, and people are deeply concerned with the instability in our society, the signs of extremist activities, as well as the growing national intolerance and that based on religious grounds. The territorial integrity of the Ukraine is under threat. The forces of destruction speak in full voice of themselves, those who resort to all kinds of disgraceful attacks on the Communist Party and socialism. They have organized themselves for a concerted action against the government, and even declare concrete dates for their undermining actions. The social and psychological climate is being also negatively influenced by poor management, the growing lack of goods, inflation, and the black market, said Vladimir Ivashko.

All the speakers at the full-scale meeting pointed to the complicated situation which emerged in social, economic, and political spheres. The members of the Central Committee did not just state facts, but tried to analyze the political situation. Next is the opinion expressed by Leonid Kravchuk, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine:

[Kravchuk in Ukrainian with superimposed English report] The five years of perestroyka have given us a rich social experience. We have acquired new knowledge of society and have felt the complexity of perestroyka. Now we observe a certain phenomenon: the people do not want to live the way they did earlier, but they also do not want to live the way they live now. Is that proof that policy of perestroyka is at a deadlock? Hardly, although we've made quite a few mistakes over this period. I think the clue lies elsewhere. There is growing disbelief among the people and concern as to whether the bodies of authority on the top and on the lower level are capable of ensuring perestroyka, of making an elementary clean-up in our own house. This means we should act resolutely and consistently in the mainstream of the democratic process, because no authority can expect support if it's unable to ensure law and order and protect its own subjects, said Leonid Kravchuk.

So where's the way out of this situation? Here's an opinion to this effect by Anatoliy Merkulov, who talked with Radio Kiev's correspondent in between the sittings of the plenum.

[Merkulov in Ukrainian with superimposed English report] Here at the plenum quite interesting proposals are made. The main idea is to restore order in our own house, says Anatoliy Merkulov. At present, members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, both party members and nonaffiliated people, new public organizations come out for Ukraine's independence, economic and political independence in paticular. What do we need it for? We need it to make the life of the Ukrainian people better. But, this is not an easy task. We must improve our legislation because our republic is connected with other republics by numerous treaties, joint enterprises, and many other ties. There are quite a few problems. Today's full-scale meeting will, to a certain extent, elucidate these problems, but there is still much to be done. As a worker of the Central Committee apparatus, I would like to say that we now work on these problems. As far as the department of foreign relations is concerned, which I lead, we now seriously work on questions of Ukraine's political and economic sovereignty, and we want to propose our variant of approaches toward these issues t the coming plenum at which the platform of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party will be discussed, said Anatoliy Merkulov.

The plenum participants appealed to all the Communists of Ukraine not to wait for directions from the authorities, but solve problems on the spot without saying that nonconformist or some other public and political organizations stay in the wing. Here's what Konstantin Kondratyuk, secretary of the party committee of the Lvov University, said in this connection:

[Kondratyuk in Ukrainian with superimposed English report] I work and live in the student environment, and our region is very peculiar with the problems which come up historically. Our regional city and district party committees are trying to avoid hard-line policy, and we feel that this is the way out of difficult situations. I think we can find common language with alternative political groups. Today, I ask myself what is to be done and what is the historic future of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Or can the party count on a political future at all? I think the party has a future, but only in the way of further democratization and renovation, said Konstantin Kondratyuk.

The plenum participants adopted a number of resolutions aimed at stabilizing political situation in the republic, easing tensions and instability.

Donetsk Rally Threatens 'Political Strike'

PM1402093390 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 8 Feb 90 p 1

["Our correspondent" V. Kosyak report: "Rally in Donetsk"]

[Text] A rally involving many thousands of people was held yesterday evening on the square in front of the

Donetsk Oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee]. The reason for the explosion of indignation among the townspeople was a local television report from the footwear association base, where imported output worth more than 10 million rubles was stored. The rally participants demanded that the entire obkom [oblast party committee] resign, A.Ya. Vinnik, USSR people's deputy and obkom first secretary, be recalled, and Sinyukov, oblast prosecutor, and Shaposhnikov, editor of the evening newspaper, be relieved of their posts. If these demands are not met by 4 March, the provisional committee monitoring fulfillment of the rally's resolution assumed the authority to declare a political strike in the city.

Ukraine Popular Movement Sponsors Kiev Rally

LD2502205190 Kiev in English to Europe 1900 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Text] A multithousand rally was held in Kiev today, upon the call of the Popular Movement of the Ukraine for Perestroyka [Rukh], which was also dedicated to the upcoming elections on March the fourth.

Today's meeting was one of the largest among all the meetings held in Kiev upon the initiative of the Popular Movement of the Ukraine. Taking part in it were some 100,000 Kievans and guests of the city. Members of almost all public organizations and associations; representatives of different nationalities; prominent men of science, culture, and the arts; as well as leaders of the city's party organization; spoke at the meeting.

People's Front Interrupt Yedinstvo's Rally

LD0602115190 Moscow World Service in Russian 1040 GMT 6 Feb 90

[From the "INTERFAX" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program]

[Text] On Sunday, Yedinstvo, the Russophone internationalist movement of Moldavia, staged a sanctioned rally in Kishinev devoted to the upcoming elections to the republican legislature and local authorities. Yedinstvo's candidates put forward their election platforms at the rally. However, it was not possible to carry the meeting through to its conclusion because of the actions of extremist groups from the People's Front of Moldavia.

Local Party Resignation Demands Analyzed

PM2302100790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent N. Mironov under the "Party Life: Notes Apropos" rubric: "Do Not Quit the Battle"]

[Text] Dnepropetrovsk—Not a day has passed of late without a new demand for the "resignation" of a party obkom [oblast committee] or gorkom [city committee] being made at another, often unauthorized rally. Seen at first as extraordinary events, these ultimatums have seemingly ceased to surprise us and now all we do is worry who is next. In the Ukraine they say someone is already marking the map. Remember, the way they recorded the troops' advance during the war: Ivano-Frankovsk, Chernovtsy, Donetsk, Voroshilovgrad... The hand is now poised over Dnepropetrovsk.

It is a very easy process, a tried and tested scenario. A rally is held, an angry resolution is put forward, there is a vote—and that's that. Whether this reflects the opinion of the majority of working people no one asks, for some reason.

But why is power being surrendered without a fight? Anyone who still has a party card in his pocket should be asking this question now. It would be stupid to blame everyone, en masse, for the economic, social, ecological, and other problems. It is more sensible to analyze everything and find out the names of the real culprits and adopt the relevant measures. For example, when a leader has behaved dishonorably, a demand for his resignation is understandable. But what if the talk about malfeasance is just idle rumor? Often the strident calls for someone's removal conceal crude falsification of the facts.

Recently rally participants in Dneprodzerzhinsk demanded the resignation of the party gorkom, saying that it was not in control of the situation. They suggested that the gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] chairman and the prosecutor should go too. The surge of emotion was due to a Central Television program called "Sergey Konev's Deputy's Values." The speakers at the rally took a peculiar view of the account of their deputy, seeing it largely as a... provocation by the party organs. The situation was aggravated by all the other things—ecological issues, empty store shelves, and so on.

Were there grounds for serious charges against certain party and economic leaders? There were, when you remember how S. Konev was elected people's deputy. But, at the same time, there was no reason to lay literally all the blame at the door of the current city leadership, which, apparently, has been operating for "a week short of a year" and was unable to exercise a significant influence on the last election campaign. Moreover, the arrival of the new leadership was effectively engineered by all the alternative forces. So to accuse everyone of "intrigues" against S. Konev is not entirely fair, to put it mildly.

This conflict has another, equally important aspect. The offending program is just one "outside" opinion. Criticism that helps each of us to become better. If you think about it, it could play a positive role, because it has revealed flaws in work, which should have been eliminated. It is a perfectly natural process of polemics, leading to a quest for the truth. But at the moment there are very many "lovers of the truth" who will exploit every opportunity of furthering their own ends.

Unfortunately, the rally in Dneprodzerzhinsk was no exception. Last Saturday there was an authorized rally in

Dnepropetrovsk as well. Dissatisfaction with the way perestroyka is going led again to resignation demands. Speakers talked about abuse of power, about the abolition of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, and about the "apparatus' machinations." All these claims could have been rebutted. In fact, the rally took place after the CPSU Central Committee February plenum, at which the question of Article 6 had already been resolved. Indeed, the "abuse" charges were being made at the "level of unsubstantiated rumor."

But I think the danger lies elsewhere. When rally participants listen closely to some people and shut others up, it is, of course, not a desire to ascertain the truth, but a desire to sling mud. Just try to wash it off afterwards. The logic is simple: If only one can get on top today, it will all be clear afterwards.

Why, then, is all this happening? Why are many party leaders unable to make themselves heard? Let us not try to justify their inertia by citing the difficult economic situation. This is axiomatic. The point is that there is a political struggle. But are they ready for it, those who continue to occupy party positions? Although most of the leaders were elected recently, rather than 20 years ago. V. Sutulov, city soviet chairman in Dneprodzerzhinsk, has been in the job for only six weeks. In Dnepropetrovsk Oblast 80 percent of secretaries of party organizations at all levels have been replaced in the past year. Does this mean that they have been a disappointment?

Let us hear what the party workers directly involved in the selection and placement of cadres have to say about it. I believe their thoughts on the subject today, on the threshold of the 28th Party Congress, will shed light on the reasons for their helplessness.

"I am asked why not all party workers are actively involved in the political struggle," Zaporozhye Party Gorkom First Secretary P. Vanat said. "My answer is: Often they try to be someone they are not. The hierarchical atmosphere in which the party worker continued to find himself prevented him from demonstrating his creative potential and fighting qualities. His personality did not develop. And the party worker has so much work to do. He is snowed under from morning until night."

"To be frank, it is very hard to meet a party secretary whom people appreciate," L. Topyuk, director of the Dnepropetrovsk Party Obkom Political Education Center, said. "This is basically because when people select cadres they are looking for someone like them. Rarely will a top-level party worker allow someone more knowledgeable and more capable to take his place alongside him."

The main selection principle is "do as I say," that is, carry out the senior comrade's orders. This "guideline" is intended for a silent audience. But when the audience is in turmoil and there are no guidelines from on high, is there nothing to say?

"The dwindling activity of local party workers is due to a loss of belief in the correctness of the decisions that are being taken," Dnepropetrovsk Party Obkom First Secretary N. Omelchenko complained. "Too many of them were not thought through and were rather hasty."

There is little point in relying on the party worker's influence on people's minds, Nikolay Grigoryevich concludes from this. This sounds strange. The reference to vindicating circumstances is not very convincing, in our view. It is time we restructured ourselves and started to act on the basis of current realities. The situation is changing daily and party workers ought not to be waiting for "instructions."

The lack of professionalism is an impediment when dealing with real life. Particularly in unplanned meetings with the people. What you need then is willpower, tenacity, and belief that the party's cause is the right one. It does not matter where the meeting is taking place—in the shop, in a field, at a rally. No one has any problem today knowing who is who. The people are sufficiently politicized. And they will regard as right not those who "win" right now, but those who try to defend the truth, who fight for it in any, even unfavorable, circumstances. In the end emotions will give way to reason and honor.

Let us go back to the rally in Dnepropetrovsk the other day. One of the points of the resolution was lack of confidence in the party obkom and gorkom, and also a demand to liquidate party rayon committees in the oblast's cities and party committees at enterprises. Do these demands express the opinion of the majority of the population? Judging by the fact that the rally had dwindled to one-third of its original size by the end, they do not. And we do not know how the people will view the meeting participants' demands, published in the press, tomorrow, when the effect of the orgy of words has worn off. If the city's Communists fail to react to the ultimatum by taking concrete action and fail to demonstrate that they are still entitled to be the leading force in the city and oblast, they will have to resign. But if... No, they must not quit without a fight. They must not surrender!

Dnepropetrovsk Obkom Plenum Discusses Situation

LD2202222190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Report by correspondent Gennadiy Klimov]

[Text] In Dnepropetrovsk, an extraordinary plenum of the oblast party committee discussed the sociopolitical situation in the oblast and the task of communists that emerged from the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th Party Congress. Our correspondent Gennadiy Klimov reports.

[Klimov] The plenum was occasioned by the events occurring in the oblast. At recent rallies in Dnepropetrovsk, Dneprodzerzhinsk, Pavlograd, and Novomoskovsk, there was sharp discussion of economic, social, political, and ecological problems. Resolutions from the rallies expressed mistrust of party bodies, city and oblast party committees.

Assessing the situation, Nikolay Kuzmich Zadoya, first secretary of the oblast party committee, said in his speech at the plenum:

[Begin Zadoya recording] The sociopolitical situation in the oblast is largely determined by the situation that is developing throughout the country as a whole. Moreover, it is being openly fanned by visiting emissaries, by the distribution of samizdat publications, and by open calls for confrontation. Unfortunately, neither the CPSU Central Committee nor the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party are offering firm resistance to such phenomena. At the same time, it has to be acknowledged that the processes taking place in the oblast have brought to light the inability of quite a large number of the staff in party committees, and communist leaders heading labor collectives, ideological organizations and institutions, to provide an objective analysis of the situation, to listen sensitively and to express people's opinions, and to devise the strategy and tactics of party political work, and suitable conditions for the sharp politicization of the masses. [end recording]

[Klimov] The rapporteur and other speakers at the plenum spoke of the inconsistency of pary bodies in relations with informal organizations and with the most powerful of them, RUKH. A great deal is now being said about the shaken authority of the party. But here are some facts that I find interesting. They were cited at the plenum. Last year, over 1,000 now former communists left the oblast party organization, but 5,500 persons joined the CPSU during that difficult time for the country and the party. At the microphone is (Anatoliy Vasilyevich Starozhuk), an operator at the Krivorozhstal combine and chairman of the labor collective council.

[Begin (Starozhuk) recording] Comrades, there is no need to wait for any instructions from above. Among ourselves, in the region, right here in the oblast, we have to make our own decisions depending on what the situation demands. [end recording]

[Klimov] The plenum's decision contains a call to consolidate the forces of perestroyka and outlines measures to invigorate the work of party organizations in preparation for the 28th CPSU Congress.

Kishinev Rally Eases Tension in Republic

PM1402100190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Own correspondent Eduard Kondratov dispatch under the "Direct Link" rubric: "Without Confrontation"]

[Text] Kishinev—Last Sunday's republicwide assembly of voters here, the "Grand National Assembly" as its organizers called it, proved that the clouds on Moldavia's sociopolitical horizon are now noticeably thinner. Speaking on television two days before the assembly, People's Front leader I. Khadyrke called on all working people in the republic to attend, regardless of nationality or membership of whichever social groups. According to my rough estimates, about 70,000 persons responded, many of them arriving from Moldavia's outlying cities and villages.

The republic assembly of voters began with a benediction by USSR People's Deputy Archpriest P. Buburuz. It seemed to set the tone for the subsequent proceedings: Despite a certain political sharpness in many speeches, the overall tone of what was said by orators in more than four hours was amicable. On this occasion the thousands-strong mass did not slight those it disliked or hiss them off the rostrum, and the event proceeded without the chanting of "Down!" which has become grievously typical of Kishinev. Judging by the approval shown by those assembled for the speeches by P. Luchinskiy, first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, and M. Snegur, chairman of the Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, the majority of the republic's population is now tightly embracing the ideas of interethnic consolidation. Very many people—representatives of villages and towns, of different social movements and societies, including ethnic ones like Bulgarian, Gagauz, and Jewish—spoke from the rostrum about the need for compromises, for the rallying of all of society's healthy forces around the specific tasks of perestroyka.

Naturally, there was no shortage of orators representing the Moldavian People's Front [MPF], which organized the assembly and is the largest social movement in Moldavia today. The MPF is seriously banking on the forthcoming elections to the republic's Supreme Soviet and to local soviets. Without listing all points of the MPF program, let me just say that it contains neither demands for Moldavia's secession from the USSR nor restrictions on anyone's civic rights.

A few days beforehand the MPF program was harshly criticized by the press and at a rally of the "Yedinstvo" International Movement. But this occasion did not produce any opponents of the MPF, despite the fact that some far from indisputable ideas were voiced from the rostrum about renaming the Supreme Soviet "Sfatul Tseriy," creating a Moldavian Communist Party independent of the CPSU, and reviewing interrepublic borders.

When I called the Moldavian SSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] duty officer Monday morning, I found out that Sunday evening produced no excesses, either. Does this mean that the standards of meetings in Moldavia are rising before our very eyes? Or is it simply a question of people becoming increasingly convinced that endlessly rejecting things and overthrowing people is not at all the way to emerge from the crisis? I should probably stick to what I know for sure: The tremendous work done by the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium under its chairman to prepare this impressive assembly jointly with the People's Front yielded its fruit—it eased the tension with which Sunday's events were awaited by millions of the republic's residents who yearn for stability and calm.

Caucasus

Protest From Armenian Religious Leader Reported

PM2302203390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Sergey Bablumyan dispatch: "Caution: Fake"]

[Text] Yerevan—According to S. Vartanyan, chairman of the Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers Council for Armenian Church Affairs, a fake document attributed to Vazgen I, Catholicos of All Armenia, is being circulated in Krasnodar Kray, Stavropol Kray, and Rostov Oblast.

The proclamation refers to certain territorial claims by the Armenians and contains a crude attack against the Russian population.

Catholicos Vazgen I has sent a telegram to the chairmen of the kray and oblast soviet executive committees in Krasnodar, Stavropol, and Rostov-na-Donu, saying the following:

"According to our information, false proclamations bearing my signature and of a clearly provocative nature have been circulated recently. Unscrupulous people who are trying to set the Russian population against Armenians living in the region do not balk at the most foul lies in order to achieve their base objectives.

"The Armenian people can only feel sincere gratitude toward all Russians in your region, who have received our sons and daughters—forced by the will of fate to leave their own country—into their families. Considering the complexity of the situation and in order to avoid possible unpleasantnesses, I ask that our sense of outrage at this base provocation be conveyed to broad public opinion through the mass media, together with my Christian blessing to all people living in your region.

"With heartfelt wishes of peace, goodness, and happiness."

Armenian Catholicos Says 'Lies' Being Spread

LD2302173290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1615 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow 23 Feb. (TASS)—Vazgen I, catholicos of All the Armenians, has called the lies that are being distributed with his signature appended in Krasnoyarsk and Stavropol Krays and Rostov Oblast in the Northern Causcasus "low caliber provocation." The proclamation speaks of certain territorial claims by the Armenians and contains crude attacks on the Russian population. Vagzen I has sent a cable to the chairmen of the kray and oblast soviets of Krasnodar, Stavropol, and Rostov-na-Donu, which was published in Moscow's IZVESTIYA newpaper today. "People without a conscience who are endeavoring to play the Russian population off against the Armenians who live in the Kray do not balk at the most foul lies in order to achieve their vile objectives," says the cable.

"The Armenian people can only have an attitude of sincere gratitude toward the Russian people of your kray, who took its sons and daughters into its own family when fate willed that they were obliged to quit their land. Taking into account how complex the situation is and to avoid possible unpleasantness, I am asking that, via the mass media, our indignation at this low-caliber provocation is brought to broad public awareness and my Christian blessing is conveyed to all those who live in your kray."

Railway Official on Transcaucasia Blockade

LD2302164390 Moscow TASS in English 1625 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 23 TASS—After a 42-day break brought about by blockades by local militants, goods traffic was resumed on Azerbaijani and Transcaucasian railways on Wednesday evening. Since that time 17 trains (a total of 785 carriages) have passed on the Baku-Megri-Dzhulfa-Yerevan railway, Soviet Deputy Minister of Railways Leonid Pingarev told journalists today.

He said, however, that the situation on Transcaucasian railways continues to be difficult and unstable. Baku-Yerevan and Yerevan-Kafan passenger traffic is at a standstill.

One hundred and fifty six trains (about 9,000 carriages) with goods bound for Armenia are held up on Azerbaijani railway. Eleven and a half thousand freight cars needed by Azerbaijani industrial enterprises are detained on its territory, and several thousand more —at other railways.

Forced breaks in Transcaucasian railway traffic is inflicting serious damage on the economy of the region and the country in general. In January and during the first 17 days of February each of the two republics, Azerbaijan and Armenia, failed to receive two million tonnes of goods, including thousands of tonnes of food and fuel.

According to Pingarev, the losses of the Soviet Ministry of Railways amounted to 500 million roubles in 1989 and 200 million roubles in the current year because of many breaks in railway traffic.

The unstable situation on the Transcaucasian railways is hampering the transportation of goods to Iran. Thirty six trains (2,200 carriages) are being held up in the Dzhulfa border station. Traffic jams delay the loading of goods bound both for Iran and Azerbaijan. Some 200,000 tonnes of grain bound for Iran has been held up at the new Tallinn Port.

The Ministry of Railways is doing its utmost to overcome the present difficulties, Pingarev said. The ministry repetedly urged Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders to normalise the situation on the railways.

Rail Traffic Between Azerbaijan, Armenia Resuming

LD2702033190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2230 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] Rail traffic from Azerbaijan to Armenia is getting going. As reported by Dayan, deputy chairman of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic Council of Ministers, at the IZVESTIYA correspondents' center, over the last few days 10 or 12 trains and more than 570 railcars have been passing daily through Norashen situated at the junction of Armenia and Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. On the whole, throughout the republic, 1,200 rail cars a day are arriving, carrying various cargoes—foodstuffs, construction materials, fuel. First of all, this is all delivered to the disaster zone where the forced interruption in construction work has put it behind schedule.

Movement in Stepanakert Railway Station Detailed

NC2402165690 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] An Azerinform correspondent has reported from Stepanakert that the agreement between the local railway workers and their colleagues in the other sections of the railway network in Azerbaijan has contributed to settling many problems related to supplying vital materials to the people of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. The agreement, which was reached through (?efforts) by the rayon's state of emergency military headquarters and the republic's organization committee for the NKAO, has increased the supply of provisions, petroleum products, construction material, and [word indistinct] to the autonomous oblast.

At the Stepanakert railway station, an Azerinform correspondent was informed that more than 600 freight cars were brought to the station since the movement began three weeks ago. Half of them contained the most necessary freight. A certain output has been attained in [words indistinct], loading products, and arranging freight cars. Nevertheless, regardless of how effective these results are, the railway workers' output is lower than what was planned.

Piling freight cars on the railway station's tracks is obstructing full restoration of work. Experts believe that clearing these tracks is possible and essential. These obstructions must be cleared, and removing the main obstacle depends on those who receive the freight. It is their fault that freight cars full of provisions wait to be unloaded daily.

Major [name indistinct], military commandant of the railway station, and Ayubov, deputy head of the Azerbaijan railways network who is at the railway station to help the commandant, believe that the loaded freight cars obstruct the arrival of other loaded freight cars. The loaded trains on the tracks are negatively affecting loading and unloading freight cars, and they also impede their movement and render the collective's work difficult. [Words indistinct] and other vehicles are also slowing things down. They are not being dispatched from the railway station on time.

The level of mechanization of loading and unloading freight must be upgraded as soon as possible in order to speed up train movement, and the railway workers must be given the necessary technical means. This has been discussed for a long time, but according to Shahzadov, director of the railway station, the matter has not been resolved. The leading officials of the Gendzha department of the Azerbaijan railways network must consider the problem.

Hundreds of Trains Still Idle in Azerbaijan

LD1602224490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2135 GMT 10 Feb 90

[From the "Television News Service"]

[Text] As before, hundreds of trains are idle on the Azerbaijan railway. However, with the aid of the military, today the first freight train was nevertheless dispatched. [video shows railway station, soldiers and civilians talking]

Armenian Railways Official on Continuing Blockade

NC2302124790 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1900 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Report by correspondent Sevata Kazaryan—recorded]

[Text] [Kazaryan] Armenia is facing virtual economic collapse because of the blockade. The supply programs for consumers within and without the republic have failed.

The question of the blockade was raised at the country's highest legislative bodies many times and consigned to oblivion as many times. When the Congress of USSR People's Deputies was discussing the problem of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO], it took cognizance of the statement by the chairman of Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet to the effect that the blockade would be ended. The question arises: If the highest state authority in Azerbaijan cannot fulfill its promise, then how can the USSR Supreme Soviet demand that the people of the NKAO abide by its decisions?

As you already know, a decision was finally adopted at the USSR Supreme Soviet session last year. However, Azerbaijan's blockade of Armenia continues. The same grave situation today prevails in the railways. Here is

Avag Khachaturyan, secretary of the party committee at the Yerevan railways branch:

[Khachaturyan] The blockade of Armenia by Azerbaijan began last August. All roads were totally closed by September and this situation continued for nearly two months. A new blockade started in January. No trains from Azerbaijan have entered through Norashen station since 11 January. The "Vremya" program again reported misleading information. It claimed that the blockade would be lifted on (?13) February, but there was no change. A section of blockaded road was suddenly opened to coincide with the USSR Supreme Soviet session. Now that the USSR Supreme Soviet session has begun, a few trains have been let through Idzhevan since 13 February. However, I could say that [words indistinct]. The difficulty is that it is hard to send these trains on to Yerevan and to the disaster zone immediately [passage indistinct]. Tens of thousands of freight cars loaded with foodstuffs and other materials are stranded on Azerbaijani territory and are being pillaged.

I returned from the NKAO just three days ago. A tough military regime is in force there. Soldiers inspect passports at every step. Today, the NKAO is deprived of its leadership and there is a martial law situation. The question arises: When a severe state of emergency is in operation there, why is the same thing not happening on Azerbaijani territory? Why was the Agdam-Shusha road opened with the help of troops, but no attempt made to open the Stepanakert-Goris road despite the fact that the NKAO has been under blockade for two years?

[Kazaryan] The inescapable conclusion is that laws are not being enforced in our country. Whose job is it to consider this situation and who must be held responsible for this?

North Caucasian Railway Damaged by Blockade

LD1202203990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 12 Feb 90

[Video report on the North Caucasian Railway by Fesunenko and A. Abramenko; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Fesunenko] In our boundless country things are so interrelated, so bound up with one another, that faults and problems arising somewhere in one region can have a most direct and unfavorable effect on a neighbor's state of afairs. Here, for example, is how harshly the continuing blockade of the Azerbaijan Railway is affecting the North Caucasian Railway. Over 100 freight trains have already built up and are at a standstill around Rostov.

[Abramenko] The fact that thousands of railcars have ground to a halt on various sections of the railway, together with freight including equipment, fuel, construction materials, and foodstuffs, is only one aspect of the losses. The other is related to the fact that, as we know, the Azerbaijan Railway is only accepting freight intended for its own republic. Bearing this in mind, here at the North Caucasian Railway, there are being forced to do extra work, resorting freight that is arriving and forming special trains. Daily work by thousands of people that is paid for by no one. According to calculations by economists, under conditions of financial autonomy, each person engaged in this operation is already losing about R30 per month.

[F.M. Kotlyarenko, head of the North Caucasian Railway] In actual fact, we are barely earning enough to cover wages. At present, there are approximately 17,000 railcars on our railway. Yesterday, we handed on to Transcaucasia only 2,150 railcars. Only freight for Azerbaijan and for Georgia are moving and all the rest is coming to a halt on the railway.

[Abramenko] One should probably add to the railways's overall and uncompensated losses the thefts from abandoned trains which have recently become more frequent. The trend is such that, whereas last year the value of stolen goods amounted to a little under R3 million, in January of this year alone, it has already exceeded R1 million.

[Kotlyarenko] Thus, this problem really has to be solved. Otherwise, it is not only our collective that is having to put up with such losses. In actual fact, our whole social program this year has been ruined, it has all been ruined. The economy of the country as a whole suffers from this, not to mention Armenia or the Transcaucasian republics.

Explosives Discovered in Rail Tunnel in Armenia

NC2702113690 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Excerpt] The Armenian Republic's Internal Affairs Ministry presented its log to the 22 February Operational Staff meeting, and the log discloses two serious incidents. First, nearly 700 kg of explosives with a fuse attached were found in the railway tunnel bordering Azerbaijan near Megri. One can just imagine what a huge subversive act has been prevented. Second, unidentified persons launched an armed attack on the Artashatskiy Rayon Department of the Internal Affairs Ministry and tried to seize the radio. Resolute measures have been taken to prevent such acts. [passage omitted]

Smyslov Warns Against Meetings, Demonstrations

NC2502060290 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0430 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Unscheduled notice by Lieutenant General Smyslov, military commandant of Baku City—read by announcer]

[Text] We remind citizens once again that in view of the state of emergency, the mass meetings, demonstrations, and rallies in the city are categorically banned. Serious measures will be taken by the law enforcement organizations against these activities.
Lieutenant General Smyslov, Baku City Military Commandant.

Security To Be Tightened in Baku From 28 Feb

NC2702102190 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Notice by the military commandant of Baku City—read by announcer]

[Text] In view of the appeals made by the citizens of Baku, the arrival of vehicles from other cities in the capital for the mourning ceremonies on 2 March will be seriously restricted as of 28 February in order to prevent a complicated situation from emerging. Reinforced military units will be deployed on the roads and in the railway transportation network, and other operative measures will be put into effect to maintain the security of the citizens.

I urge the sovereignty organs in the rayons and the leading officials of the establishments and administrations not to send the vehicles under their authority to Baku during this period. The residents of the suburbs of Baku and the residents of the republic's rayons should not be allowed to travel to the capital for [word indistinct] and other purposes. I urge all the citizens who attend the mourning ceremonies to comply with the requirements of public law and order, avoid complicating the situation, and prevent lawless activities.

I recall that, in accordance with the USSR Supreme Soviet's decree dated 15 January 1990, all rallies, meetings, marches, and demonstrations are banned in the city during the state of emergency.

Esteemed residents of Baku, I urge you to heed the requirements of the laws.
Lieutenant General Smyslov, military commandant of Baku City.

Film Director on Baku Shootings

PM2302181690 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 7, 18 Feb 90 p 10

[Stanislav Govorukhin "Eye Witness" article: "A Rehersal?"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Stanislav Govorukhin, a well-known director, is making a film about crime. When he learned about the pogroms in Baku, he immediately flew there with his cameraman.

I came back from Baku stunned and overwhelmed by what I had seen. I at once sat at my desk—I could not keep these terrible impressions to myself.

First the saddest part of it all. The troops entered the city when already there were no Armenians left. Those alive had left and the dead were already buried. There was no one to protect.

I talked with the military. A single battalion of specially trained soldiers would take care of the pogrom-mongers and soon make them see sense. On tne days of pogroms there were, 11,500 internal troops! The generals' declarations that the troops were blocked in barracks are laughable! When they decided to leave the barracks (in the small hours of the morning of the 20th), they up and left them. No problem. They crushed the dilapidated fence with tanks and drove out onto the street straight across a parking lot, flattening the cars.

Another unpleasant aspect. They knew in advance that the pogroms were going to take place.

But everybody was silent. The people's deputies of Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijanian intelligentsia, those in charge, the Party and government authorities of the Republic all kept silent. No one objected:

"Look everyone! Look at this corner of our planet. A crime is being prepared! A genocide—a terrible massacre of innocent people!" Why, why did the Azerbaijanian intelligentsia keep quiet when they should have cried out at the top of thier lungs? Were they afraid? Who were they afraid of?

We know who. Those who we should be afraid of,too. The fascists! Let's call a spade a spade. Those who incite people of one nationality to a bloody massacre of people from another nationality are called fascists. In plain words.

The troops entered the city in the small hours of the morning of the 20th. But the Soviet Army entered a Soviet city as an army of occupiers during the night on tanks and armoured cars, clearing the road for itself by fire and sword. According to the military commandant that night 60,000 rifle shells were spent.

A 10-year-old girl testifies:

"I came out to the balcony and saw tanks in the square and people standing in front of them linking hands. Suddenly the tanks started to mow the people down.

I've seen a lot of balconies riddled by machine guns and houses defaced with bullet holes. How can this be? There were people behind those walls, maybe the very people who were giving aid to the Armenians (there were many such people in Baku).

Many were killed in their apartments or on balconies of houses. The sad fact is that 106 were killed and innumerable people wounded. There would have been less casualties if the people had been convinced that the army, their own army, would not start shooting at its own citizens.

A car stood on the Sumgait road, letting a tank column pass. Sitting in the car were three scientists from the Academy of Sciences—three professors. One of them was a woman. Suddenly one tank left the column and with a noise of grinding metal it flattened the car, killing all the passengers. The column didn't stop—it went on to crush the enemy sitting in wait in the city.

The three professors were buried; in the centre of the city, in the small park, behind the bronze statue of Kirov which stands on a tall pedistal. There are numerous graves here. Women and children. Here is the grave of Larisa Mamedova, a seventh-form schoolgirl.. There is no photo on the grave (there was no one left to bring a photo—her father was gravely wounded that same night)—instead a school uniform and a satchel have been placed on Larisa's grave. Here is another grave without a photo. The inscription says: "Yefimov. Was blind. Killed with a bayonet." A photo shows a newly-wedded couple embracing—Larisa and Ilkham Allakhverdiyev. He was shot, she committed suicide by taking poison.

On 2 February (!!) a boy was shot under our very eyes (the doctors are still fighting for his life, but there is little chance). It happened as follows. A white Volga car hit a soldier walking along the street, but didn't stop. Lieutenant Akhmedshin, the CO, shot at the disappearing car. But the officer proved to a poor shot and hit a passenger bus. A deaf-dumb boy of 15 sat with his back to the window, the bullet him him in the right shoulder.

He was brought to the hospital and I saw a fresh wound for the first time. At a first glance it was a very light wound. But then a wet X-ray was brought —it showed two large metal shadows deep inside his body. Another two bullets? With one single entrance hole?

Dr. Idayat Isayev, specialist in military field surgery, a veteran of the Vietnam war:

"Many such bullets were taken out of the dead bodies. Here is one of them—you can see the crushed bronze shell which itself did a lot of harm and two small steel rods taken out of different parts of the body. And all that with a single bullet hole."

There is a world of difference between reasonable measures of expediency which the government might use to stop a civil conflict and an aggressive military attack.

If the troops didn't enter the city to protect the citizens, then what did they come for? The two million inhabitants of Baku understood it as follows—The tanks entered the city to punish the city, which demands sovereignty. And to punish it severely so that other Republics would get the message. Well, if this is the case, the military expedition to Baku has convincingly proved that the Empire can still be controlled by force.

But for how long? Our generals, apparently, think—"It'll continue for as long as necessary". I think they are wrong. Any army like the one in Baku gradually becomes unfit for combat. And these are not just empty words.

I looked at the log-book of a militia precinct. Soldiers stopped a pedestrian, searched him, took his money. Soldiers drove a tank against a shop door, smashed it down and stole goods. Soldiers took off a man's hat. Soldiers entered an apartment, searched for valuables, but finding nothing they took an engagement ring from the hand of the owner.

It's time to sum up results and make conclusions.

If the military action in Baku is a good example of universal dissolution, of the incompetence of our officers, of anarchy and non-professionalism, then... then this is terrible. Can such an army stand against a serious enemy trained to fight? And if it cannot then why are we spending huge sums on its upkeep?

But what if everything was done according to plan? If the Baku operation was an example of a brilliant operation by the troops?

Then it is a catastrophe.

The country's president signed the decree. Some people might decide to make the following conclusions from this—it was he who ordered the soldiers to crush people with tanks, to shoot at ambulances, at houses, windows, at a maternity home—no mercy for anyone!

I don't believe this. Last May, together with other people's deputies, I supported his election to the presidency of the Supreme Soviet. And I'm not yet sorry that I did so.

Of course, this is only my personal view, but... when, at Gorbachev's decision, it was decided to reduce the army unilaterally, and now that the terrible war in Afghanistan has come to an end, when we are now expecting the long awaited withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, and when the sharp reduction in the number of generals has become the order of the day—I get really afraid for my President.

Maybe Baku was a rehearsal?

Aliyev Abuses Show Need for Cadre 'Renewal'

PM0702103190

[Editorial report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 February 1990 Second Edition carries on page 5 a 4,500-word article by Doctor of Medical Sciences V. Efendiyev under the heading "Aliyevism, or Tears for the 'Good' Life," exposing the nepotism, corruption, and sycophancy reportedly rife in Azerbaijan in the past when Geydar Aliyev was first secretary there. It is introduced as follows:

"My republic is living through a time of tragedy. Extremists and renegades of all hues are trying to unleash a fratricidal war. News from Azerbaijan is regarded by the whole world as combat reports.

"I am not alone in wondering: Where did all this begin? Who is profiting by the events that have been raging for the past two years not only in my Azerbaijan but throughout the Transcaucasus? Surely it was not impossible to prevent the tragedy?

"Only one person has been bold enough to claim that this situation could have been avoided. On one condition: that he had held full power in the republic. That person is Geydar Aliyev, who said in front of the

Azerbaijan Permanent Mission in Moscow: 'This would not have happened if I had been in power!'

"Is that so?"

Analyzing Aliyev's rule, Efendiyev first concentrates on the preference given to people from his native Nakhichevan. "Azerbaijan is a multiethnic republic," he says, "but, during the years of G. Aliyev's rule the leadership did not include a single Talysh, Lezgin, Kurd, or Tat, with the rarest of exceptions.... Those promoted to the leadership mainly came from Nakhichevan." "When they registered a new face among the nomenklatura in Baku, the militia were 100-percent confident that here was another person from Nakhichevan."

This situation still persists today, Efendiyev writes. Members of the "clan" built by Aliyev are "still in the republic's Communist Party Central Committee, Council of Ministers, and Supreme Soviet Presidium, and in the apparatus at central and local level. Virtually one in four of the republic's Supreme Soviet deputies comes from Nakhichevan." The clan, he says, works under the motto "The worse, the better," meaning, he explains, "The worse for restructuring, the better for the clan."

Efendiyev focuses on the pervasive presence of Aliyev's immediate and extended family. "Aliyev," he writes, "had a lot to say on the subject of nepotism and the need to combat cronyism, which he absolutely correctly described as 'An extremely immoral phenomenon.'" However, he notes, "Aliyev always looked out for his relatives and fellow countrymen.... In short, wherever you looked, relatives, relatives of relatives, and relatives of relatives of relatives were in all the key positions."

According to the writer, Aliyev and his policies had a "devastating" effect on the republic's economy. Under the slogan of combating private ownership and "self-seeking attitudes," he allowed "several tens of thousands of fruit trees to perish, residential buildings to fall empty and decay, and dacha settlements to fall into neglect" at Apsheron. Apparently, "even post-April party and government resolutions encouraging the development of individual subsidiary plots and collective horticulture and truck gardening were ignored." "It did not worry him," he writes, "that in Baku 70,000 families did not have normal living conditions and that 200,000 were living in shanties with no running water or sewerage system...."

Under Aliyev, Efendiyev observes, "the republic's history was drawn in two colors: black, when everything was bad, before his accession, and the brightest white, post-1969, when everything negative disappeared."

Another buttress to Aliyev's position, he writes, was his relationship with Brezhnev. "Brezhnev," he says, "adored sycophants and yes-men, among whom Aliyev had no equal. It was Aliyev who made the discovery that Brezhnev was the greatest figure of the 20th century. Aliyev never tired of speaking of the 'genuinely Leninist work style' of 'Ilich the Second.'"

The abuse of power under Aliyev extended into the law courts: "The republic lived from one trial to the next," Efendiyev continues, while "only a narrow circle of people knew that reprisals were being carried out against objectionable people who thought differently and that misdemeanours were sometimes given out as the most serious crimes."

He concludes that people who say "Give us back Aliyev!" are "yearning for the whip, yearning for lawlessness, and yearning for the 'good' life."

The article is followed by an editorial footnote, which reads:

"The question of the need to renew the party and engage all mechanisms allowing it to become the real vanguard of society at this very crucial point in history—the time of restructuring every sphere of our life—is now being raised more seriously than it has ever been. This process is under way and a great deal is being done to speed up restructuring. The CPSU Central Committee plenum opening tomorrow will undoubtedly give this process the dynamism befitting the demands of the time.

"But there is another aspect here which gives rise to questions to which we cannot always give clear answers: Why, having accepted the resignation of people who have compromised themselves or simply failed to justify communists' trust, does the party not honestly and openly convey to the broad masses of working people the reasons for their resignation or release from their duties and not give a party political assessment of the misdemeanours and sometimes even outright crimes committed by these people? The mass media's editorial mail, and primarily the PRAVDA editorial mail, has in recent years been literally weighed down with letters from people asking when the deeds of 'leaders' like Suslov, Romanov, Grishin, Kunayev, and others are going to be made public. They give the names of many oblast party committee first secretaries who have retired from the scene without so much as batting an eyelid, as they say. The train of their ill repute mingled with their unseemly actions stretches behind them.

"Of course, no one is calling for a settling of scores. But the party's renewal is closely bound up with purification and with giving people what they deserve. After all, in the final analysis, exacting cadre work by the party in the conditions of restructuring is inconceivable without this. Communists' letters, with which it is impossible not to agree, say that in many cases the stumbling block in assessing the actions of leading party figures is the unscrupulous stand taken by a number of people in the party apparatus today—particularly by those who have spent decades sitting comfortably in the quiet of central offices, who now find it inconvenient to criticize the culprits because they themselves served them for many years. Meanwhile, some apparatchiks have blown the dust off their old colleagues and are trying to get them in the 'firing line' again. The party apparatus has, of course, been appreciably renewed recently. But evidently not enough, because signs of inertia and conservatism among apparatus workers of party committees at all levels are coming from all over the place.

"Life shows that cadre problems—the timely replacement of various leaders and members of the apparatus, its constant renewal, and the exclusion of any abuses of power—play a decisive role in revolutionary restructuring. One would think that, going on the wishes of many communists and party organizations, all these questions should be discussed in detail on the threshold of the 28th Party Congress. The party's renewal, the enhancement of its vanguard role, and, in the final analysis, the success of restructuring depend on how they are resolved."

Yerevan Commentary Deplores NKAO Media Situation

NC2502111790 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Station commentary]

[Text] The news media in Artsakh [Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] does not exist as such today. There are no radio and television reports, and the oblast paper is under the military jackboot. The only sources of information are agitation-disseminating automobiles on which loudspeakers are mounted. These deafen people around the clock, with their reports not only on vehement issues, but also on topics about Turkish supremacy.

The military was not satisfied with this, however, and also uses the radio waves. During the hours devoted to the oblast's radio, it promotes its own objectives. In its long calls, it blames the Armenians for all the world's ills and (?condemns) the deputies and the (?leading personalities of the movement) [words indistinct].

Political Officer Discusses Trancaucasus

PM2302105190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Feb 90 First Edition p 1

[Interview with CPSU Central Committee February Plenum participant Major General A. Skoryy, member of the Military Council and chief of the Transcaucasus Military District Political Directorate, conducted by own correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Kaushanskiy under the "Topical Interview" rubric; date, place of interview not given: "We are Constantly Tested by Life"]

[Text] [Kaushanskiy] Aleksandr Vladimirovich, you took up your post only last December. And it might be thought that this interview could have waited. But the need for our interview has been determined by time itself: The CPSU Central Committee Plenum now over, the alarming situation in the Transcaucasus, the use of the district's troops to normalize the situation. You were thrown in at the deep end, as it were. Urgent decisions had to be made in a region that was new to you. Were you ready for such a turn of events? Had you formed an idea of your future work when you set off for the Caucasus?

[Skoryy] The region is not altogether new to me, you know. I was here, in the district, many years back. I obtained my first work practice in multinational military collectives. Had I formed an idea? Yes, since I had been following the development of events in the Caucasus for some years. And this took account of the characteristic features of the history, way of life, and psychology of the peoples of the region. These represent very substantial factors in strengthening the personnel's political attitude and morale, military discipline, and law and order. It is not possible to cut yourself off behind a regimental fence from events which are seething just a stone's throw away. And service performed by young people on the territory of their own republics is a fact that needs to be constantly borne in mind. But I did not expect the events to develop in such a way. The tragedy of the refugees, the cases of vandalism, the departure of servicemen's families, and the problems that arose thereby... I often fell to thinking during those days and nights that there was unjustifiably long delay.

[Kaushanskiy] Have your views on the role and place of political workers in such extreme situations altered? It is no secret that that this category of serviceman is under particularly ferocious criticism.

[Skoryy] I am deeply convinced that many past critics, if they are of course not mere ranters but people capable of sober analysis, have convinced themselves that the political worker scarcely looms large today in such circumstances. I have no wish to belittle the role of other officers, but I did repeatedly see in Stepanakert, Gyandzha, and border villages located between Armenia and Azerbaijan how the political worker's voice removed the tension, reassured, brought home the truth, engendered trust, and made people, figuratively speaking, sheath their swords.

Many people know of the efforts made by Major General M. Surkov, USSR people's deputy and political worker, at the talks held between the hostile parties. There is a host of other examples too. Scorning danger, Lieutenant Colonel N. Zubov—who was given early promotion to the rank of colonel the other day—went unarmed to establish contact with extremists.

And how much composure, will, and diplomatic talent, if I may put it that way, was shown by Lieutenant Colonels S. Ustyanov and S. Smolskiy and Major A. Rybak. Nor can I fail to mention political directorate officers V. Belchenko and V. Kuznetsov. For them, as—incidentally—for many of our comrades, the dividing line between one day and the next became pretty notional during those weeks. Such a situation often arises in a combat setting. And people are coping excellently with the extra strain. In short, in political work, as life remorselessly shows us, the authority of an individual who is capable of assuming responsibility, is highly intelligent, and has a clear grasp of the specific nature of interethnic relations assumes paramount importance.

[Kaushanskiy] I should like to return to your idea about drawing lessons from the situation...

[Skoryy] Actively drawing lessons, let us put it that way, since I have observed myself how political workers have reorganized themselves before my very eyes, acquiring very important experience. I will cite just a few key features. We could not have supposed that the evacuation of families would assume such a scale, could we? The extremists' threat triggered off a kind of chain reaction of alarm among women and children. And a consequently appropriate response from the officers: transportation, food, heating, and checking of flights. Commanders and political workers had an enormous amount of work put on their shoulders. But there is, after all, another side to this. How can an officer or warrant officer serve without his family? It is abnormal. In other words, as the situation returns to normal it is necessary to induce the families to come back. This is, I think, sensitive, delicate, but essential work. Moreover, it is the insistent request of the majority of Baku's inhabitants.

Then there is the dearth of information when newspapers are not coming out and Baku television screens are blanked out as a result of sabotage. The resultant vacuum was daily filled with rumors whose destructiveness it was sometimes difficult to guess. I personally had to fly urgently to Stepanakert to help organize the normal operation of local television. The absurd, provocative nature of the broadcasts from Shusha put people into shock. Fabricated casualty figures were obligingly inserted into informal organizations' printed leaflets which circulated throughout the Transcaucasus. The plan was to make people hate the soldiers and aggravate interethnic stife. But people need the truth...

[Kaushanskiy] I saw in Baku how the special, small-format issue of the military district newspaper was literally snatched up.

[Skoryy] Yes, it was published hard on the heels of events and carried accurate information. Everything had to be put on an operational footing: Special propaganda means and the activities of agitation teams who provided people at local level with objective information, communicated all the vicissitudes of the situation to them, and explained the gist of decisions and documents. And political workers are now conducting a difficult dialogue with the local population—enterprise workers, the authorities, and the leaders of informal organizations.

[Kaushanskiy] You referred to dialogue, including dialogue with the leaders of informal organizations. We were told in a pretty peremptory manner at one of Baku's major plants that the first thing to do is withdraw the troops. Otherwise, they said, there is no point in talking to us. We will carry on the strike.

[Skoryy] And yet I am convinced that dialogue and political methods will have the final say. It must be borne in mind that the People's Front leaders are mixed in terms of their outlook and social makeup.

And then, let's face the truth. Since the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, you will have seen for yourself once again that the leaders of the People's Front could tomorrow stand at the helm of completely legitimate parties and compete with the CPSU on a democratic basis.

[Kaushanskiy] And finally, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, your current concerns. I can see some notes on your work schedule...

[Skoryy] Yes indeed, I will comment on some of my notes. Weapons... There are thousands of firearms and hundreds of kilograms of explosives circulating in the Transcaucasus. The population has a whole arsenal in its possession. It is essential to persuade people to hand in these potential dealers of death immediately. I consider this a priority area for commanders and political workers. Discipline... The state of discipline in some subunits which are brought up to strength by servicemen from other regions is a matter of concern. And one more thing: One's heart bleeds for those officers left without their families. Some of them are requesting a transfer to other districts. Some are faced with the dilemma of whether to summon their family back from their enforced evacuation or not. It is important to look into the case of every officer...

Refugees Face Housing Problems in Armenia

LD2402180690 Moscow Domestic Service in German 1200 GMT 24 Feb 90

[Text] At its latest session the Armenian republican emergency situation headquarters has considered the issues of refugees from Azerbaijan. A report by the Armenian state committee for receiving and settling the compatriots coming back to their motherland is set for 27 February. Our correspondent Koryun Khumaryan reports:

[Khumaryan] Refugees are becoming one of the main problems in the republic. On the notice board at the committee for receiving refugees there are a dozen hastily written notices saying that Yerevan enterprises are offering employment to knitters, locksmiths, and sewing-machine operators. Some of the cooperatives invite the refugees from Baku as well. According to those notices I counted a total of about 600 vacant jobs in Yerevan. This is a drop in the ocean, and there is even less living accomodation. Many residents of the capital have sheltered relatives, acquaintances or simply strangers, but it is understandable that the shelter is temporary. It was decided to carry out a complete inventory of the housing stock in Yerevan and other towns and settlements of the republic in order to find out the exact number of empty apartments. On the initiative of the committee some rayon soviets started to allot land for the refugees to build their own living accomodation, but what will it give in the conditions of the toughest economic blockade? If even construction materials for the area of the earthquake don't get into the republic.

Our conversation with (Gagik Vartanyan), deputy chairman of the state committee for receiving and settling the compatriots—that was a second one in the same week—started with that question:

[Begin recording] [Vartanyan] Today we are facing a big problem, the problem of providing construction materials for settling the refugees, i.e. for construction of their own houses. But, as you know, at present this is not possible.

[Khumaryan] That means that there are people who have been here since February, 1988, after the events in Sumgait and don't have any home. That means they have to sit it out for another year, as we don't have those construction materials and there won't be enough of them. Have any corrections been introduced into our construction plans?

[(Vartanyan)] Yes, literally the other day representatives of all the appropriate ministries and departments, representatives of executive commitees and town and rayon soviets gathered at the Council of Ministers of the republic, and they were presented with the task in very short time to work out a republican program for settling the refugees and for finding the means at the expense of local construction resources of organizations—I mean construction cooperatives—that will be able to build these houses in the future.

Running ahead, there is a plan to form a construction directorate, the workers of which will be from among the refugees. This construction direcorate will be attached to the state committeee for receiving and settling the returning Armenians. [end recording]

Official Denies Supplying Weapons to Tajiks

LD2102175390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Report by correspondent A. Goraynov in Dushanbe—from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Yesterday rumors were circulating around the city regarding the staging here on 21 February of an unsanctioned mass meeting. Students and members of voluntary patrols came to the assistance of staff members of law enforcement bodies. Fortunately, the rumors proved to be just that. Today the day turned out very quiet both for these bodies and for the military subunits. Many residents of Dushanbe, judging from our conversations with people, are concerned about establishing responsibility for the organizers of the disturbances. According to official data, 39 criminal cases have been instituted and 18 people have been arrested on suspicion of committing pogroms.

About some more rumors, very serious ones. Our filming crew today visited the border troops headquarters.

[Begin recording] [Goraynov] Comrade general, you have just returned from the border. What is the situation there? After all, rumors are circulating in the city to the effect that armed groups of extremists are penetrating our territory from neighboring Afghanistan. Can you either refute or confirm these rumors?

[A.N. Martovitskiy, first deputy chief of the Central Asian Border District] Yes, I was at the border yesterday. I chatted with the local population of the kishlaks [villages] near the border. I inquired about and investigated the situation. I did not receive any information locally to the effect that some groups or individuals have attempted lately to cross the state border.

Availing myself of the opportunity, I would like to say the following: Looking through our central press, in particular IZVESTIYA's 19 February issue, I came across a report saying that Afghan mujahidin are supplying Tajikistan with weapons. We, the border guards, are angered by this information. I repeat that this has not been confirmed and that we are guarding and will guard the border reliably, especially during this uneasy situation in the republic.

Chechen-Ingush First Secretary Interviewed

90UN0870B Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with D.G. Zavgayev, first secretary of the Chechen-Ingush Oblast party committee, by A. Grachev and A. Shinkin under the rubric "The Party and Perestroyka": "I Believe in Reason"]

[Text]

Doku Gapurovich Zavgayev only recently became first secretary of the Chechen-Ingush Obkom [oblast party committee], and it was to some extent unexpected for him. The party activists had proposed his candidacy for this position literally before the beginning of the organizational plenum. And after rather heated debates in the course of discussing the aspirants, a secret ballot was conducted and the majority chose him for the candidacy.

Doku Gapurovich is not yet 50 years old. He graduated from an agricultural institute and by correspondence from the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee, and he has defended his candidate dissertation. His career cannot be called either swift-moving or easy: rural teacher, mechanic, chief engineer, director of a state farm, chairman of a rayon soviet executive committee, head of a republic association of state farms, ChIASSR [Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] minister of agriculture, department head, secretary, and second secretary of the oblast party committee. And for every "advance" upward, recognition for his diligence, competence, and honesty.

Doku Gapurovich compared our conversation about interethnic relations with walking on burning coals. Nonetheless, he did not look for vague answers but rather gave his candid opinion of these serious issues.

[PRAVDA] The nationalities question, which struck us 3 years ago like lightning from a clear sky, has today become, one might say, a commonplace phenomenon. Burning coals, using your expression, strewn about the entire country. And they really do burn. No one remains indifferent. Which are greater: the problems engendered by the years of Stalinist lawlessness and stagnation, or the emotions?

[Zavgayev] Can we really separate one from the other? Where there are problems, there are also emotions. The waves of nationalist passions wash between these two banks. And many grievances have mounted up in this oblast over the last 50 years. Today it is difficult to analyze the problems. Simply because no one was prepared for such a turn of events. Party and soviet workers repeat "friendship of the peoples" and "internationalism" over and over like an incantation without knowing or wanting to think about what this means for the people and how they interpret it. And I am not yet talking about concepts such as the evolution of national consciousness and a national psychology.

As a result, a dance of sympathy and antipathy reigns. Emotions seize people and complicate the resolution of urgent tasks. And at times the boundary between national and nationalist interests disappears, and national egoism and chauvinist arrogance are awakened.

[PRAVDA] Does it not seem to you that the excess of passions around the problem of nationalities serves the purposes of some people?

[Zavgayev] Of course. Some, I have noticed, act with a sincere desire to help their people genuinely improve their situation while others only seek a means of asserting themselves. And they are prepared to sacrifice any of the noble ideas of our perestroyka to their personal ambitions. But in my opinion the sea will not dry up, and the people will not lose their way. They will sober up sooner or later. And to reduce the complexity of national problems to a certain circle of ambitious people means a genuine inability to see what is going on around oneself.

It seems to me that it would be more correct if the party committees were to stop concentrating only on the struggle against individuals with extremist attitudes and for the most part rebuild propaganda and public education methods. They must comprehend the complex character of the nationalities problem in this regard, understanding that economic, social, political, cultural, psychological, and historical factors are all closely woven into it. They must not ignore or underestimate any one of these factors.

[PRAVDA] However, Doku Gapurovich, knowledge that is not confirmed by experience is at times sterile and full of mistakes...

[Zavgayev] You propose to cross over to concrete matters, I believe. But I must say honestly that in this instance I have not succeeded in everything. The practice of "my command," if I may call it that, is still underway. Workers of the oblast party committee and many city and rayon party committees have already given up the silence of office work. And we have fewer comforts: We handed over the building for our city party committee to our university, and physicians will soon be the masters of the present oblast party committee building. A republic diagnostic center will be moving into it.

We have begun to give an account of our activities starting from the situation in the labor collectives. We have embarked on a carefully argued, direct, and honest dialog with people. At many enterprises we are not only the oblast party committee secretaries but even instructors for the first time in recent years. And we consider it our duty to rule out any kind of pressure or imposition of the will upon a part of the population of one nationality by representatives of another.

Much is explained in a lively conversation, and the questions that are raised by the "wise guys" are taken care of. They ask, let us say, why are there many doctors in the city and few in the village? Someone wants to get the peoples at each others' throats and he reasons: Well, more Russians live in the city and therefore they have better conditions there than for the Chechens and Ingush. But in fact the old circulars as well as an unwillingness on the part of local authorities to create living conditions for doctors in remote settlements are at fault. The Russians have nothing to do with it.

A recent plenum of the party Central Committee passed a resolution concerning meetings by the leaders of the party with communists and workers of Lithuania. I consider this proper. Studying and reasoning out a problem from the inside means finding the true solution.

[PRAVDA] You spoke at the September CPSU Central Committee Plenum where the party's policy on nationalities and current conditions was discussed. And you spoke in particular about the need to reorient the approach to an economic strategy. What is your thinking on this issue?

[Zavgayev] It seems to me that I formulated it clearly enough: We must not go from goals of the economy to the person, but just the reverse—from the person to the goals of the economy. Then the rudiments of new interethnic relations will form better. For instance in order to resolve somehow the problem of finding work for the population, the republic "dreamed up" the construction of factories for biochemical products, batteries, and other products. But no one can say today why the decision was made to build specifically these enterprises, how they contribute to our social structure, or how they guarantee the employment of our population... And how prepared are the people who live primarily in the country to master the mostly new types of activity which are so remote from the traditional work of the Vaynakh people?

And here is another facet of that same model. Whatever position you take—public health, education, quantity of schools and institutions of culture, construction of housing—Chechen-Ingushetiya is at the bottom of the charts for the regions of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]. What is that—an accident? Of course not. You cannot even explain that solely by Stalinist arbitrariness in regard to the treatment of our people. The answer here is that the republic developed according to the will and dictate of the branch departments, which did not take into account the character of our region and the interests of our national development.

You ask whether it was possible to avoid that. It probably was. Now, considering the mistakes of the past, we have concerned ourselves in earnest with the creation of a model for the social and economic development of the republic. At its base first and foremost will be the interests of the person. It will also be a program of our concrete actions and our final goal. People will be able to judge the work of the republic's party organization according to the execution of that which we have planned.

[PRAVDA] Judging by the heat of the passions involved, the largest outcry is connected with the status of the state language. What is your position on this issue?

[Zavgayev] These passions generally flare up, in my view, because the language has become in some places simply a weapon in the political struggle... And as a result many in the republics like to extol the "language problem." And still it is necessary to acknowledge that there is an issue here. I myself have noted that many, especially the youth, are losing their ties to the native language.

But I personally am firmly convinced that our large and multilingual state needs one state language across the whole territory—Russian. That is, if we wish to preserve our union and not isolate ourselves on our farms, of course. Remember the legend about the tower of Babylon. When people spoke the same language, work went well. But as soon as the Most High forced people to speak different languages, they ceased to understand one another. With that the construction of the tower came to a halt.

However, I do not under any circumstances deny that there will be a second state language on the territory of the republic equal to Russian—that of the indigenous population. This is a personal matter for each people. I have had occasion to hear people say on this point that state bilingualism obstructs the development of the national culture. This is a rather strange argument. No bureaucratic document has ever enriched culture. The main thing is to know how to think in one's own language, to express the soul and the national knowledge of the behavior of one's people... And for that, one must in general know how to think and to genuinely love one's native region. Knowledge of the language alone does not guarantee this. I believe that the platform of the CPSU on the nationalities question offers a correct reference point for the solution of this problem.

I am also struck by the "cavalry attack" approach in the study of language. Ultimatums obviously are clearly not appropriate here. Life is life, and it is hard to alter it even with the sternest of decrees. I have become convinced through the experience of my republic. For instance, in all our schools they began to teach the Chechen and Ingush languages. But when they examined the matter, they became convinced that the training was not very effective. After all, Russian, Chechen, Ingush, Armenian, and Kumyk children, as will as children of other nationalities, will be studying in the same class, using the same program and the same textbooks. What is needed, naturally, is a differentiated approach. We need textbooks that account for the unique character of the person. In other words, we are preparing ourselves for a prolonged, steady effort. We have created a special center for problems of bilingualism, there are courses in the native languages, textbooks and phrase books are being prepared...

[PRAVDA] Readers of the newspaper are really put on their guard by constant claims of infringement on nationalist grounds. And the motives are becoming too familiar: Someone did not give someone else full measure, or someone fixed himself up at someone else's expense...

[Zavgayev] Well, old and new injustices should be eliminated. Let us say that there is a long-standing dispute around the renaming of the village of Sovetskiy. People want to return it to its ancient name of Shata. But they considered everything carefully and decided to go against the wishes of the inhabitants. And would the Soviet power have been weakened by changing the name? Hardly. In my view, when the people wish to restore the old names of their cities and villages, we should decide the issue more boldly. Will it cost money? Yes. But why not use the funds of the labor collectives and the inhabitants themselves for this purpose? I believe they would respond favorably.

But something else troubles me. As old wounds are healed, some give rise to new injuries in terms of nationalist egoism instead of leading to democracy, equality, mutual respect, and the free development of the peoples. For some, a bad past often overshadows the present. However, malice toward good has never benefited anyone. And we have also seen more than once the destructive consequences of maximalism. There is only one step from there to the stinking blaze of interethnic enmity which destroys all friendship, kindheartedness, and benevolence.

[PRAVDA] Are you afraid that blood will flow and that people will abandon happiness and faith?

[Zavgayev] I am not afraid, but there are grounds for serious apprehensions. You yourself are aware of the points of contention. But I would like to believe that nationalist extremism will not darken people's reason and destroy our moral and historical structures.

And my belief is founded on the people's reason. And on the fact that we have all learned "not to be ashamed" of telling the truth to the very end. Individual instances are not the entire truth. That same history which we so love to quote requires intense scientific study of the interrelation of all circumstances. Otherwise we can lose a sensible attitude to the past. And how far can you go forward with your head looking backward?

For this reason the oblast party committee is trying to turn the debate away from nationalist egoism and in the direction of a respect for peace, compassion, ecological considerations, and the people's self-improvement. To this end we are heightening the authority of the councils of elders and veterans, and we are learning how to cooperate with them properly. We are seeking out contacts with representatives of the clergy and with various informal associations in order to reduce interethnic tensions. We have "restructured" our approaches to the formation of cadres. We have decided that there will not be any offices secretly allotted to representatives of a certain nationality.

[PRAVDA] We would nonetheless like to end our conversation with a question about friendship. Can you sense friendship among the peoples of the republic?

[Zavgayev] Of course we have not forgotten the pain and suffering of "The great migration." But we also remember how, under those brutal conditions, the Russians, Ukrainians, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and many others supported us and helped us to survive. I know that by my own experience when, as a 4-year-old child, I found myself in Karagandinskaya Oblast. Concerning the events of tsarist times, our neighbor Rasul Gamzatov was right to say, "The Caucasus fascinated Pushkin's Russia." Numerous incidents prove that even then people of various nationalities knew how to be friends. In any times, the magnanimity and goodness of the best Russians and people of indigenous origin have shown through.

Perhaps I am repeating myself, but I wish to recall a simple thought: We are no longer subject to the past, and the future depends on us. This is because we shall be able to direct the processes of perestroyka for the good of the person no matter what nationality he may be.

Chechen-Ingush Residents Protest Social Ills

PM2302104790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Ali Kazikhanov report under the rubric "Direct Line. IZVESTIYA Own Correspondents at the Teleprinter": "On the Wave of a Rally"]

[Text] Groznyy—Over the last few weeks rallies have been held in five rayons in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR], removing the first secretaries of Malgobekskiy, Nazranovskiy, Sunzhenskiy, Nozhay-Yurtovskiy, and Achkhoy-Martanovskiy Rayons. Shalinskiy Rayon is now "in turmoil."

Sunday [18 February] hundreds of inhabitants of the rayon center gathered in the village of Shali, along with people from Argun and Gudermes. The demonstrators demanded the immediate resignation of the rayon leadership and members of the CPSU rayon party committee bureau, headed by Yu. Usamov, first secretary. The speakers spoke of sensitive issues. For many years the cement plant has literally poisoned people with its discharges. But, despite protests from the people of Shali, the rayon leadership also intended to build an accumulator plant and a biochemical plant. The reservoirs in the rayon are polluted and there are no highways. There are many unresolved socioeconomic development questions and violations of the principles of social justice.

The demonstrators' demands were conveyed to the oblast party committee. Monday the square in the rayon center was once again filled with people: They were awaiting an answer to their demands. But none came.

A group of representatives of the Shali branch of the "People's Front" began to force their way to the rostrum. Standing on the rostrum, Sh. Bisultanov, director of the Shali bakery, who had tried previously to calm passions and called for reason, suddenly seized a pistol from his pocket. A relative of his, M. Abdulkhadzhiyev, tried to stop him. The gun was fired accidentally. The bullet penetrated Bisultanov's left hand and ended up in Abdulkhadzhiyev's shoulder. Both men were immediately hospitalized.

I was told at the Chechen Ingush ASSR Ministry of Internal Affairs that criminal proceedings have been instituted. The situation in the rayon is under control.

Internal Affairs Ministry on Crimes in Baku

NC2402152290 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Notice by the Azerbaijan Ministry of Internal Affairs—read by announcer]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted on low-level criminal offenses] We urge the citizens of Baku to abide by the rules and the laws. Forty-seven [as heard] individuals were detained for breaking various laws: 39 for violating the curfew, two for violating the state of emergency decree, six for violating the passport regime, and two for committing crimes. [passage omitted]

Further on Criminal Offenses

NC2402194690 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Excerpts] Dear listeners, good evening! There were no operational changes in Baku during the day. No negative interethnic developments were recorded, but four crimes were recorded during the day. [passage omitted on low-level criminal offenses]

Fifty-nine apartments were ransacked in (?Detayli) district from 13 to 16 January. All of these incidents are being investigated. Meanwhile, Kasumov Rukhshen Kasum Oglu and Beshirov Dzhabrail Aga Oglu were detained for robbing citizen Kasumova's house. [passage omitted]

Recently, there have been rumors spread that the bodies of those killed with firearms have been discovered in various parts of the city. We inform you that this is false. [passage omitted]

Georgian Party Conference on Transcaucasus

90US0495D Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 18 Jan 90 p 1

[Report from the press center of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party: "In the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party"]

[Text] On 16 and 17 January, a conference was held in the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party. Participants included members of the Central Committee Bureau, the republic government, and Tbilisi city party committee, and leaders of the city soviet and republic law enforcement organs. The conference involved an examination of the current socio-political situation in the republic and Transcaucasus region in general, and the consideration of current, topical issues proceeding from this. It was chaired by G. Gumbaridze.

It was noted at the conference that, although the situation in the Tskhinvali region continues to be stable, Tbilisi city transportation and most industrial enterprises are operating in their usual manner, schools, services, and other establishments are functioning normally, and an upright civic stand is becoming increasingly noticeable in labor collectives and across broad layers of the community, yet the situation remains tense in the republic as a whole, and particularly in the capital, where actions begun by social organizations are continuing. It was noted that the number of serious crimes has increased sharply, both in the republic in general and in Tbilisi. A significant portion of these have not yet been disclosed.

Particular alarm was expressed regarding the tragic situation we see in neighboring republics of the Transcaucasus, which disturbs the entire population of Georgia. It was emphasized that every labor collective and all citizens of the republic must observe special procedures at such a time as this, must exercise prudence and caution, insofar as just one careless step or provocative action could escalate the dramatic situation on the territory of our republic as well. Appropriate efforts are being made to maintain order and calm in regions where the Armenian and Azeri population reside.

It was also noted that, in such a complicated situation as this, party, soviet, trade union, and law enforcement organs must exhibit a great degree of intensity and responsibility in their efforts to normalize the situation. They must work more actively with people and within the labor collectives. They must use convincing and well-founded argument to explain the danger of the present situation, listen attentively to the opinions of the workers, be always with them, provide them information on a regular basis, and guide them during these complex processes. At the same time, it is in just such a complicated situation that special significance must be attributed to protecting people's rights, consolidating order, and putting an end to violations of the law. If we do not see an appropriate legal response given to every single violation of the law, it will be difficult to avoid an extremely dangerous atmosphere of impunity and permissiveness, which will serve to further inflame an already intense situation.

Border Official Denies Afghan Infiltration Rumor

LD2302144690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Video report by correspondent A. Goraynov in Dushanbe—from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Yesterday rumors were circulating around the city regarding the staging here on 21 February of an unsanctioned mass meeting. Students and members of voluntary patrols came to the assistance of the staff members of the law enforcement bodies. But, fortunately, the rumors proved to be only rumors and today the day turned out very quiet both for them and for the military subunits. Many residents of Dushanbe, judging from our conversations with people, are worried about establishing responsibility for the organizers of the disturbances. According to official data, 39 criminal cases have been instituted and 18 people have been arrested on suspicion of committing pogroms. [video shows pedestrians walking and traffic moving in Dushanbe streets]

About some more rumors, very serious ones. Our filming crew today visited the border troops headquarters.

Comrade General, you have just returned from the border. What is the situation there? After all, rumors are circulating in the city to the effect that armed groups of extremists are penetrating our territory from neighboring Afghanistan. Can you either refute or confirm these rumors?

[A.N. Martovitskiy, first deputy chief of the Central Asian Border District] Yes, I was at the border yesterday. I chatted with the local population of the kishlaks near the border. I enquired about and investigated the situation and I did not receive any information locally, to the effect that some groups or individuals have attempted lately to cross the state border. Availing myself of the opportunity, I would like to say the following: Looking through our central press, in particular IZVESTIYA's 19 February issue, I came across a note saying saying that Afghan mujahidin are supplying Tajikistan with weapons. We, the border guards, are angered by this information and I repeat that this has not been confirmed and that we are guarding and will guard the border reliably, especially during this uneasy situation in the republic. [video shows Martovitskiy seated at his desk and Goryanov seated at the table adjacent to the desk; the 19 Feb issue of IZVESTIYA lies in front of Martovitskiy and the camera focuses on the article in question]

Central Asia

Supreme Soviet Presidium, Uzbek Ministers Meet

LD2602202190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] A joint sitting of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic Council of Ministers with the participation of representatives of the Meskhetian Turks was held today in Tashkent. Cases of conflict situations were examined as well as urgent measures to stabilize the situation in places densely populated by Meskhetian Turks. It was stressed that the destabilization of the situation in these rayons has been caused by accumulated socioeconomic problems and also by deliberate unlawful actions by corrupt and criminal elements striving to incite interethnic strife in order to attain their own selfish ends. The meeting's participants stated with great resoluteness that the firmest measures should be used, in accordance with the law, against such criminal persons, in order to stabilise the situation. All healthy forces must be consolidated. Karimov, first secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan Central Committee, spoke at the meeting.

News Conference on Tajikistan Election Results

LD2602182790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] Preliminary results of elections have been reviewed in Tajikistan. A news conference was held in Dushanbe devoted to this. Our correspondents Leonid Lazarevich and Mudzhafar Madzhidov report:

[Lazarevich] Speaking at the news conference was Kakhar Makhkamovich Makhkamov, first secretary of the Republic's Communist Party Central Committee. He said, inter alia:

[Begin Makhkamov recording] In the Republic overall, of the total number of those listed on the electoral roll for secret ballots, some 90 percent of the electors took part, according to preliminary figures. In the city of Dushanbe it was 79.4 percent, while during the local soviet elections this figure was 75 percent. There were very many candidates to the parliamentary seats: more than 1,000 persons. The elections cannot be considered ended in all constituencies. In Kulyab Oblast, elections are finished in nine of the 25 constituencies, while in the remaining 16 constituencies there will be repeat elections. In the city of Dushanbe they are finished in 12 of the 33 constituencies. These are preliminary figures. One is pleased by the fact that the turnout was high in all constituencies, in all rayons of the republic. [end recording]

[Madzhidov] At the news conference it was announced that all the leaders of the Communist Party of Tajikistan Central Committee who stood for the Supreme Soviet received the support of the electors, and they will be awarded people's deputies' seats. At the meeting the question of the tragic events in Dushanbe on 12, 13, and 14 February was again raised. It was noted that everything that happened had been of an organized nature, and an investigation is now taking place. More than 50 criminal cases have been instituted and 35 persons have been arrested.

Comrade Makhkamov stressed that the bodies of the Procuracy, the inquest, and militia officials are now doing everything possible to find those who organized the disorders and who took part in them. A party investigation is being conducted, and the results will be announced at the Republic's Communist Party plenum on 3 March.

Journalists' questions were also answered by Comrade Karimov, deputy chairman of the Republic's Council of Ministers and chairman of Gosplan, who has been heading the Provisional Committee elected by those attending the rallies. One of the main demands of this committee was the resignation of the republic's leaders. At the meeting it was announced that work is being completed on a television documentary to be shown on republican television that will help everyone understand the gist of the events which have taken place.

Elections Proceed Peacefully

LD2502222790 Dushanbe Domestic Service in Tajik 1700 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Excerpts] Elections for People's Deputies of Tajikistan were held in the republic today. Up to 1600 in Dushanbe, 64.4 percent of electorates had cast their votes. Of course, this figure can be explained in many ways. However, it is impossible to ignore the state of emergency and the curfew. The situation in the capital never helped the pre-election agitation campaign. Activists of party committees were obliged to engage in solving numerous other issues. [passage omitted]

The situation one day before the elections of people's deputies of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] was very tense. The reason for this was a rumor that unofficial organizations throughout the country would hold meetings and demonstrations. However, the first hours of voting dispersed this dark cloud of anxiety. Order ruled at polling stations. Neither militias nor troops could be seen in constituencies. This was in response to claims by specific circles alleging that people would be voting in the presence of weapons and arms. There was no basis for such claims.

Electorates (?voluntarily) went to polling stations, and by doing so were showing their support for party leadership and republican government, and that their call for the promotion of political activity in this complex situation has found allies. [passage omitted]

As it can be seen from these reports, contrary to predictions by [words indistinct], from the beginning people actively participated in elections of people's deputies of the Tajik SSR. In spite of this, individual persons tried to disrupt the election process in some places and to use the gathering of people in unfavorable conditions to encourage sabotage. It is true that such efforts were few and did not bear any fruit. However, incidents were observed in some constituencies of Gissar and the [name indistinct] region, including the (?Rakhati) village and Varzab region. These incidents (?could have been) prevented without any negative consequences with timely measures by members of constituency election commissions.

Tajik Meeting on Party Plenum, Congress

LD2502130190 Dushanbe Domestic Service in Tajik 0020 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Text] A meeting of the Bureau of Tajikistan Communist Party Central Committee was held on 23 February. The meeting discussed and adopted a resolution on convening the expanded 18th plenum of the Central Committee. The plenum will be held on 3 March. It will discuss the following issues:

—On emergency measures to improve the situation in Dushanbe and republic, and preparations for the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of Tajikistan.

—Information of the Tajikistan Communist Party Central Committee Bureau on the results of investigation of statements by Khayeyev, member of the central committee bureau and chairman of Tajikistan Council of Ministers.

The bureau of the Tajikistan Communist Party Central Committee requests all citizens of the republic to send their proposals on preparing for the plenum and the 21st Congress to the following address:

Dushanbe, Lenin Street 80, Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan. Envelopes should be marked "To the plenum and congress."

Tajik Official Reacts to Soviet Weekly Article

LD2402161190 Moscow TASS in English 1555 GMT 24 Feb 90

[Text] Dushanbe, Soviet Tajikistan, February 24 TAJIKTA-TASS—Secretary of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee Shodi Shabdolov described a recent commentary in the Soviet COMMERSANT weekly as "provocative and slanderous" at a news confernce here today.

Commenting on the events in Dushanbe on February 12 and 13, COMMERSANT, a publication of the USSR Cooperative Union, wrote that soldiers fired at peaceful people while members of the Rastokhez People's Front occupied the Tajik Communist Party Headquarters and fully controlled the situation.

The weekly also said that electricity and water supply was cut off and the heating system did not work in the city for a long time.

Shabdolov said "These allegations do not correspond to reality and evoke indignation of all honest people in the republic."

The situation in the Tajik capital, which is still under curfew, is returning back to normal. More people can be seen on streets and squares. Most industrial enterprises and organisations are working today—although usually they do not work on Saturdays—to compensate for the losses from almost a week of work stoppages.

The Republican authorities have decided not to postpone elections to the Tajik Supreme Soviet, scheduled for February 25.

The leaders of Tajikistan and Dushanbe's military commandant assured the population that "Any attempt by destabilising forces to thwart this important political event and to exert pressure on voters will be resolutely stopped."

An investigation group is making efforts to identify participants in the February 12-13 pogroms, including those who incited young people and teenagers to mass disorders.

Criminal proceedings have been started against 40 people. Another 20 were arrested on suspicion of having committed crimes during the two days.

People continue to turn in weapons. On Friday, 44 rifles and pistols were turned in to law enforcement bodies.

Kirghiz Supreme Soviet Adopts Decree on Pogroms

PM2302203990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Gennadiy Shipitko dispatch: "Protecting People"]

[Text] Frunze—The Kirghiz SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium has adopted a decree "On Responsibility for Actions Directed Against Public Order and Citizens' Safety."

The reason for the appearance of the decree is the growing social tension in the republic caused by a series of unsanctioned rallies at which calls have been made to expel people not indigenous to the region. It was adopted in support of the numerous wishes expressed by working people, war and labor veterans, young people, and people of various nationalities, including Kirghiz.

The decree prohibits any preparation and storage for purposes of subsequent circulation in verbal, written, printed, or audiovisual form of material containing a threat to public order or calls for pogroms, the violent expulsion of citizens, and the confiscation or destruction of their property or material which aims to sow panic among the population.

It stipulates the penalties: A fine of up to 500 rubles [R], arrest for a period of 15 days, or correctional labor for up to two months. Further offenses are punishable by a fine of up to R1,000 or two months' corrective labor.

Today 48 percent of the republic's population is not indigenous to the region. The decree will make it possible to protect them against extremist attacks.

Unopposed Kirghiz Deputy Elections Viewed

90US0494A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 5, 3 Feb 90 p 3

[Report by E. Borbiyev: "A Familiar Picture"]

[Text] Frunze—Republic and oblast and some rayon and city newspapers recently carried on their front pages an interview with M. Vasilenko, chief of the republic Communist Party Central Committee Organizational Work Department, by a correspondent of the Kirghiz Telegraph Agency under the questioning headline: "What Did the Nominations Show?" And so, at first glance, the picture seems to be quite normal. A total of 1,049 people were on the ballot in the 350 electoral okrugs for the elections of the republic people's deputies—three candidates for every mandate and almost two contenders for each seat in the local soviets. And in answer to the question "Who is he, the current candidate?", we must answer: Almost one-third of the candidates for the republic's highest organ of power are workers in industry, transport, and construction, while one-fourth come from the agrarian sector, while one in six is a representative of science and culture, public education and public health.

And now let us look at these figures in another light. The Kirghiz parliament will be made up, as before, of 350 deputies. The republic party organization has this structure: one central committee, two oblast committees [obkoms], and 59 rayon committees [raykoms] and city committees [gorkoms]. All the raykom and gorkom first secretaries, obkom second secretaries, and Central Committee department chiefs have been nominated as deputies: 90 people, almost one-fourth of the corps of deputies. And in practice they have all been registered in the so-called nonalternative okrugs. And if there are any contenders then, let us be candid, they are weak in all respects. To the point, this is a very convenient variant of the merely formal alternative—the new "perestroyka" invention of the apparatus and is very effective and very widespread.

Soviet power in the republic is represented by 65 subdivisions—the rayon and city soviets. So that only about 10 leaders from the local soviets are being polled for the highest legislative organ. Local political futurologists are claiming in strong language that that the future parliament will be made up of party figures and leaders of enterprises and organizations, and even shepherds. Evidently what they have in mind is that our republic president is a former shepherd.

Say what you will, there is food for thought here. An extraordinary congress of the communists of Kirghizstan will take place this year, and it will, naturally, form a central committee—the leader in the intervals between congresses. And will it not again be made up of those same people—the first secretaries, department chiefs, and other apparatus workers? A well-known and familiar picture from the years of stagnation, and even earlier years. Thus, there is a real prospect that soviet power, that is, the power of the people, may be concentrated in the hands of certain party circles and people convenient for them. Let me ask the rhetorical question: Is perestroyka needed here?

Kirghiz Ban on Consumer Goods Exports Questioned

PM2502185990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Own correspondent Gennadiy Shipitko report under the rubric "Direct Line": "Export of Goods Prohibited"]

[Text] Frunze—The Kirghiz Council of Ministers has banned most consumer goods from being exported from the republic.

Henceforth it is prohibited to export the following goods either by mail, road, rail, or air: foods, footwear, sanitary equipment, all imported non-comestibles, hosiery and woolen goods, school writing equipment, movie camera items, sewn goods, cupronickel and stainless steel tableware, pocket calculators, furniture—the list is endless.

I would not venture to pass judgement on the legality of this instruction, but there is something that I find interesting: How, for example, are militia personnel going to be able to keep track of hundreds of pencils, razor blades, or zip fasteners disappearing across the border? Are they going to individually search everyone leaving the republic?

In any case, this shows concern "to improve the provision of the republic's population with foods and industrial goods in great demand," according to the Kirghiz Council of Ministers instruction.

Against whom is this regional "separatism" directed? After all, we are talking about goods which, in the majority of cases, are not manufactured within the republic itself. Would it not be better to focus the militia's efforts on combating speculation? Then no one would have to worry that reciprocal measures could follow in the future from those who likewise resolve to "improve the population's provision with goods" in this fashion. It is not hard to guess where this could lead.

Frunze Rally Angered by Leaders' 'Sidestep'

PM0602151590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 6 Feb 90 p 1

[K. Bayalinov, A. Chelnokov report: "Frunze, 4 February"]

[Text] In the evening an unauthorized rally attended by many thousands of people was held in the capital of Kirghizia in the central square named for Lenin. Participants demanded action to regulate migration into the republic from other parts of the country, tighter deadlines for the promulgation of the Law on the State Language of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR], the solution of the housing and ecological problems, and the creation of a People's Front in the republic.

G.I. Ivantsov, Kirghiz SSR prosecutor, declared from the rostrum that none of the leaders of the republic or the city were prepared to enter into a dialogue on that day. This statement angered people, who then broke through the militia cordon and installed their leaders on the rostrum.

This was not the first rally held in recent days in Frunze. The demonstrations were organized by members of the "Ashar" informal association, which claims the role of a people's front.

If our demands are not met, one of the speakers declared, we will have no choice but to demand the resignation of the republic's top leaders.

On this occasion law enforcement forces managed to keep the situation under control. But what will happen tomorrow if the authorities continue to sidestep a frank discussion?

Association of Soviet Turks Formed in Frunze

LD0602192190 Frunze Domestic Service in Kirghiz 1300 GMT 27 Jan 90

[Text] An association of Soviet Turks has been established in Frunze. The Turks, who came from all rayons of Kirghizia, confirmed the association's regulations and program. A president and vice president were elected. Now the association will satisfy the demands of citizens of Turkic nationality in all organizations. At the conference, (Massut Riza), president of the association, was nominated as a candidate for a people's deputy from the Kirghiz SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], from people of the Turkic nationality.

Further Developments in Dushanbe Reported 23 Feb

'Rumors' of Withdrawal Denied

LD2302200890 Dushanbe Domestic Service in Tajik 1700 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] Disturbing reports reaching the press center and newspaper offices speak of rumors alleging that troops who enforce order are going to be withdrawn from the city on Monday. Is this true, we asked Navdzhavanov, military commander of the city. There is no basis for such thinking. The issue of troops withdrawal has not been generally discussed, the commander replied.

Situation 'Remains Unstable'

LD2302163190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1531 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] Dushanbe, 23 Feb (TASS)—The Tajik capital continues to live under the state of emergency declared after the extremist pogroms on 12-13 February. The temporary press center of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in Tajikistan reports that the situation remains unstable. Attempts have been made by certain forces to wreck the elections to the republican parliament planned for Sunday.

Last night the duty patrol detained seven private vehicles with no numberplates. Attempts to smuggle drugs into the city are becoming more frequent. While inspecting motor traffic during the curfew, the law and order bodies discovered in the trunks of two private vehicles 470 packets of medicine containing narcotics, six sets of syringes, and two explosive devices. Investigations will show for whom they were intended. The law enforcement bodies have confiscated 58 firearms from citizens. According to the competent bodies, some of the inhabitants still possess weapons, including explosives and incendiary bottles. Another resident of Dushanbe has been arrested on suspicion of involvement in the crimes committed by extremists on 12-13 February. A total of 21 people have been charged with committing pogroms, arson, and assassination attempts.

Reason Prevailing

PM2302162790 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 23 Feb 90 p 3

[TADZHIKTA-TASS report: "Reason Prevails"]

[Text] Dushanbe, 21 Feb—A report from the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs' temporary press center in Tajikistan inspires a certain amount of hope. Not a single interethnic clash has been reported in the past 24 hours. The night watch of the self-defense detachments—created to ensure the safety of the inhabitants of the microrayons and to protect workers' and students' hostels during the tragic days of 12-13 February—went by peacefully. The streets of the Tajik capital, until recently empty, are becoming their normal lively self. Almost 95 percent of industrial enterprises and practically all stores and communications departments were back at work.

Everything makes it clear that reason is beginning to prevail over emotion. This is attested to by the fact that the republic leadership, the Muslim clergy, and the healthy forces of the informal movements apparently managed to persuade the aggressively inclined section of young people not to hold the unsanctioned rally scheduled for midday today. K. Makhkamov, first secretary of the republic Communist Party Central Committee, has appealed to the population to resolve socioeconomic and other problems by means of political dialogue and not by pogroms and nationalist outbursts. His speech is published in the republic newspapers.

Situation 'Inspiring Some Hope'

LD2302130490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0430 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] The situation in Dushanbe is inspiring some hope. The streets of the Tajik capital, which recently were still deserted, are gradually reviving. The city's residents are starting to think that it is necessary to resolve the situation—a situation, I must say, which is not easy and which somewhere is a crisis situation—by means of a peaceful dialogue.

Our special correspondents Leonid Lazarevich and Mudzhafar Madzhidov report on the situation in Dushanbe.

[Begin recording] [Lazarevich] A state of emergency and a fairly harsh curfew are in force. Without special passes people are not permitted to appear in the streets from 2200 until 0600.

On the streets there are armored troop carriers and soldiers with submachine guns and bulletproof vests. Motor vehicle inspectorate staff members are checking motor vehicles.

At the samne time, at first glance the city appears ordinary, completley normal. Enterprises and shops are operating. Perhaps there are fewer passers-by than usual.

[Madzhidov] The greater part of the population has responded to the request by the investigative bodies and more and more new statements are appearing on crimes committed previously. There are freshly detained and arrested people. Unfortunately, there are victims, who, because of fear, have only just decided to come out of their houses and to turn to medical institutions for help. We have interviewed Tajikistan's minister of health, Gunora Kamilovna Pulatova.

[Pulatova] Today, it can already be said unequivocally that the medical service of the city of Dushanbe has coped with such a difficult situation with honor. Literally from the first minutes of information coming in from ambulance staff, an operational headquarters was set up at the Health Ministry. The main load was taken on by first aid stations, but on the whole, all patients have been concentrated here in Republican Clinical Hospital No.3. For several days running, people did not leave the operating tables and their working places. Students from the sixth and fifth year of the medical institute joined. Students from medical colleges joined and on the whole work was carried out in full.

[Madzhidov] During the pogroms some 30 ambulances were smashed.

[Pulatova] This fact took place. Well, what we feel most sorry about is the loss of two reanimation vehicles [reanomobil], which were imported and had equipment installed in them. Well, the price of one reanimation vehicle is 43,000 [no currency denotation as heard]

[Lazarevich] Today, 97 people remain in hospital beds. Mixing with residents of Dushanbe, we understood that physical injuries are healing faster than mental ones. Restoring the atmosphere of goodheartedness and amity for which Tajikistan was famous until recently will be far more difficult. [end recording]

Dushanbe Casualties Noted

LD2302151190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1340 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Nina Merezhkova]

[Text] Dushanbe, 23 Feb (TASS)—"Out of 207 people hospitalized during the tragic days of 12-13 February in the capital of Soviet Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 97 are still in the hospital. The rest have been discharged. Help came too late to eight casualities," Gulnora Pulatova, the Republic's minister of health, told the TASS correspondent.

"The first injured began to arrive in the evening during the disturbances of 12 February," she recalled. "The flood of them increased with every hour. Events grew much more difficult the next day. The republican clinic, where the largest part of the casualties were brought, ran out of bandages, blood substitutes, and medicines. We could only deliver all that by motor vehicle guarded by a detachment of submachine-gunners: The crowd blockaded the clinic and did not allow transport through."

"The doctors and nurses did not leave their posts for several days and surgeons worked around the clock in the operating rooms. Aggressive persons who burst into the departments and threatened the clinic's patients and personnel complicated the work."

"Some extremists have been spreading rumors that Russian doctors are not giving assistance to injured Tajiks," Gulnora Pulatova continued. "That is a lie. People of 32 nationalities—Tajiks, Uzbeks, Russians, Germans, Jews—work in Dushanbe's medical institutions. Not one of them has thought for one minute about the nationality of the person to whom he is lending assistance."

Situation in Dushanbe Updated

LD2302102990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] About the situation in Dushanbe. Over the past 24 hours the situation in the Tajik capital has not changed. The city has been functioning normally. No violations of the law on interethnic grounds have been registered. Over the past 24 hours, the employees of the internal affairs bodies have confiscated 58 hunting weapons, two thunder flashes, and 470 packets of drugs containing medicinal substances. One person has been arrested for taking part in mass disturbances. Eighty-nine people have been detained for curfew violations. The situation is under control. You have been listening to a report by the Press Center of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Afghan Mujahidin Readiness To Aid Tajiks Denied

LD2102123190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1117 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] Dushanbe, 14 Feb (TAJIKTA-TASS]—Major General Anatoliy Martovitskiy, deputy chief of the troops of the Central Asian border district, has refuted rumors about armed groups of Mujahidin crossing the Soviet-Afghan border. He told a TASS correspondent that recently, there has not been a single incident of the border having been crossed by separate individuals, not to mention armed groups.

"The sadly well-known events that took place in the capital of Tajikistan on 12-13 February naturally changed the situation at the border too", Martovitskiy noted. "The contingent of troop units has been strengthened, and the vigilance of soldiers and officers has been increased. We presume that extremists taking part in arson attacks and pogroms may try to escape just retribution. Our task is not to permit this".

The question of the correspondent as to whether it is true that armed groupings of Mujahidin, ready to come to the aid of Tajik extremists, are gathering at certain sections of the Soviet-Afghan border, also met with a negative reply.

"At our outposts, there is constant observation of the movements of Afghan opposition groups along the border. Apart from this, we maintain constant communications with Afghan border troops and can say with complete confidence that this report bears no relation to reality", the major-general stated.